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ABSTRACT 
 
Illiberal Integrationism: Assimilation, Orientalism, and Constitutional Patriotism in the 
Federal Republic of Germany 
 
by 
 
Joseph Loe-Sterphone III 
  
In March of 2016, German right-wing nationalist-populist political party Alternative für 
Deutschland took the second and third largest seat shares across three state-level elections. 
These electoral successes, in combination with the rise of anti-immigrant groups such as 
PEGIDA, have prompted a renewal of public discussion about what constitutes Germanness 
and who can really be German. This thesis engages with these two questions formulated 
thusly: (1) what does it mean to be a German national, and (2) to what extent do German 
citizenship and naturalization policies promote national exclusion? Drawing on the literature 
on nation and citizenship, this thesis takes a comparative historical approach to 
understanding German national exclusion by examining changes to the German national over 
time as well as taking a cross-sectional approach to contemporary legal developments. The 
first section draws on citizenship law in combination with popular debates over the content of 
the German national in order to construct an understanding of what it means to be German 
and how citizenship law produced and maintained legal boundaries around the national 
community. Further data includes analysis of the content of the citizenship test, which was 
introduced in 2007, and workbooks used in integration courses, introduced in 2004, both of 
which contribute to understanding how Ausländer are expected to “integrate.” The consensus 
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understanding of the German nation and nationalism is currently that Germany is a nation-
state that established itself through ethnic nationalism that has been shifting more towards 
civic nationalism. Ultimately, this study finds support, however, for the presence of 
longstanding barriers to citizenship predicated on being culturally national. Most notably, 
this study finds that what it means to be national is now cast in terms of Western liberal-
democratic norms, which allows for and encourages essentialist distinctions between 
Occident and Orient.  
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Introduction 
German Citizens and German Nationals 
 
On March 13, 2016, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) [Alternative for Germany], a right-
wing populist political party founded in 2012 under the name Wahlalternative 2013 
[Electoral Alternative 2013], surprised everyone by receiving the second largest share of 
votes in the state election for Saxony-Anhalt, and the third largest share in both Baden-
Württemburg and Rheinland-Palatinate. Certainly, this level of success from such a new 
political party is surprising, but what has concerned news outlets, establishment politicians, 
and onlookers is the slate of policies supported by AfD: they are a Eurosceptic, populist 
political party with a distinct anti-immigrant and anti-Islamic agenda.  
 As a party, AfD opposes Germany’s continued participation in the European Union. 
For example, Armin Paul Hampel, who is the director of AfD’s branch in Lower Saxony and 
was one of the party’s candidates in the last European Parliament election, has opposed 
immigration within Europe, claiming that “other parties want immigration only so that they 
can incorporate Germans into a large European slurry.”1 Furthermore, many have attributed 
this recent electoral success to popular backlash against Merkel’s acceptance of substantial 
numbers of Syrian refugees over the past year. In fact, it seems that AfD’s open and verbose 
antipathy towards Muslims and immigrants has helped them gain support. For example, 
                                                     
1 “Andere Parteien wollen Zuwanderung nur, damit die Deutschen in einem großen europäischen Brei 
aufgehen.” Hampel’s quote here is expressing a common AfD view that Germany is losing more of its character 
the more it integrates into Europe and acts as a part of Europe. Like many right-wing populist parties and 
movements, AfD politicians frequently claim that Germany is under attack, its character is being lost, and the 
German nation will disappear if things continue as they are going. Matthias Zahn, “Die AfD und die 
rechtspopulistichen Töne,” Tagesschau, 
http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/politikimradio/audio119582.html. 
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Beatrix von Storch, a member of the European Parliament for AfD, has said that the “greatest 
threat for democracy and freedom today comes from political Islam” and that Islam is a 
“political ideology incompatible with the Basic Law.”2 In similar comments, the director of 
AfD in Brandenburg, Alexander Gauland, argued that “Islam is not a religion like 
Catholicism or Protestantism, but is instead always associated with the takeover of the state. 
As a result, the Islamization of Germany is a danger.”3 
 AfD’s slogan, “Mut zur Wahrheit” [the courage to tell it like it is], is particularly 
salient in Germany, where certain types of talk and the expression of Nazi ideology are not 
only taboo, but sometimes illegal.4 Indeed, many were particularly compelled by AfD 
politicians’ willingness to “call things by their name” [endlich einmal beim Namen nennen] 
and to “shoot straight” [die Meinung geigen].5 The success of right-wing populist political 
parties is not limited to Germany or this particular election. Indeed, Austria’s Freedom Party, 
Greece’s Golden Dawn, France’s National Front, the United States’ Tea Party and its 
spiritual successor in Donald Trump’s faction of the Republican Party, Denmark’s Danish 
People’s Party, Lega Nord in Italy, the Swiss People’s Party, and the Sweden Democrats are 
all receiving substantial popular and electoral support. Therefore, it would be more accurate 
to say that in all of “the West” open support for xenophobic and exclusionary policies and 
parties is again in vogue. In each case, support for these parties tends to hinge on narratives 
of cultural infiltration, immigrants and refugees who cannot or will not integrate, and liberal 
                                                     
2 “Die größte Bedrohung für Demokratie und Freiheit geht heute vom politischen Islam aus,” and “Der Islam ist 
an sich eine politische Ideologie, die mit dem Grundgesetz nicht vereinbar ist.” “Von Storch: ‘Islam ist nicht 
mit Grundgesetz vereinbar,’” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, May 13, 2016, 
http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/von-storch-islam-nicht-mit-grundgesetz-vereinbar-14182472.html. 
3 “Der Islam ist keine Religion wie das katholische oder protestantische Christentum, sondern intellektuell 
immer mit der Übernahme des Staates verbunden. Deswegen ist die Islamisierung Deutschlands eine Gefahr.” 
“Von Storch: ‘Islam ist nicht mit Grundgesetz vereinbar,’” 
4 See Strafgesetzbuch §86. 
5 Robert Pausch, “Partei der radikalisierten Mitte,” Die Zeit, March 14, 2016, 
http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2016-03/afd-analyse-erfolg-landtagswahlen-partei-waehler.    
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societies protecting themselves from “illiberal people.”6 These arguments about essentially 
different peoples, often from the Near East, and the need to defend the nation from them are 
not new, and find their roots deep in the Western tradition of Orientalism. In fact, that same 
tradition is very much alive today not only in the explicit xenophobia of right-wing populist 
movements, but also in the “centrist” (right and left) politics of Christian Democrats and 
Social Democrats across Europe. 
 Indeed, it is not only AfD politicians and their compatriots in the National Front and 
the Sweden Democrats, for example, who oppose Turkey’s membership in the European 
Union. Opposition to Turkish accession has been widespread and consistent. Perfectly 
“liberal” politicians – such as former French Prime Minister Jean Pierre Raffarin and former 
French President Nicolas Sarkozy – and newspapers have regarded the topic of Turkish 
accession to the EU as untenable because Turkey and Islam are incompatible with European 
values.7 The incompatibility between Europe, or “the West” more broadly, and Islam is a 
well-trodden topic of conversation outside of extreme right-wing politics. Indeed, debates 
about whether or not Muslim immigrants can or will integrate into German society are 
commonplace. In fact, the founding of the German anti-Islam group PEGIDA (Patriotic 
Europeans against the Islamization of the West),8 the Charlie Hebdo shooting and Paris 
attacks, and the European refugee crisis have all contributed to building anti-Islamic 
sentiment in Germany in 2014 and 2015. 
                                                     
6 Chistian Joppke,”How liberal are citizenship tests? A rejoinder,” (working paper, Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, 2010). http://eudo-citizenship.eu/commentaries/citizenship-
forum/citizenship-forum-cat/255-how-liberal-are-citizenship-tests?showall=&start=10 
7 Thomas Koenig, Sabina Mihelj, John Downey, and Mine Gencel Bek, “Media Framings of the Issue of 
Turkish Accession to the EU,” Innovation: The European Journal of Social Science Research, 19 (August 
2006). 
8 PEGIDA in German stands for Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes. It is worth 
noting that the German word “Abendland” can also be translated as Occident, although PEGIDA uses “the 
West.” 
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 Germany provides an excellent case study for analyzing nationality and exclusion, 
especially within the context of the European Union, for several reasons. First, Germany is 
one of the driving forces of EU policy, as a result of its status as the strongest economy in the 
Eurozone, its geographical location, and its commitment to active involvement in 
establishing EU policy programs. Second, as I argue below, German identity and politics 
after the Holocaust relied heavily on being European and integrating into “the West.” This is 
particularly important to note because prior to World War II, Germany was considered 
neither Western nor Eastern European. Instead, German scholars asserted that Germany had 
its own “special path” [Sonderweg] or development. 
 In addition to its geopolitical position, Germany’s current and historical domestic 
politics provide a unique and important set of concerns. Beginning with the establishment of 
a single German state in 1871, Germany has since had several different political systems, 
including a federal parliamentary monarchy, a federal republic, a fascist dictatorship, and a 
second federal republic. Each of these changes in systems of governance included a shift in 
the state’s relationship with national symbols and history as well as with nationalism. These 
varied from extreme devotion to the nation promoted through state-spread propaganda reliant 
on national symbols to extreme distancing from nationalism and state use of national 
symbols. In addition, Germany’s system of citizenship ascription followed both of the major 
ideal-typical models outlined by Rogers Brubaker in his Citizenship and Nationhood in 
France and Germany.9 Until 2000, Germany had been characterized as having a system of 
citizenship jus sanguinis [by blood]; this meant that citizenship was granted at birth only to 
                                                     
9 Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1992). 
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those of German descent.10 After major reforms went into effect in 2000, German citizenship 
law included instances of citizenship jus soli, or by birth on German soil. As a result, 
Germany provides a case for analysis of how exclusion can be formulated under both models 
in the same national context. Finally, Germans have been actively and publicly engaged with 
the national question since the eighteenth century. Indeed, questions of nation and 
nationalism have been at the front of German public discourse and an ever present concern 
from Johann Gottfried Herder’s call for the revitalization of German national art and culture 
in the late 18th Century and Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s Addresses to the German Nation in 
1808 to the Leitkultur [guiding culture] debates in 1999 and debates over the place for 
multiculturalism in Germany after 2010.11  
  All of these historical and political factors and concerns have led to the following 
questions: What does it mean to be “national” in Germany? What qualities, beliefs, and 
knowledge grant an individual membership in the national community? Has this changed 
over time, and if so, how? How has exclusion from the national community been framed and 
expressed in German public discourse? Do the boundaries of the national community 
correspond to the boundaries outlined by the state in citizenship law? Furthermore, how do 
state institutions and policies, specifically citizenship law and its accompanying institutions, 
articulate these boundaries and set expectations for immigrants? Does membership and 
involvement in the European Union have an impact on national identity and national 
exclusion? Do Orientalist narratives of essential differences and unbridgeable divides 
between East and West inform German national identity, both in the past and the present? 
                                                     
10 I explore what this means in more detail in Chapter 3. 
11 To quote Cynthia Miller-Idriss: “The trouble with Germans, Napoleon reportedly once remarked, is that they 
are always becoming, never being. Indeed, the German nation has been in an almost perpetual state of change.” 
Cynthia Miller-Idriss, Blood and Culture: Youth, Right-Wing Extremism, and National Belonging in 
Contemporary Germany (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009), 46. 
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And finally, if Orientalist narratives are present, how are these supranational narratives 
translated into national ones? 
 
Chapter Overview 
This thesis seeks to understand the relationship between institutional exclusion and nation in 
Germany between 1945 and 2015. More specifically, I aim to evaluate how exclusion is 
derived from and embedded in German national ideology through the language of 
Orientalism, understood as politics and culture. In pursuit of this objective, this thesis 
proceeds as follows.  
 Chapter One outlines and evaluates theoretical contributions to the study of nations, 
the national, and nationalism. The chapter argues that the national, the ideological content 
around which each community called nation is organized, is constantly negotiated and 
renegotiated by politicians, intellectuals, bureaucracies, and the public. It also argues that 
exclusion is both an inherent part of nation and its institutional expression.  
 In Chapter Two I discuss the methodological basis for this study. This includes an in-
depth discussion of the state of comparative historical research, as well as an outline of the 
research design and data-gathering processes undertaken in this study. Ultimately, I argue for 
the importance of longitudinal study of the German national and citizenship in order to better 
understand both the current hegemonic German national and how it is shaped and informed 
by previous iterations.  
 Chapter Three explores the development of institutional expressions of nationhood in 
Germany from 1870 to 1999. More specifically, it focuses on the importance of the language 
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of culture in the exclusion of non-nationals in a period typically understood as being 
dominated by the language of ethnicity. To that end, it examines changes in citizenship and 
naturalization law as informed by changes in common understandings of what makes 
someone “national” as expressed in public discourse and public debates. In looking at 130 
years of history together, it becomes apparent that systematic exclusion continues to be 
articulated through a language of culture in German public discourse, which is a tradition that 
precedes the Nazi period, even though the race-based language of exclusion has largely 
disappeared in the contemporary period. 
 Chapter Four examines how policy following the substantial reforms to citizenship 
law passed in 1999 established “integration” as the primary criteria for naturalization, as well 
as standards for what integration meant and should look like. To do so, I zoom in from the 
broad comparative historical view of the previous chapter to focus on two sets of texts that 
represent two contemporary institutions in German naturalization law: integration courses 
and the citizenship test. What emerges here are narratives of justifiable exclusion bound up in 
Germany’s placement within Europe and revisionist national historical accounts of Germany 
as having developed alongside Western Europe – essentially boiling down to a reworking of 
the Occidental-Oriental divide. 
 Finally, the Discussion and Conclusion discusses key trends and patterns in the 
language of the national and in institutional forms of exclusion. I summarize overarching 
arguments and narratives, while also addressing three key themes present in chapters Three 
and Four. Furthermore, it explores the role of Orientalism and Orientalist divisions between 
East and West in German national narratives over time. In doing so, it connects trends and 
commonalities from previous chapters, bridging the jus sanguinis and jus soli citizenship 
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regimes in Germany, and argues that national exclusion is still very much a central part of 
German citizenship law and nationhood. 
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Chapter I 
On the Production and Reproduction of National Meaning 
 
At a conference at the Sorbonne in 1882, Ernest Renan famously rejected common ethnic 
and linguistic definitions of the nation, instead proposing the nation to be a “daily plebiscite” 
that “presupposes a past but is reiterated in the present by a tangible fact: consent.”1 Indeed, 
Renan found the idea of a natural basis for the nation insufficient. Specifically, he asserted 
that ethnic and racial ties were recent fabrications, allegiances and sentiments cannot be 
derived from language, and the geography that bounds a national community often changes 
over time. As a result, Renan found each of these insufficient as a definition for the nation. 
He instead posited the nation as a community of will, predicated on living a solidarity built 
on the back of shared suffering, sacrifices made, and a willingness to make them once more. 
 Importantly, Renan maintained a separation between the nation and the state that was 
lacking in many later theories. For example, building on Renan’s understanding of the nation 
as “a soul, a spiritual principle,”2 Max Weber described the nation as a “community of 
sentiment” that would normally produce its own state.3 This definitional linkage between the 
nation and the state became the standard, so much so that it was often an unstated underlying 
assumption in discussions of nation or nationalism.4 Some, such as Eric Hobsbawm or 
                                                     
1 Ernest Renan, “What is a Nation?” in Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?, trans. Ethan Rundell (Paris: Presses-Pocket, 
1992).  
2 Ibid 
3 Max Weber, Hans Heinrich Gerth, and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1946), 176. 
4 For more on this argument, see: Ulrich Beck, What is Globalization? (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000); Rogers 
Brubaker, “In the Name of the Nation: Reflections on Nationalism and Patriotism,” Citizenship Studies 8 (June 
2004); Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, “Methodological nationalism and beyond: nation-state 
building, migration, and the social sciences,” Global Networks 2 (October 2002).  
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Rogers Brubaker, reversed the direction of the process and considered nations and 
nationalisms to be possible only through the state.  Specifically, Eric Hobsbawm asserted that 
the nation “belongs exclusively to a particular, and historically recent period” and “is a social 
entity only insofar as it relates to a certain kind of modern territorial state.”5 Furthermore, he 
argued that these things we call nations and nationalisms are only worth discussing insofar as 
we discuss their relation to the state specifically because they cannot be disentangled. In spite 
of the reversal of the direction of the relationship between the two, such theories of nation 
and state still maintain an inseparable bond between the two. 
 Similar to the interconnectedness of the nation and state, there is a tendency to 
conflate the nation and nationalism such that they are difficult to separate. The bulk of the 
literature on nations characterizes them as always either subsumed by, in the throes of, or the 
direct result of nationalism. Those who regard nationalism purely as a discursive formulation 
often run this risk. Craig Calhoun asserted that nationalism produces nations, which are 
“particular way(s) of thinking about what it means to be a people.”6 Similarly, Ernest Gellner 
asserted that nationalism “invents nations where they do not exist,” making nationalism the 
determining process and, therefore, the object of study.7 Consider, also, Rogers Brubaker’s 
definition of the nation as a political claim on a group of people.8 He rejected the idea of the 
nation as a meaningful community and replaced it with the political discourse around the 
nation. In attempting to break down the nation as an analytical tool and category, Brubaker 
replaced the nation with nationalism and examined practices of nationalist political discourse.  
 This conflation of terms is not uncommon. Indeed, the nation is frequently replaced 
                                                     
5 Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 1990); Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Publisher Limited, 
1983), 9. 
6 Craig Calhoun. Nationalism (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997), 99.  
7 Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 168. 
8 Brubaker, “In the Name of the Nation.”  
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by nationalism, or, at the least, explained as the result of nationalism, after which point 
nationalism becomes the object of study.9 Studies that treat the nation as its object are few 
and far between, and, more often than not, they are either histories of particular nations or 
studies of nationalism masquerading under a different name. Similarly, some, such as Walker 
Connor, have argued that identification with the state is frequently mistaken for identification 
with a nation for the same reasons that multinational states are often misidentified as nation-
states.10 Ultimately, as Connor argued, there is a great deal of confusion and debate within 
the academic community as to what nations, nationalism, and states are, where one begins 
and the other ends, and the degree to which these concepts are actually bound to one another 
in practice as opposed to in theory. Any study that considers one of these concepts its object 
must carefully theorize each of them. 
 The state, like the nation, has been subject to a great deal of terminological confusion. 
In addition to its conflation with the nation, the state is also frequently mistaken for 
“government” or “territory.” Governments, however, are only a form of authorized agency 
granted legitimacy by a particular social relationship called “the state.” The lifespan of any 
given state could be measured by the governments that have served its interests. That is, 
governments and states are not identical; while governments and regimes change, the state 
and its apparatuses remain the same. Modern rational bureaucratic governments are only 
manifestations of a particular (and dominant) type of state apparatus.11  
 Here, Weber’s definition of the state as “a human community that (successfully) 
                                                     
9 See, for example, Etienne Balibar, “Is There a Neo-Racism,” in Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, ed. 
Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein (Brooklyn: Verso, 1991); Gellner, Nations and Nationalism; 
Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780. 
10 Walker Connor, Ethnonationalism: The Quest for Understanding (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1994). 
11 Edward Heath Robinson, “The Distinction Between State and Government,” The Geography Compass, 7 
(August 2013). 
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claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” is 
particularly helpful.12 His definition casts the state as: (1) a social relationship of domination 
that (2) relies on legitimacy and, therefore, cooperation and (3) is tied to a given territory.13 
The pairing of state and nation that we have witnessed is a particular means by which to 
grant the state legitimacy. Myths of historic territory, which are important for national 
imaginaries and which I will discuss in more detail below, tie the state to the territory it 
administers through a relationship of legitimacy granted through a claim on the nation. For 
this reason, states seek out nations as a particular route through which to grant their 
domination legitimacy.14 At the same time, nations seek access to state apparatuses so as to 
better administer their boundaries and control which bodies may and may not enter the 
national community. State apparatuses can include administrative bureaucratic structures, 
legal systems, military organizations, education systems, etc. As a result, states and state 
apparatuses are often involved in producing nationals, nationalizing foreigners, and policing 
the boundaries of the national.  
 That said, the processes by which modern national symbols are created and nationals 
are reproduced needs to be elaborated. Studies of nation and nationalism have been deeply 
and primarily concerned with the genesis of nations.15 While this is certainly an important 
                                                     
12 Weber, Gerth, and Mills, From Max Weber, 78. 
13 It is worth noting that the relationship between the state and its territory is one of administration. National 
myths, such as Manifest Destiny, may describe the nation as being destined to overtake a greater territory than it 
possess, or may attribute to the nation a greater territory than the state administers, as had been the case for 
Germany from inception to reunification. National aspirations for territorial gain often inform state policy or, at 
the very least, share its goals of expansion. 
14 Weber famously described the nation as a community in search of a state. I would argue that both statements 
are true. States seek to establish and maintain their legitimacy through attachment to a nation, while nations 
seek states in order to administer the territory they inhabit. The relationship is symbiotic.  
15 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New 
York: Verso, 1983); Connor, Ethnonationalism; Gellner, Nations and Nationalism; Liah Greenfeld, 
Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); Liah Greenfeld, The 
Spirit of Capitalism: Nationalism and Economic Growth (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); 
Atsuko Ichijo and Gordana Uzelac, When is the Nation? Towards an Understanding of Theories of Nationalism 
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topic on which we have not yet reached consensus, we are losing sight of how nations 
operate in the modern era. Transnational citizenship, globalization, and cosmopolitanism are 
all used to back up the argument that the nation-state is dying, if not already dead, and that 
identification with a nation is greatly diminished as well. In order to combat these assertions 
– if, indeed, combat is merited – we need to develop a new understanding of how nations 
function in the neoliberal era. Such a project necessitates an untangling of the concepts 
addressed above, as well as a theory of reproduction that explains how the nation becomes 
ingrained enough to survive at the micro-level. Below, I will engage with existing literature 
on the nation and nationalism with the goal of establishing a theory of nation and nationalism 
that describes modern iterations of these phenomena. After that, I will construct a theory of 
the reproduction of nationals through interaction with other individuals and state apparatuses. 
From this can come a theory that enables study of nationalism at the micro level, which is 
sorely lacking, based on understandings of the symbols and meanings produced and 
disseminated by the state and its controlling elites.  
 
Nation - modernity and imagination 
In the face of substantially different definitions of the nation and a tendency to lose sight of 
the nation in the midst of nationalism and the state, it seems necessary to approach the 
concept cautiously and meticulously. Is the nation a political claim on a people’s allegiance, 
a means of understanding the world, or a legitimate community? Are nations modern 
creations, continuations of earlier forms of kinship, or have they always existed? Does the 
nation come into being and exist from below, or is it created and maintained by and through 
                                                                                                                                                                    
(New York: Routledge, 2005). 
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elite action? Each of these questions addresses a point on which the scholarly debate around 
the nation has hinged.  
 Defining the nation is a difficult task. Umut Özkirimli, echoing Brubaker, hesitated to 
define the nation so as not to fall into the social scientific habit of reifying social categories 
of practice.16 This concern over treating social constructs as real analytical categories is not 
unfounded. Too often social scientists have mirrored or approximated the nationalist 
narrative of nations as eternal or existing outside of narratives and myths.17 However, to 
abandon the reality of nations is to risk throwing the baby out with the bathwater. There is 
room for a concrete definition of the nation that does not reify the category or regard it as 
existing outside of the social. Unfortunately, formulating such a definition requires a 
piecemeal approach. Neither objective nor subjective criteria can be the sole basis for a 
constructive and exhaustive definition of the nation. For every set of objective criteria posited 
by a theorist there is at least one exception. Even within the subset of cases that meet a given 
set of criteria, said criteria might not be valued as “national” by the people that make up a 
given nation. Similarly, defining the nation solely in terms of subjective criteria, such as 
solidarity, loyalty, internal and external recognition, etc., makes it difficult to differentiate 
nations from other forms of identity or community, including religious groups, sports clubs, 
or political parties. If not a list of criteria, then a discussion of the shared characteristics of 
nations is a means by which to develop a definition of the nation. 
                                                     
16 For more on this, see Brubaker, “In the Name of the Nation;” Umut Özkirimli, Theories of Nationalism: A 
Critical Introduction (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2010). 
17 For examples of theoretical reification of nations and national categories, see Hall’s summary of Gellner’s 
criticism of Miroslav Hroch in John A. Hall, “Introduction,” in The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and the 
Theory of Nationalism, ed. John A. Hall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). See also, John 
Armstrong, Nations before Nationalism (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1982); John 
Hutchinson, “In Defence of Transhistorical Ethno-Symbolism: A Reply to My Critics,” Nations and 
Nationalism, 14 (January 2008); Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986). 
See also Andreas Wimmer’s critique of Hutchinson’s ethno-symbolist approach in: Andreas Wimmer, “How to 
Modernise Ethno-Symbolism,” Nations and Nationalism, 14 (January 2008). 
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 Concern over reifying the nation is not unfounded. There is a very thin line between 
recognizing that people hold national identities or understand themselves as situated in a 
national community and treating nations as things that exist outside of politics, relations, or 
experience. Certainly, nations are not the immutable and eternal communities of fate that the 
nationalist discourse would have us believe.18 Instead, they are communities maintained 
through their very perception of community and the production of community-effects. That 
is, nations are communities only insofar as they are believed and understood to be 
communities by their members; they are, however, communities nonetheless. On the other 
hand, internal identification is not a sufficient condition for nationhood, for if solidarity and 
self-awareness are sufficient for constituting a nation, then a barbershop quartet could be a 
nation just the same as the Catalan.19 Any scholar, nationalist, or state official would attest 
that nations are qualitatively different from other forms of social organization, and if they are 
to be so, then there must be more to them than simply community-effects. 
 What characteristics, then, differentiate nations from other forms of collective 
identity? Some have suggested that it ought to be objective characteristics, such as shared 
language, race, ethnicity, or territory.20 Renan addressed and dismissed each of these traits in 
his 1882 address; since then, others have continued to refute these qualities. For example, 
one can learn German without becoming German in much the same way that one can live in 
                                                     
18 For discussions of the naturalistic myth, see: Patrick J. Geary, The Myth of Nations, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2002); Gellner, Nations and Nationalism. 
19 See Anderson, Imagined Communities. Anderson notes that nations are imagined communities specifically 
because they are comprised of individuals who will likely never meet or encounter one another, but consider 
themselves to share membership in the same community. In fact, Anderson suggests that all communities which 
expand beyond immediate face-to-face interaction must be considered imagined. This does not, however, make 
them “false” communities, which would imply that there are “real” communities. Instead, it is the process of 
imagining that is interesting and which differentiates one imagined community from the next.  
20See, among others, Hutchinson “In Defence of Transhistorical Ethno-symbolism”; John Hutchinson and 
Anthony D. Smith, Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); Smith, Ethnic Origins; Anthony D. 
Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin, 1991). 
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France without being or becoming French. Similarly, there are ethnic groups and self-
identified nations that cross territorial boundaries – consider Russians in Georgia, Belarus, 
Ukraine, and other post-Soviet states; Basques in France and Spain; Macedonians in Greece, 
Bulgaria, Albania, and Serbia; or the Kurds who span Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran – as well 
as territorial states that are home to multiple ethnic groups – the Igbo, Hausa-Fulani, and 
Yoruba in Nigeria; the Scots, Welsh, Irish, and English in the United Kingdom; or the 
Catalan, Castilians, Basque, and Valencians in Spain. To borrow from Walker Connor: “How 
much simpler it would be if adopting the Polish language, living within Poland, and adhering 
to Catholicism were sufficient to define membership in the Polish nation.”21  
 Nevertheless, objective criteria may be points of organization in some nations. In 
such cases, however, it is not the presence of these objective criteria but their perceived 
presence around which people are organizing.  Myths of ethnic or cultural homogeneity, 
rather than objective and measurable homogeneity, are the central points of organization for 
nations. Otto von Bismarck called on Germans to “think with [their] blood” when urging 
them to unite into a single state;22 Benito Mussolini emphasized the existence of racial 
difference between Italians and other Europeans;23 and Maximilien Robespierre remarked 
that based on their anti-monarchist republicanism alone, one might regard the French as 
another species altogether.24 These claims of homogeneity, however, were claims to fictive or 
recent homogeneities. Bismarck’s appeal was made to Germans from thirty sovereign states 
regarding the unification of territory home to Prussians, Germans, Poles, Czechs, and Slavs. 
Mussolini’s Italy had, until 1870, been a group of disjointed states so culturally distinct as to 
                                                     
21 Connor, Ethnonationalism, 197. 
22Ibid. 198. 
23 For more on appeals to fictive homogeneity, see Chapters 5 and 8 in Connor, Ethnonationalism 
24 Lynn Hunt, Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1984), 100. 
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prompt Antonio Gramsci’s famous musings on the lack of an Italian national-popular 
culture.25 In the same way, France’s revolutionary party emphasized the importance of these 
shared republican ideals in the face of very real regional sectarianism. Nonetheless, appeals 
of this sort are often oriented towards creating or drawing on false memories of a mutually 
shared past or towards a mythic present which begins a new era.  
 There are some who argue, however, that nations and national identities have 
premodern origins. Liah Greenfield and Miroslav Hroch, for example, each placed the 
origins of nations in the Middle Ages. For Greenfeld, rather than being a condition of 
modernity, nations caused it,26 while for Hroch, it took centuries for the processes through 
which the objective and relational bases for nations to unfold.27 On the other hand, Anthony 
Smith and John Hutchinson emphasized the value and durability of pre-modern ethnic and 
cultural ties.28 Smith, in particular, argued there were nations in the classical and medieval 
periods, including the Hellenistic Greeks and 5th Century Armenians. In addition to seeing 
nations in pre-modern eras, Smith argued that shared memories and myths, as well as 
inhabiting an historic territory, are objective criteria for identifying nations. These criteria 
constituted an essence derived from pre-modern ethnic ties upon which modern nations are 
built or from which they were derived.  
 Arguments focusing on la longue durée have their share of criticisms. Eugen Weber’s 
                                                     
25See sections VI and IX in Antonio Gramsci, Selections from Cultural Writings, ed. David Forgacs and 
Geoffrey Nowell-Smith (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2012). See also Massimo d’Azeglio’s famous statement: 
“We have made Italy, now we have to make Italians” quoted in Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism.  
26 Greenfeld, Nationalism: Greenfeld, Spirit of Capitalism.  
27 See Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the 
Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among Smaller European Nations (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1985); Miroslav Hroch, “Real and Constructed: the nature of the nation,” in The State of the Nation: 
Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism, ed. John A. Hall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998). 
28 See Hutchinson, “In Defence of Transhistoical Ethno-symbolism”; Hutchinson and Smith, Nationalism; 
Smith, Ethnic Origins; Smith, National Identity 
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empirical study of the development of French national identity is credited with providing 
strong evidence for the recency of nations. In it he showed that during 1870s and as late as 
the First World War, most French citizens living in isolated, rural villages did not identify 
themselves as Frenchmen. In fact, Frenchmen did not really begin to exist outside of urban 
centers until after the First World War.29 Others, including John Breuilly, Craig Calhoun, and 
Geoff Eley and Ronald Suny have argued against Smith’s conception of nations as 
contingent upon pre-modern ethnies in various ways, either by emphasizing the recency of 
widespread nationally-based identity or by providing examples of nations without ethnic 
bases and ethnic groups that did not become nations. One of Connor’s critiques of Smith’s 
argument that the only real nations are ethnic nations is particularly salient here: Connor 
contended that where Smith saw objective criteria, he ought to have been seeing fictions that 
are perceived as real.30 It is not that a people has a real and essential connection to a historical 
territory, but that they believe themselves to. This relates to substantial and compelling 
research that supports the thesis that nations draw on pre-modern ties to create and recreate 
historical fictions or fictions of homogeneity. Consider, for example, that Mussolini’s designs 
for public architecture in Rome during the 1930s and 1940s relied heavily on architectural 
styles that recalled Roman facades and columns so as to reinforce the myth of fascist Italy as 
the inheritor of the Roman Empire’s legacy.31 Nations may be inventions or fictions, but they 
must have a basis in something. These fictions, argued Gellner, must come from some sort of 
                                                     
29 Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1976). 
30 Connor, Ethnonationalism, 197 
31 John Agnew, “The Impossible Capital: Monumental Rome under Liberal and Fascist Regimes, 1870-1943,” 
Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Human Geography, 80 (December 1998); Dianne Yvonne Ghirardo, “Italian 
Architects and Fascist Politics: An Evaluation of the Rationalist’s Role in Regime Building,” Journal of the 
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“pre-existing differentiating marks... even if... these are purely negative.”32  
 This debate around the origins of nations sheds light on two important characteristics 
of nations. The first of these is the importance of memory in creating and sustaining of 
nations. Historical error, as Renan pointed out, is fundamental to nation-building. Forgetting 
and misremembering are key, particularly to the homogenizing processes that produced and 
continue to produce nations.33 However, recognizing nations as modern constructs does not 
negate the importance of shared myths, memories, or notions of an historic territory. Instead, 
it regards these not as components of an immutable essence, but rather as fictions around 
which members of a community organize and through which they understand the landscape 
of their social world and their position within it.  
 Second, if we consider nations to be communities organized around fictive memories 
and homogeneity, then we must consider nations always to be works-in-progress. Who can 
be included in the national community might change across decades or centuries in much the 
same way that the myths, symbols, and traditions that those included deem salient will 
change across time. The perceived fixity of the nation is a shared illusion. Part of the 
historical error that is fundamental to the nation is a misremembering or ignorance of the 
changes made to the content around which the community organizes. Most Americans easily 
forget or are unaware, for example, that “under God” was only added to the Pledge of 
                                                     
32 Gellner, Thought, 168. 
33 See Anderson, Imagined Communities. Here, Anderson noted the importance of print capitalism in the 
development of national consciousness from above. The existence of a single “national” language enabled 
communication on a field below Latin but above local and regional vernaculars, a fixity which created the 
illusion of antiquity, and a centralizing tendency not present in previous languages-of-power. Each of these 
factors enabled the mass imagining of a community of individuals speaking and reading the same language 
despite never coming face-to-face.   
 See also, Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, and Gellner, Nationalism. Similar to Anderson, Gellner 
argued that the existence of high culture is a defining characteristic of nations, which could only emerge in the 
modern industrial era. Specifically, high cultures enable standardized communication through an intolerance of 
local, context-dependent communication and exchange. The emergence of a standardizing high culture which 
pervades (is imposed upon) “entire populations and not just elite minorities” is the condition through which 
agro-literate societies become part of larger nations. 
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Allegiance in 1954, while the pledge itself had only been formally adopted twelve years 
prior.  
 This discussion leads us to a definition of the nation that differentiates it from other 
forms of imagined community. We can understand nations as communities of people who 
share a perception of their internal homogeneity, are internally and externally recognizable, 
and share myths of history and territory, symbols, traditions, and fictions. Certainly elements 
of this definition still pertain to other communities; internal and external recognition, for 
example, which still applies just as well to fans of a football club, remains insufficient. 
Similarly, objective criteria such as shared language, shared ethnicity, or shared territory are 
revealed for what they are - fictions grounded in shared perception. The question is not 
whether the objective criteria are present or not, but if members, at some intuitive and 
subconscious level, “know” them to be present.34 Shifting the question in this way prevents 
the reification of nations and treats them, instead, as a social relationship that must be 
carefully maintained, as well as produced and reproduced. In addition, by regarding the 
nation as a social relationship organized around myths, symbols, traditions, etc., it becomes 
possible to focus on the processes through which they are created, adjusted, and 
institutionalized, as well as the ways in which different groups fight over which meanings 
dominate. 
 
National - politics and representation 
National characteristics and meanings are not static. Myths, symbols, and meanings must 
change over time in order for the nation to remain compelling as an imagined community. As 
                                                     
34 Connor, Ethnonationalism, 215. 
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technology broadened our capacity for connecting with people from different regions and 
cultures while simultaneously working to homogenize culture, knowledge, and ideologies, 
how could 19th century conceptions of national communities remained salient? New symbols, 
traditions, and readings of history were and are regularly produced to fortify national 
identification and perpetuate the nation as a lens through which to understand the world and 
our position in it. How, then, is the national – those meanings, symbols, myths, etc. around 
which people are organizing to form a nation – changed and how are these changes spread 
and accepted? 
 Theories of nation and nationalism have taken a primarily top-down perspective. This 
seems counterintuitive if nations are, in part, communities of people holding similar 
understandings of their social world as well as of how this connects them to other people 
with the same understanding. Along this line, Connor argued that nationalism is an entirely 
mass phenomenon, rather than an elite one; interest in nations and nationalism, he argued, 
stems from the fervency and intensity it engenders not in small bands of elites, but in an 
entire population. Studying only the written word, then, to answer questions about the 
genesis of nations only offers insights into the feelings and allegiances of elites and literati, 
telling us nothing about the sentiments of the masses.35 Hobsbawm raised similar concerns, 
noting that the emergence of writers, philosophers, and politicians musing on the existence of 
some eternal community, while not meaningless, cannot be sufficient evidence for the 
existence of such a community. Indeed, neither official ideologies nor cultural artifacts 
provide a perfect road map to the sentiments of even the most nationalistic member.36 
Similarly, it is not necessarily the case that meaning and symbols transfer directly from elites 
                                                     
35 Walker Connor, “The Timelessness of Nations,” in History and National Destiny: Ethnosymbolism and its 
Critics, ed. Montserrat Guibernau and John Hutchinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004). 
36 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, 11. 
  
22 
 
to masses. For example, the use of Hercules as a representative of the French people during 
the Revolution was meant to act as a subversion of his use as a representation of French 
monarchs, a practice that dated back to the reign of Francis I. However, this subversion was 
evident only to the educated and literate. Instead, Hercules was, to the masses, nothing more 
than a symbol of the strength, courage, and masculinity of the peasant.37  
 However, Hobsbawm’s concern for pragmatism is not the only compelling reason for 
research on the national to take a top-down approach. Elites, particularly the intelligentsia 
and those with access to or control of state apparatuses and the media, have the greatest 
capability for institutionalizing and naturalizing meaning.38 Any popular understanding of 
fascist Italy as a continuation of the Roman Empire emerged and was disseminated through 
state sponsorship of rationalist architecture and imperially inspired murals.39  
 The state is unique in its capacity for distributing, institutionalizing, and naturalizing 
meaning. In addition to creating meaning, the state often promotes or silences meanings from 
other actors. Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger suggested that meaning, specifically 
traditions, can be invented by a wide variety of actors, including individuals, parties, 
movements, or popular groups. These other creators of symbols and traditions, however, 
typically lack the resources, power, and capabilities required to disseminate, institutionalize, 
and normalize these meanings. Public education, holidays, ceremonies, and law all serve to 
institutionalize and distribute meaning to a large territorial population with greater efficiency 
and efficacy than can be achieved through other means. For example, maypoles, despite their 
                                                     
37 Hunt, Politics , 101-3 
38 Christopher Hill, National History and the World of Nations: Capital, state, and the rhetoric of history in 
Japan, France, and the United States (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008); Hobsbawm, Nations and 
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origin in peasant culture as a symbol of rebellion, did not become a symbol of the French 
Revolution until they were appropriated by the Convention and made to be staples of public 
festivals celebrating the Republic, which resulted in over 60,000 planted by 1792.40  
 The state has been involved in the maintenance of the nation through the production 
of the national from the start. Fernando Lopez-Alves argued that nations were created 
through conceptualizing processes led by the state’s bureaucratic, legal, and military 
apparatuses.41 States were and remain the primary engine of nation-formation and nation-
building.42 Again, the Convention relied on the institutionalization of ritual – such as 
celebrating Republican holidays around maypoles, burning effigies of Louis XVI, executing 
traitors, or the invention of a national civil uniform – to homogenize and create the French 
people. Similarly, Napoleon used continental war to institutionalize meaning and create a 
homogeneous Frenchness. In this case, conceptualizing is important here because it is a 
process that is never complete. The process of conceptualizing, however, needs to be 
understood as a contested and circular process between elites and masses, rather than a pure 
and unfettered injection of meaning from the top down. Elites inject or suggest new 
meanings, traditions, histories, etc. into the public sphere, and it is the degree to which they 
are accepted by the masses that determines whether or not these meanings become national 
meanings. Furthermore, mass and popular movements around the national contest elite 
conceptualizations and offer their own from the bottom up. These mass/popular meanings 
can be accepted by the elite and incorporated into the dominant conceptualization of the 
                                                     
40 Hunt, Politics, 59. 
41 Fernando Lopez-Alves, “Which State, Which Nation? States and National Identity in Europe, South America, 
and the United States Compared, 1750-1930,” Working Paper 510 (Universidad del Cema, 2013).  
42 Balibar, following Gellner, notes that the states engage and manipulate the nation by appropriating the sacred 
and, more specifically, by centralizing the administration of the everyday. This process of appropriating the 
everyday makes the state “the ‘Supreme Court of Appeal’ in matters of the normalization of fundamental 
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national.  
 Hobsbawm and Ranger’s perspective, which focused on the ways in which new 
meanings are created and those that have faded away are revived and reinstated, is important 
for understanding the national. Symbols and myths that become national are not immune to 
attack and can certainly die out, either as a result of changing structural and social conditions 
or of efforts by competing groups to reconstitute the national. The transitory and precarious 
nature of national symbols and myths,43 in combination with the state’s capacity for 
institutionalizing and ritualizing meaning, implies two deep and intrinsic connections 
between the national and politics.  
 First, politics is the primary site for competition over national meaning. Politicians, 
bureaucrats, elites, and popular groups all have preferred versions of the national that they 
want to be not only dominant, but also hegemonic.44 The dominant form of the national – 
those symbols, rituals, and meanings that have become institutionalized and pervasive – can 
be considered hegemonic precisely because of their reliance on legitimation. The national is a 
patchwork of meaning that has reached a “‘compromise equilibrium’ by incorporating 
ideological elements from competing nationalist projects, and embarks on a process of self-
reproduction and naturalization until its values become ‘common sense.’”45 Hegemony is not 
achieved through manipulation or force, but through the compliance and consent of 
                                                     
43 Certainly some meanings and myths are much harder to supplant than others. Those meanings which are 
closer to the center of the nation’s organization, such as its myths of origin, homogeneity, or symbols signaling 
continuity, are much less malleable or susceptible to attack. However, these too can fade away or be replaced 
when dramatic enough pressure or events question their legitimacy or value. Germany’s myth of ethnic 
homogeneity was questioned as a value only after the Holocaust. Nonetheless, its resilience and centrality to the 
German nation is what underpinned the West German government’s decision not to recognize East Germany’s 
sovereignty and enabled reunification in 1990. 
44 See Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1995) and Özkirimli, 
Theories of Nationalism.  
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competing factions and those over whom hegemony will be exercised.46 This complicity has 
important implications for the substantial role of civil society and non-state actors in 
reproducing the national and national identity. 
 As addressed above, there are always different, competing national projects, in 
addition to non-national identity projects, being pursued and promoted by civil groups, 
politicians, and elites who are trying to establish a hegemonic national meaning. New 
symbols and myths are constantly being injected into and tested within public discourse, 
which either become national or fade away, while the hegemony of existing meanings is 
tested and retested through this process.  As a result of this, hegemony is never complete; 
instead, it is a process that is always being negotiated, recreated, and modified.47 Because of 
the state’s substantial capacity for ritualizing and naturalizing meaning, access to state 
apparatuses becomes the primary means through which groups can engage in this process of 
meaning-making. As a result, those attempting to create new national symbols, myths, or 
meanings tend to pursue access to state apparatuses, whether through being elected to office 
or obtaining positions within the bureaucracy, in order to increase the potential for their 
myths and meanings to become hegemonic.  
 Second, because access to the state determines a faction’s potential for ritualizing and 
naturalizing meaning, politics is predicated on the national. When myths or symbols become 
national, they exercise a constraint on political discourse, dictating the range of positions, 
                                                     
46 This point is emphasized James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985). Scott noted that opposition can only be voiced through the language 
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statements, and appeals that are allowable and realistic within it. Politicians, elites, or popular 
groups seeking access to state apparatuses must either promote issues and policies that exist 
on the continuum of the allowable or, if oppositional, must be framed in its language.48 
Access to office, as well as potential for injecting meaning, is contingent upon perceived 
legitimacy as a member and representative of the nation.49 Those not seen as members of the 
nation are substantially less likely to gain access to office or create new meaning that will 
become hegemonic. Electoral politics, especially, is full of appeals to national symbols and 
myths. Candidates pursuing office often make these appeals either to present themselves as 
representing the nation’s interests or to present competitors as antagonistic to those interests, 
whatever they may be.50 During the 2008 American presidential election, for example, Tea 
Party pundits and leaders did not make the claim that Barack Obama is a Muslim because it 
legally disqualified him from office. Instead, the assertion was meant to delegitimize him as a 
representative of the national community and as an embodiment of the national. Furthermore, 
continuously making the claim “Barack Obama is Muslim” did nothing to invalidate his 
candidacy or speak to his qualifications, but instead discursively aligned him with people 
who were and are framed as not only un-American, but also outside of the realm of political 
                                                     
48 The constraints that the national places on politics regarding the positions and meanings that are expressible 
speaks to the inertia of national meaning. It is largely resistant to grand changes except perhaps in times of crisis 
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Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible (New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2004). 
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as rejections of illegitimate foreign rule. For more on post-colonial nationalism and nationalist movements, see 
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Books, 1986). 
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reality and feasibility.51 In making appeals to the national, politicians and bureaucrats test 
their legitimacy or the legitimacy of their competitors as well as their conceptualization of 
the national. Their appeals are not simply references to rigid meanings that exist in perpetuity 
once they have been established, but also attempts adding to the range of meanings that 
constitutes the national and establishing themselves as nationals.52 
 This is particularly important because it reveals something about the nation-state. 
Recently, many scholars have brought into question the nation-state formula and its status as 
the standard global political unit. For some, the existence of multinational states, states that 
administer a territory that is home to multiple nations, as well of nationless states provide 
evidence that the nation and state need to be analyzed separately and that this separation must 
be maintained. Indeed, Connor’s efforts to draw attention to what he called “terminological 
chaos” in nationalism studies had precisely this goal. He argued that scholars needed to keep 
unquestionably clear the distinction between nation and state, as well as nationalism and 
patriotism. There is, however, a notable problem with these criticisms: states continue to 
claim to represent a particular group of people - more specifically a particular national 
people. Even those states that are welcoming to migrants or are referred to as multicultural or 
                                                     
51 This is very similar in structure to the claims made against John F. Kennedy as a practicing Catholic. There 
are, however, two substantial differences between the two cases. First, the claim that Obama is a Muslim is a 
racialized claim which works specifically because of his skin color. While Kennedy’s legitimacy as a 
representative as well as his priorities were also called into question, comments made regarding Kennedy’s 
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multinational require that immigrants engage in a process of “integration” in order to 
naturalize and acquire citizenship.53 Becoming a citizen - that is, a person for whom the state 
recognizes itself as responsible - is impossible without subjecting oneself to a homogenizing 
process. States create naturalization processes and citizenship tests to ensure that they 
continue to represent only those who hold the characteristics that mark them as a member of 
the nation. Such processes require that migrants learn cultural, civic, political, and historical 
knowledge that is deemed as confirming that an individual knows, gain particular values, and 
be able to call upon the range of symbols, myths, and meanings which are valued by the 
nation.54 In other words, applicants are expected to prove that they: (1) are willing to consider 
themselves members of this nation; (2) have internalized national symbols, meanings, etc.; 
and (3) possess the requisite knowledge and values to be considered as members as well. 
 The process through which these laws are created, then, is not only affirming already 
existing meanings by treating them as boundaries to national membership, but also creating 
or reviving them. Such meanings are tested in the court of public opinion, succeeding or 
failing based on how coherent they are within the context of already salient meanings. Again, 
the range of meanings that can be classified as realistic or viable is dictated and bounded by 
the already existing national. From such a perspective, changes to the national come either 
incrementally or as the result of moments of great historical rupture.55 Institutionalizing 
                                                     
53 What it means to integrate into a “multicultural society” will be discussed at length below, particularly in 
Chapter 4. 
54 For more on citizenship tests, see Christian Joppke, “Through the European Looking Glass: Citizenship Tests 
in the US, Canada, and Australia,” Citizenship Studies, 17 (January 2013). For work on the incorporation of 
cultural restrictions into citizenship tests, see Liav Orgad, “Illiberal Liberalism: Cultural Restrictions on 
Migration and Access to Citizenship in Europe,” The American Journal of Comparative Law, 58 (2010). 
55 Here, I aim to differentiate between the sorts of changes that emerged in post-World War II Germany and the 
types of changes we can see emerging in any given historical period. Conceptions of the national in post-war 
Germany required immediate substantial changes as a result of the ways in which national memory, ethnic 
homogeneity, and other salient symbols had been used as the basis for genocide and fascist nationalism. This 
type of immediate, radical change to conceptions of the national is rare and can only come from these moments 
of intense crisis. Otherwise, change to the national occurs as a result of constant, unflinching competition over 
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meaning through state apparatuses is a means by which to safeguard myths and symbols 
against challenge. When they have been codified in law or recognized as national holidays, 
putting forward new and contradictory meanings is difficult at the national level. For 
example, efforts to replace Columbus Day, the American national holiday recognizing the 
“discovery” of North America by Christopher Columbus, with Indigenous Peoples’ Day, a 
celebration of the peoples indigenous to North America, have received recognition and 
legitimation in only a select few cities, but have gained little traction at the national level. 
The resistance stems, in part, from the age and longevity of the discovery myth and in part 
from its institutionalization as a federally recognized and celebrated holiday. Columbus’ 
position in the myth of American origin is entrenched and, by virtue of this entrenchment, 
resists being supplanted by another, directly contradictory myth. The myth of Columbus’ 
discovery is the history that is known, which presents the nation in a positive light, and that 
regards the United States as having a racially white beginning. Each of these contributes to 
the myth’s resilience and helps to explain why myths that compete directly with this one gain 
very little traction among nationals. 
 Conceiving of the national as the set of symbols, myths, etc., which have been made 
hegemonic, often in the arena of politics, allows for politics and political products to be 
sources of data for analysis of the national itself. Speeches given by public figures, laws and 
constitutions, and political party platforms are all methods through which officials and elites 
inject, test, and institutionalize meaning. Specifically, law that directly targets the range of 
acceptable behaviors, including dress or cultural practices, as well as citizenship and 
naturalization law, are methods of codification. In any state that claims to represent a nation 
– that is, with leading officials who make such a claim that is believed by its subjects –  
                                                                                                                                                                    
the interpretation of relevance of symbols and myths.  
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citizenship law can be understood as the institutionalization of agreed upon meanings. Its 
legitimacy stems from its acceptance by the people it governs rather than forceful imposition 
from above. Consequently, the boundaries the law sets forward for citizenship must reflect 
those that bound membership in the national community closely enough for it to be 
hegemonic. The remaining question, then, regards how the national is taught and made 
available to the national community. How does a Frenchman become French or a German 
become German? Through what processes are nationals made? Where do we look to see their 
production and reproduction? 
 
Nationalism - reproduction and exclusion 
Contrary to what national myths would have us believe, no one is born a national. No amount 
of blood, no matter how red, can make someone an American. Nationals do not occur 
naturally, but are instead produced through processes of socialization.56 Because the national 
is constantly being tested and, perhaps, altered, the production of nationals is an ongoing 
process. More than that, nationals are produced and reproduced through interaction with 
institutions, other individuals or groups, and the symbols and myths which make up the 
national. Production is, at its core, a process of differentiation, designating those bodies, 
values, and cultures that can be considered national. It is another process through which the 
national is recreated and naturalized. For those who are marked as non-national by legal-
bureaucratic apparatuses, the alterity of their bodies or visible cultural practices is confirmed 
and reproduced through micro-level interactions with nationals and macro-level interactions 
                                                     
56 “Right of return” policies, for example, are predicated on there being an ethnic basis for membership in the 
nation. The underlying assumption, however, is that those who can be designated “ethnic Germans,” for 
example, would continue to practice Germanness and socialize their children to German symbols and meanings, 
such that they are essentially German nationals living abroad. This is also the case for Russia’s right of return 
policies in the wake of the dissolution of the USSR. I explore this in more detail below. 
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with the state. 
 Understanding nations as social relations rather than natural groups with objective 
signifiers, highlights interaction as a site for boundary maintenance.  Indeed, interpersonal 
and intergroup interactions become one of the primary sources of day-to-day boundary 
maintenance. Recognition of another individual as a group member, Fredrik Barth argued, 
carries with it recognition of shared “criteria for evaluation and judgment… [that is] the 
assumption that the two are fundamentally ‘playing the same game.’”57 Constructing the 
national simultaneously constructs alterity because exclusion is the soul of the national.58 
Once a value or attribute is incorporated into the national, competing values or attributes 
become associated with the Other. Exclusion from the national community, then, depends on 
the salience of these categories within the community. Those meanings that are closer to the 
center of the national – that is, more entrenched within the national – demarcate those 
boundaries that are not crossable. Individuals on the other side of these boundaries are 
excluded from aspects of social life. Such Others need not be external to society, however. 
Engin Isin, for example, argued that citizens are constructed in opposition to Others within 
the state’s territory rather than those external it. That said, the national has historically been 
constructed and represented as opposing outsiders near and far. There are “proper” capitalist 
Americans standing in opposition to communist traitors, but there are also freedom-loving 
Americans standing opposite the Soviets, the Vietcong, and the Chinese. Both of these myths 
are vital to creating the American. Using these particular sets of meaning, Americans can 
differentiate between and police one as true or legitimate Americans as well as police the 
                                                     
57 Fredrik Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference (Long Grove: 
Waveland Press, 1998; orig. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1969), 15. Although Barth was writing on ethnic 
groups, his treatment of ethnic groups as cultural groups sharing symbols and meanings allows for his theories 
to carry over to nations.  
58 Balibar, We the People. 
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external boundaries of the national community. 
 Micro-level boundary maintenance can cross over into macro-level maintenance 
when considering interaction between individuals and the bureaucracy. In particular, states 
with a decentralized bureaucracy rely heavily on bureaucrats, equipped with specialized 
knowledge that “presuppose[s] and constitute[s] at the same time power relations,” to 
ultimately make the decisions about which applicants will be recognized as national through 
the ascription of citizenship.59 While each state has qualifications upon which the decision is 
expected to be based, individual bureaucrats are able to use their authority to create 
Kafkaesque circumstances in order to bar applicants from citizenship.60 Making the process 
appear lengthy and unwieldy, overstating the difficulty of tests or applications, or sending 
applicants to other offices or to the back of the line for arbitrary errors on forms are all ways 
for bureaucrats to police the boundaries of the national community from a position of 
authority without necessarily mirroring state policies.  
 Boundary maintenance through interaction is, however, a process of second-order 
socialization. Individuals can only police the boundaries of the national community if they 
are already familiar with the range of meanings that they hold as representing the national. It 
is primarily through first-order processes of socialization that individuals come to be aware 
of and internalize the national. This includes socializing processes that occur at home, with 
peer groups, in the media, and in schools. The primary production of nationals occurs in the 
                                                     
59 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Random House, 1995; orig. 
Paris: Editions Gallimond, 1975), 27. 
60 One is reminded, here, of Franz Kafka’s parable Vor dem Gesetz in which a man approaches a gate to the law 
and asks for entry. The guard there tells the man that he cannot be permitted to enter, and that the guard is only 
the first of many guards, each of whom is more fearsome than the last. The guard never physically bars the man 
from accessing the realm of the law, but the guard’s discouragement and stories of a long and difficult process 
is enough to prevent the man from actively pursuing entrance, eventually dying without having ever gotten past 
the first barrier. 
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school, which is a strong and naturalized homogenizing institution.61 Schools are tasked with 
the responsibility of producing nationals through the presentation of historical narratives, 
symbols, and rituals as not historically contingent and socially constructed, but as objectively 
real. It is in schools that Germans are taught the works of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, 
Rainer Maria Rilke, and Franz Kafka, but never required to know of Turkish folk authors, 
such as Cemal Süreya. Similarly, it is in the classroom that American students learn of the 
noble Revolution against tyranny in the name of Freedom, ritually pledge their allegiance to 
a symbol of the nation-state, and are taught the value-system which makes for “good” 
Americans. Textbooks, therefore, become home to the national as well as a site for its 
contestation. In 1958, E. Merrill Root argued that the Cold War would be lost not to the 
strength of the USSR, but to weaknesses in American schools. Authors of textbooks, he 
argued, were misrepresenting history such that the freedom and opportunity of the individual 
was no longer central to American institutions and history. “Our American Revolution is 
unique” he wrote “because it aimed at setting the individual free to work out his own 
problems in his own way.”62 By losing sight of this fact of history, this system of meaning 
that makes Americans who they are, he argued, America would lose its spiritual and 
ideological war for the survival of its own soul. 
 Contemporary contestations over the representation of the American Civil War is 
another case that lends credence to the argument that textbooks and schools are central to the 
                                                     
61 The school is, according to Althusser, the dominant ideological state apparatus of the modern capitalist era. 
Where Althusser focused on the reproduction of the worker via the naturalization of the ideology of the ruling 
class, I am emphasizing the creation of nationals through education. Such an approach is consistent with an 
understanding of the national as hegemonic, as the goal of ideological state apparatuses is to reproduce a 
particular class of individual not through repressive force, but through the naturalization and internalization of 
the ideology of the ruling class. For more on this, see Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State 
Apparatuses,” in Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, ed. Louis Althusser (New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 1971). 
62 Merrill E. Root, Brainwashing in the High Schools (New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1958). 
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socialization of nationals. There is an ideological war in the United States over whether the 
South seceded to keep its right to maintain slavery or as a matter of states’ rights. Contests 
over the narrative of national history are contests over the representation of the nation. Most 
nations aim to be represented in a positive light that matches national values. If a nation 
values the individual over the collective, historical events that highlight the individual and 
narratives that represent an event as highlighting the individual will be prioritized and given a 
greater deal of focus. It is the perceived loss of a central American value in accounts of 
American history that Root and many Southerners cited as a threat to the nation, which they 
are fighting to prevent or reverse. It is important to note that negative representations of the 
nation can be central to national history. Germany, for example, constructed and legitimated 
a great deal of its civic values - many of which have attempted to replace ethnicity as the 
basis for the modern Germanness - on the back of the Holocaust. Indeed, I will argue below 
that the modern system of German national meaning includes what appears, at first glance, to 
be anti-national sentiments informed by experiences of extreme, fascist nationalism during 
the 1930s and 1940s. 
 Schools are responsible, then, for the presentation of myths and symbols as facts and 
values. It is in schools that youth are made to understand themselves in terms of the national. 
Schooling presents a process of deconstruction and reconstruction in which students are to be 
integrated into the national community through a lengthy process of homogenization. 
However, there are other identities that are resistant to integration and, as a result, become 
the object of legal action or exclusion. Both the French and German “secular” states, for 
example, have placed bans on religious iconography in schools; such laws ought to be read as 
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specifically targeting forms of the veil worn by Muslim girls and women. 63 Indeed, much of 
Europe has struggled to integrate Muslims into the national community specifically because 
the values and history they ascribe to Islam do not match the values and history of Christian 
Europe. Despite claiming to be secular, much of Europe maintains Christianity as the default 
setting for its national community, and so the veil represents a marker of irreconcilable 
difference against which the state must legislate.  
 What is taught in schools is how to be a national. Students within a national territory 
learn a relatively homogeneous curriculum teaching them the same set of skills, values, 
myths, and symbols that allow them to operate in social space in the same way. The content 
of the curriculum becomes natural, such that changes in the framing of historical events of 
significance or the underlying values is met with popular resistance from people who have 
been out of school for decades. Such personal investment in schools is not an investment in 
objective truth, but rather an investment in meanings that make up the national as a lens 
through which to understand and evaluate the world. For this reason, it is vital to evaluate the 
content of the material being taught to youths and adults attempting to assimilate. It is the 
source of knowledge about the national and the source of the boundaries that are maintained 
through interpersonal interaction and law. 
 
Towards a methodology for studies of nation and nationalism 
National communities are reflexive communities. They exist only because their members 
recognize the community as existing. Members continue to actively reproduce national 
communities through the reproduction of the symbols and meanings around which this 
                                                     
63 Trica Danielle Keaton, Muslim Girls and the Other France (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 
2006). 
  
36 
 
community organizes. For this reason, the character of a nation may shift across time through 
the unending contestation of its symbols and myths. Taking such an approach to nations 
incentivizes study at two levels. First, studying the nation at the macro-level, at the level of 
the national, allows us to understand the symbols and meanings around which people are 
organizing. It helps us to identify the particular modalities that nationalism and national 
appeals can take. Once that is known, we can understand the ways in which the national 
community is bounded and policed. While most, if not all, nations will have similar methods 
for policing the community, the differences in meanings will allow particular nationalisms to 
go unnoticed. Such nationalisms may be occluded through seemingly absurd comparisons to 
more overtly fascist nationalisms, as is the case in much of Europe, or may hide in 
antinationalist rhetoric as a wolf in sheep’s clothing. Similarly, differences in state 
apparatuses and the historical development of the national community will impact the ways 
in which the state interacts with the national and directly polices it. 
 Second, and equally important, is analysis at the micro-level. Some of this work has 
been done already and follows from Michael Billig’s analysis of everyday reproduction in 
Banal Nationalism. Billig argues that much nationalism goes ignored because it does not look 
like separatist movements, revolutions, fervent pride, or fascism. Instead, what is being 
missed is the nationalism that must exist in the everyday. If not for this every day, “cold” 
nationalism, how would we know how to act during moments of extreme, “hot” nationalism?  
Nations do not end when major geopolitical events or moments of fervor do. The nation and 
its symbols become a part of daily life during these interstitial moments. We do not forget 
what it means to be American, Vietnamese, French, etc. precisely because we interact with 
the national on a daily basis. Micro-level understandings of nationalism cannot stop with 
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interactions between individuals and symbols. Indeed, part of what differentiates this 
neoliberal period from previous eras is the state’s ability to conscript individuals into 
processes of monitoring and policing.64 The understanding of symbols and meaning gained 
from macro-level approaches, especially those aimed at analyzing politics and education, 
ought to inform micro-level analysis. Schools and politics produce nationals, informing and 
reminding them of what is and ought to be salient. What they do with that knowledge, that 
nationalism which they have internalized, and how they use it to police the boundaries of the 
nation needs to be better understood.  
  This is not to say that grand theorizing is fruitless or undesirable, but rather that deep 
knowledge of cases is invaluable.65 Politics that may appear transnational, multinational, or 
even directly anti-national at first glance may, in fact, be national politics. This, however, can 
only be known through direct engagement with the materials and processes through which 
the national is created and disseminated. Specifically, understanding the messages that 
politicians infuse into national discourse and institutionalize in law and educational curricula 
allows for a deep knowledge of particular cases. Although studying the written word cannot 
give us insights into the hearts of nationals, it informs our understanding of the range of 
meanings that might exist in their hearts. In the following two chapters, I examine precisely 
these areas in Germany, a nation-state that established itself through ethnic nationalism and, 
                                                     
64 Foucault, Discipline. 
65 Miguel Centeno and Fernando Lopez-Alves made a similar argument in The Other Mirror: Grand Theory 
through the Lens of Latin America. The volume’s central thesis is that because grand theory on nations was 
developed from a unique and atypical set of primarily Western European cases, it is not as comprehensive as it 
claims and aims to be. Indeed, such theories, they argued, are insufficient when moving beyond the scope of the 
cases upon which the theories are founded. Their critique of grand theory on the development of nations and 
nationalism was much needed and provided interesting and meaningful reconceptualizations of influential social 
theorists, such as Barrington Moore, Samuel Huntington, Benedict Anderson, and Karl Polanyi. In a similar 
manner, I assert that relying on grand theorization about the genesis of nations to explain modern nations is 
restricting the scope of cases and outcomes that we can understand and analyze. For Centeno and Lopez-Alves’ 
argument, see Miguel Angel Centeno and Fernando Lopez-Alves, The Other Mirror: Grand Theory though the 
Lens of Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
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over the last twenty years, has been shifting more and more towards civic nationalism. In 
addition, Germany’s fascist past has led to a national community that prides itself on its lack 
of nationalism or explicit national pride. All of these components have culminated in a 
unique set of meanings that still take the form of the national. Ultimately, this study aims to 
be a grounding for future interaction-based studies of micro-level nationalism in Germany.  
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Chapter II 
Theoretical Framework and Methodology 
 
Eric Hobsbawm put it best when he wrote: “official ideologies of states and movements are 
not guides to what is in the minds of even the most loyal citizens or supporters.”1 Although 
institutional practices are not informed solely or necessarily primarily by popular 
understandings of ideology, they do however structure material outcomes for individuals 
living within the region administered by a given state. Therefore, macro-level institutions 
structure access to rights and goods made available by the state. Analysis of institutional 
practices and state expressions of ideology, however, can never produce an understanding of 
“nation” as it is practiced and understood at the micro-level. Similarly, these institutions can, 
at least in some capacity, be understood as produced from a range of options that maintains a 
party’s electability.2  
 What is considered the ideological content of a nation is not static. At both the 
individual and aggregate levels, the conceptual content around which national identity and 
national community are organized, which I call “the national,” is constantly being 
supplemented, called into question, modified, and adapted. Emerging demographic, military, 
political, economic, and academic concerns all impact how academics, politicians, media 
personnel, and the public negotiate the national and what content becomes the focus of these 
negotiations. Consequently, cross-sectional analyses of national ideology are likely to lose 
                                                     
1 Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 1990), 11. 
2 Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy, (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1957).  
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sight of how institutional understandings of who qualifies as “national” change over time, as 
well as how entrenched powers resist that change. In order to study the national, therefore, it 
is absolutely necessary to use a method that allows for longitudinal comparison within a 
single case. 
 The comparative historical methodology opens up options for study. 3 Its small-N 
orientation allows for more thorough contextualization of the phenomena being studied and 
for an attention to historical detail that is not feasible in large-N studies. Even in studies with 
a substantial universe of available cases, comparative history is suitable for inquiry 
investigating social change over large spans of history. Comparative history also represents a 
unique relationship with theory: it can be used both deductively to test hypotheses derived 
from existing theory and inductively to generate and extend theory from cases. Comparative 
history is a method that allows for several types of studies; more specifically, it supports both 
small-N and relatively large-N, synchronic and diachronic, archival research and 
ethnographic research, etc. As a result, constructing a research design requires knowledge of 
what comparative historical methods can do. As a result, this chapter proceeds as follows: 
first, I discuss key works of comparative history, emphasizing how they conceptualize the 
relationship between method and theory. With this in mind, I outline the research design, 
data, and data collection methods I employed in conducting this study. 
 
Comparative Historical Methodology 
                                                     
3 I am using James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschmeyer’s definition of comparative historical research as 
having three components: “a concern with causal analysis, the exploration of temporal processes, and the use of 
systematic and contextualized comparison typically limited to a small number of cases….” James Mahoney and 
Dietrich Rueschmeyer, “Comparative Historical Analysis: Achievements and Agendas,” in Comparative 
Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, ed. James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschmeyer. (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
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Comparative historical analysis has a relatively long history in the social sciences. Adam 
Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, for example, constitutes an early instance of comparative 
historical methodology. Many of the seminal texts that influenced the development of 
political science and sociology are works of comparative history.4 Indeed, much early 
sociological and political scientific theory was generated through the use of the comparative 
method.5 
 Karl Marx’s works on the development of capitalism in the West, considered 
foundational to the discipline of sociology, are important works of comparative history.6 His 
analysis, which resulted in his theory of class conflict as the driving force of economic and, 
thereby, political change, relied heavily on cross-temporal comparisons between modes of 
production, as well as on cross-spatial comparisons within the same mode of production. 
Capital and Grundrisse, especially, feature discussions of Western European feudalism as a 
contrast for his characterization of class relations under capitalism as well as analyses of 
capitalism in more than one society. Marx’s application of comparative historical methods 
was aimed at generating a grand theory that could describe all historical and future economic 
and social change. 
                                                     
4 See, for example: Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (New York: The Free Press, 
1995); Marc Bloch, Feudal Society Volume 1: The Growth of Ties of Dependence, translated by L.A. Manyon 
(Cornwall: T.J. Press, 1993; orig. London: Routledge, 1961); Marc Bloch, “Toward a Comparative History of 
European Societies,” in Enterprise and Secular Change: Readings in Economic History, ed. Fredric C. Lane and 
Jelle C. Riemersma (Homewood: R.D. Irwin, 1953); Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, translated 
by Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000); W.E.B. Du Bois, 
Black Reconstruction in America, 1860-1880 (New York: The Free Press, 1998 [1935]); Karl Marx, The 18th 
Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (London: Wildside Press, 2008); Karl Marx, Capital Volume 1: A Critique of 
Political Economy (New York: Penguin, 1992); Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive 
Sociology, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); Max Weber, 
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (London: Routledge, 2001). 
5 Matthew Lange provides an insightful account of the development, refinement, and systematization of the 
comparative historical method. Matthew Lange, Comparative Historical Methods (Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications, 2013). See also: Reza Azarian, “Potentials and Limitations of Comparative Method in Social 
Science,” International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, 1 (April 2011) . 
6 For more on this, see: Emil Oestereicher, “Marx’s Comparative Historical Sociology,” Dialectical 
Anthropology, 3 (May 1978). 
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 W.E.B. Du Bois’ work is another major selection of early comparative historical 
sociology. In Black Reconstruction, he made use of primary source data, statistics, 
biography, and inter-state comparisons to argue that, contrary to the prevailing argument of 
the time, Reconstruction was “a missed opportunity to achieve social democracy in 
America.”7 Du Bois also argues that economic interests drive politics and political 
transformation. In doing so, he provided an intersectional analysis that linked the economic 
exploitation of Southern Blacks and poor Southern whites to racism as well as to the failure 
to create real democracy in the South. Furthermore, Du Bois blended a concern with grand 
theory, namely structuralism and materialism, with an attention to the contingent and 
contextual nature of Reconstruction. As a result, Black Reconstruction both develops theory 
and explains a particular case. 
 Max Weber’s contributions to the comparative historical methodology are perhaps the 
most notable.8 Much of Weber’s work was oriented towards “wedding general, 
transhistorical concepts (‘historical models,’ or ideal types) to specific courses of events 
(‘secular theories’).”9 It is from his detailed and case-oriented work that he developed key 
theories, concepts, and definitions, including but not limited to the topics of: rationalization, 
Verstehen, ideal types, bureaucracy, legitimate authority, the state, the development of the 
Western city, and capitalism.  
 In one of the most famous works of comparative history, The Protestant Ethic, Weber 
examined why rational capitalism emerged only in particular Western societies. Making use 
                                                     
7 Isaac Martin, “The Comparative Historical Sociology of W.E.B. Du Bois,” Trajectories, 27 (April 2016), 23. 
8 Stephen Kalberg explored Weber’s contributions to the comparative historical methodology in great detail in: 
Stephen Kalberg, Max Weber’s Comparative Historical Sociology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1994). 
9 Edgar Kiser and Michael Hechter, “The Role of General Theory in Comparative-Historical Sociology,” 
American Journal of Sociology, 97 (July 1991), 3. 
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of comparisons between those Western societies that had developed rational capitalism and 
those that had not, as well as between Western rational capitalistic societies and non-Western 
societies, Weber argued that ideology had a strong impact on the economic development of 
the West. More specifically, he argued that because the acquisition of wealth was associated 
with heavenly salvation in Calvinism, the spiritual drive towards rational capitalism present 
in predominantly Calvinist regions enabled economic developments that did not occur 
elsewhere. This was a strong departure from previous comparative historical work on 
economic development and capitalism, which had focused on structural conditions as 
generating economic change.  
 Protestant Ethic and especially Economy and Society present another major departure 
from the standard in comparative historical research: Weber’s concern with multicausality.10 
Where previous works emphasized a single causal process and the value of general theory, 
Weber argued for multicausal approaches and a retreat from general theory, which could 
never accurately describe every context equally well. For example, he further complicated his 
linear argument from Protestant Ethic that particular religious ideologies generated the drive 
towards capitalism thusly: “religion nowhere creates certain economic conditions unless 
there are also present in the existing relationships and constellations of interests certain 
possibilities of, or even powerful drives toward, such an economic transformation.”11 
Weber’s works in Economy and Society included extensive essays on methodology and 
comparative history. These included essays devoted to developing the ideal type as a 
heuristic device, arguing for limited theoretical generalization, arguing for equal attention to 
                                                     
10 For a detailed account of Weber’s insistence on multicausality, see Chapter 2 in Kalberg, Max Weber’s 
Comparative Historical-Sociology. 
11 Weber, Economy and Society, 577. 
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the multiplicity of potential causes, and supporting a focus on contextual analysis. Despite 
Stephen Kalberg’s assertion that Weber’s methodological work had been largely overlooked, 
his contributions to the method have been invaluable. 
 As should be clear from this discussion of early comparative historical work, the 
relationship between the method and theory generation is a curious one. On the one hand, 
there are works of comparative history aimed at producing general theory that can explain all 
instances of a phenomenon. On the other, there are works like those of Max Weber and 
W.E.B. Du Bois, which focused on generating explanations for particular events and cases, 
as well as on testing theoretically and logically derived hypotheses. Both have been valuable 
as forms of macro-social inquiry and allow for the examination of large social units – states, 
nations, governing systems, etc. – and large social questions – nationalism, democracy, 
economic development, path dependency, historical materialism, etc. However, the 
relationships between comparative history and theory influence not only the types of 
questions researchers ask, but also the number and type of cases they select for using them. 
 
Method, case selection, and theory 
Comparative history, as derived from Mill’s methods, is particularly valuable for macro-
social analysis; 12 that is, it allows for deductive approaches that use large units of analysis, 
                                                     
12 The logic for the two primary modes of comparative historical analysis stems from John Stuart Mill’s A 
System of Logic, in which he outlined two applications of the method: the “Method of Agreement” and the 
“Method of Difference.” To use the Method of Agreement, the researcher must establish a set of cases that 
share in common the result of interest and also share a set of causal factors. On the other hand, Method of 
Difference contrasts cases that share both the causes and the phenomenon-of-study with cases in which the 
causes and phenomenon are missing. These methods allow for variation between cases, but seek to highlight 
crucial similarities and differences, respectively. That is, the Method of Agreement does not require that cases 
be identical, but rather that the key causal variables and the resulting phenomenon are shared. Similarly, cases 
selected for the Method of Difference do not need to be different in every conceivable way; rather, they need 
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such as the world system, nations, states, economies, regions, etc., to answer questions across 
societies or systems.13 With this in mind, comparative history is well-suited to hypothesis 
testing, causal analysis, and the generation of grand theory. Indeed, many of the most well-
known and influential works of comparative history are those that address large macro-social 
problems. Such studies and their research questions tend to prefer, or often require, analysis 
of several cases in order to evaluate existing theories and generate new ones. This is, in part, 
because comparative historical analysis “encourages one to spell out the actual causal 
arguments suggested by grand theoretical perspectives… [and] succeeds only if it 
convincingly fulfills this goal.”14  
 In Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, for example, Barrington Moore Jr. 
analyzed several cases in order to explain the possible trajectories that produce modern 
societies. Moore’s interest in the structural conditions that produced democracies, fascist 
dictatorships, and communist societies relied heavily on his belief in the capacity for 
comparative history to produce grand theory. Indeed, in the preface to Social Origins, he 
wrote: 
Comparisons can serve as a rough negative check on accepted historical explanations. 
And a comparative approach may lead to new historical generalizations. In practice 
these features constitute a single intellectual process and make such a study more than 
just a disparate collection of interesting cases. For example, after noticing that Indian 
                                                                                                                                                                    
only differ in outcome and in key causal variable, while other variables may be shared. A third type of 
comparative historical analysis, Qualitative Comparative Analysis, is discussed below. John Stuart Mill, A 
System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, ed. J.M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981). 
13 For examples of such analyses, see: G. Reginald Daniel, Race and Multiraciality in Brazil and the United 
States: Converging Paths? (University Park: Penn State Press, 2006); Christopher Hill, National History and the 
World of Nations: Capital, state, and the rhetoric of history in Japan, France, and the United States (Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press, 2008); Frances V. Moulder, Japan, China and the Modern World Economy: 
Toward a Reinterpretation of East Asian Development ca. 1600 to ca. 1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1977); Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the 
European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic Press, 1974). 
14 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 19. 
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peasants have suffered in a material way just about as much as Chinese peasants 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries without generating a massive 
revolutionary movement, one begins to wonder about traditional explanations of what 
took place in both societies and becomes alert to factors affecting peasant outbreaks 
in other countries, in hopes of discerning general causes.15 
 
 It is unsurprising that Moore’s theory of political developmental trajectories emerged 
from a multi-case approach. He built his causal argument for each trajectory from detailed 
knowledge of three cases each; that is, for example, to develop the trajectory characterized by 
the transition from bourgeois revolution to democracy, Moore drew on England, France, and 
the United States. Approaching each case longitudinally, he was able to increase the diversity 
of cases in his analysis by looking at shifts in coalitions between peasants, aristocrats, and 
bourgeoisie, as well as at historical moments in which the scales of a given society were 
tipping towards one ideal type or the other. For example, he argued that Britain and France 
both had reactionary periods, which might have led to fascism, as well as revolutionary 
periods, which resulted in capitalist democracy. Having a range of cases for each trajectory 
and then breaking each case into several smaller cases enabled both inter- and intra-category 
comparisons, which in turn allowed for a more detailed elaboration of causal processes and, 
therefore, a more developed argument.16 
 Theda Skocpol’s study of the causes and outcomes of social revolutions took a 
similar approach. In States and Social Revolutions, Skocpol drew heavily on three cases of 
                                                     
15 Barrington Moore Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the 
Modern World (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1966), x. 
16 By increasing the number of cases at his disposal, Moore was able to use both of Mill’s methods for 
comparative historical analysis. Moore is able to validate his arguments for each trajectory by comparing it to 
the causal processes he argues are at play in the other two (Method of Difference). Similarly, by comparing 
different periods within the same nation, Moore is able to use the Method of Agreement to develop his causal 
argument for each trajectory. That is, comparisons between revolutionary France and Civil War America help 
Moore develop the causal processes, which he then validates by comparing France’s bourgeois revolution to 
that led by the reactionary Junkers in Germany, for example. 
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social revolution – the French, Russian, and Chinese Revolutions – and contrasted them with 
negative cases, in which conditions were similar but the result was different, such as 
England, Japan, and Prussia.17 Like Moore, Skocpol also relied on cases with similar 
processes and outcomes, in spite of substantial inter-case differences, to develop a theory of 
social revolutions; following this, she contrasted her positive cases with those in which a 
social revolution failed to occur, despite being similar in “every apparently relevant respect 
except for the causal sequence that the contrast is supposed to validate.”18 Skocpol’s cases are 
revolutionary moments rather than nations or states, which allows for the same nation to 
produce multiple cases. For example, she draws on two cases from Russian history: the failed 
revolution of 1905 and the Russian Revolution of 1917. 
 For Skocpol, comparative history operates akin to “a kind of multivariate analysis… 
[for] causal statements about macro-phenomena for which, inherently, there are too many 
variables and not enough cases.”19 Others have since made use of this approach to make 
grand theoretical arguments about macrosocial phenomena. In National History and the 
World of Nations, for example, Christopher Hill drew on Japan, France, and the United 
States in order to construct an argument about the conditions under which national history is 
produced and reproduced. Hill selected these particular cases both because “[t]riangular 
comparison resists the reductive, binary conclusions that are likely to develop when 
investigating phenomena like nationalism that hold essential qualities dear” and because their 
substantial systemic differences allowed him to emphasize global capitalism. 20  Essentially, 
                                                     
17 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions. 
18 Ibid, 37.  
19 Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, “The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry,” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, 22 (April 1980), 182. See also, Theda Skocpol, States and Social 
Revolutions, 36. 
20 Christopher Hill, National History and the World of Nations: Capital, state, and the rhetoric of history in 
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case selection allowed Hill to emphasize a particular causal process, using the same Method 
of Difference as Skocpol. 
 Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier’s work on the processes through which 
organized labor movements were incorporated into national politics in Latin America used 
comparison of eight cases to develop a theory of social change in countries with long 
histories of urban and commercial development. Collier and Collier’s approach was very 
similar to Moore’s: cases were grouped into categories around similar processes of 
incorporation, from which they developed theories about social change, and then they 
compared across categories in order to validate the different theories. In addition to 
generating hypotheses and grand theory through a multi-case approach, Collier and Collier 
also utilized in-depth analyses of individual cases in order to “evaluate whether the dynamics 
of change within each country plausibly reflect the same causal pattern suggested by the 
comparison among countries.”21 Thus, unlike Moore and Skocpol, Collier and Collier 
incorporated the second use of comparative history into their study. They not only used 
comparative history of multiple cases to generate grand theory, but also comparative history 
of single cases in order to demonstrate or undermine theory.  
 This second form of comparative history, based in reconsideration and evaluation, is 
most clearly exemplified by Fernando Lopez-Alves and Miguel Centeno’s edited volume, 
The Other Mirror: Grand Theory Through the Lens of Latin America. Each chapter in the 
volume used a Latin American case to re-evaluate the ubiquity of various grand theoretical 
traditions. Samuel Valenzuela’s chapter, for example, re-evaluated Moore’s theory of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Japan, France, and the United States (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008), X. 
21 Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, 
and Regime Dynamics in Latin America (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002), 5. 
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political transformation in the Chilean context. He argued that Chile’s political 
transformations cannot be adequately described by Moore’s model, basing this conclusion on 
detailed accounts of Chilean class status and relations. According to Valenzuela, the coalition 
between large landowners and the rural iniquilinos is seemingly counterintuitive if 
understood exclusively from Moore’s perspective, but viewed through the lens of mutual 
Catholic interests, the coalition seems to make more sense. Other chapters take the same 
approach to reconsidering grand theorization through the lens of single-case comparative 
history. 
 Another of the most prominent works of comparative history, E.P. Thompson’s The 
Making of the English Working Class, evaluated traditional Marxist theories of class 
formation through a description of the constant making, re-making, and unmaking of the 
English working class.22 Thompson examined the contributions, coalitions, and actions of 
several groups and individuals who would be considered as members of the “working class” 
in England during the Industrial Revolution. From this approach, he produced an 
understanding of English history that was difficult to fit neatly into the Marxist tradition. As 
a work of comparative history, The Making of the English Working Class is a diachronic, 
descriptive single-case work that developed middle-range theory about class formation 
derived exclusively from the English case. 
 Other single-case comparative histories take a similar diachronic approach to a single 
nation-state, political system, or trading company. These include Charles Frye’s “Parties and 
Pressure groups in Weimar and Bonn;” Julia Adams’ “Principals and Agents, Colonialists 
and Company Men;” Philippe Schmitter’s Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil; 
                                                     
22 E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New York: Vintage, 1966). 
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John Agnew’s “The Impossible Capital;” and, in some ways, Rogers Brubaker’s Citizenship 
and Nationhood in France and Germany and G. Reginald Daniel’s Race and Multiraciality in 
Brazil and the United States: Converging Paths?.23 Single-case analyses applying the case 
study method can be used to generate hypotheses, gather data for later theory-building, or test 
theoretical propositions.24 While such studies cannot produce or invalidate theory on their 
own, they are invaluable to long-term processes of theory-building and evaluation. 
Furthermore, the single-case method can be used inductively to develop middle-range theory 
from detailed knowledge of the case. 
  Middle-range theory is especially valuable to comparative historical research because 
it provides starting points for generating hypotheses in studies oriented towards grand causal 
theory. The relationship between John Foran’s Taking Power and Fragile Resistance, for 
example, provides a particularly compelling example.25 In Fragile Resistance, his sweeping 
comparative historical analysis of Iranian social change since 1500, Foran took the single-
case approach, comparing various periods of Iranian history to one another, as well as briefly 
to other countries. From this study, he developed the theoretical concept of “political cultures 
of opposition,” which he later integrated into a model of multiple conjunctural causation in 
                                                     
23 Julia Adams, “Principals and Agents, Colonialists and Company Men: The Decay of Colonial Control in the 
Dutch East Indies,” American Sociological Review, 61 (February 1996); John Agnew, “The Impossible Capital: 
Monumental Rome under Liberal and Fascist Regimes, 1870-1943,” Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human 
Geography, 80 (December 1998); Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1922);  G. Reginald Daniel, Race and Multiraciality; Charles E. Frye, 
“Parties and Pressure Groups in Weimar and Bonn,” World Politics, 17 (July 1965);  Philippe Schmitter, 
Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971).  
 Both Brubaker’s and Daniel’s works include more than one case. In spite of this, they are valuable 
examples of how to build middle-range, as well as grand, theory from a single case approached diachronically. 
In Brubaker’s case, his longitudinal analyses of the French and German cases were the basis for building ideal-
types. Similarly, Daniel’s comparisons between the US and Brazil relied heavily on initial diachronic study of 
both nation-states. 
24 Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” The American Political Science 
Review, 65 (September 1971). 
25 John Foran, Fragile Resistance: Social Transformation in Iran from 1500 to the Revolution (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1993); John Foran, Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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Taking Power, where he sought to create a causal model that would explain the success or 
failure of a Third World revolution.  
 Foran’s comparative history in Taking Power did not, however, rely on the Millsian 
logic outlined above that dominates comparative historical research. Instead, Foran made use 
of Charles Ragin’s Qualitative Comparative Analysis. One of the key differences between 
Mill’s Methods of Agreement and Difference and Ragin’s Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(QCA) is that QCA allows for a researcher to test multiple paths that lead to the same 
outcome.26 This is especially important when attempting to understand failure as an outcome. 
For example, Foran explored the multiple causes of movement failure in Taking Power, and 
found six causal models that explained the failure of three categories of failed revolutions. 
While valuable for analyses that hypothesize multiple causes of the same outcome, QCA is 
less useful for single-country analyses that are looking to develop middle-range theory.  
 
Limitations and concerns 
As with every methodological paradigm, comparative history has limitations, several of 
which I will address briefly. One of the primary critiques levied against comparative 
historical methodology is that of bias, including bias in the selection of cases and biased 
conclusions resulting from case selection. Derived from the logic of quantitative analysis, 
                                                     
26 Qualitative Comparative Analysis uses Boolean algebra, a branch of algebra and mathematical logic also used 
frequently in the philosophy of logic, to evaluate and simplify the internal logic of causal arguments. 
Researchers using QCA rely on deep contextual knowledge of the cases to evaluate the presence or absence of 
the variables in their model. These data are then represented via truth tables and condensed to determine which 
combinations of variables are required to produce particular outcomes (paths). In this way, Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis is similar to spatial modeling or game theory, insofar as they are all methods by which to 
formalize and test arguments and theories. For more on the method, see: Charles C. Ragin, The Comparative 
Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1987); Charles C. Ragin, Fuzzy-Set Social Science (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).  
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several scholars have argued that comparative historical studies are inherently biased because 
they select cases for their outcome, rather than sampling randomly.27 Without variation in the 
dependent variable, it is impossible to discern what is causing a particular outcome. 
However, comparative historical analysis does not follow the same logic as quantitative 
analysis. Specifically, studies seeking to understand the necessary conditions for an outcome 
benefit from reducing variation in the dependent variable.28 
 In addition to concerns about selection of cases based on outcome, bias in the 
selection of cases for comparison can result in biased or incomplete conclusions. For 
example, the Sonderweg thesis, which developed out of the Bielefeld School in the 1960s, 
argued that Germany’s path from feudalism to democracy was unique and all but guaranteed 
the development of fascist ideology and control. Historians promoting the Sonderweg thesis 
supported the argument by comparing German development to that of Britain and France. 
However, reflecting on the Sonderweg, Jürgen Kocka argued that “[t]he Western 
comparative perspective makes National Socialism appear deviant; from a southern or south-
eastern European perspective, Nazism becomes part of a phenomenon spread across large 
parts of the continent.”29  
 Lopez-Alves and Centeno’s edited volume The Other Mirror is focused on addressing 
precisely this concern. The volume ultimately highlights how biased case selection – focused 
in this particular instance on Eurocentrism in the production of grand theory – resulted in 
                                                     
27 Barbara Geddes, “How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative 
Politics,” in Political Analysis, volume 2, ed. James A. Stimson (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1990); Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in 
Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
28 James Mahoney, “Strategies of Causal Assessment in Comparative Historical Analysis,” in Comparative 
Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, ed. James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschmeyer (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003); Ragin, Fuzzy Set Social Science 
29 Jürgen Kocka, “Aysmmetrical Historical Comparison: The Case of the German Sonderweg,” History and 
Theory, 38 (February 1999), 49. 
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biased conclusions and theory that struggle to explain cases outside of Europe. Comparative 
historical researchers, therefore, need to be sensitive to how case selection biases conclusions 
and outcomes, by either limiting the scope of their conclusions or being more conscientious 
in case selection.30 Fortunately, Mill’s logics for comparison are oriented toward precisely 
this: cases are selected based on exactly how they vary and on which variables.  
 Another related problem stems from the unevenness of case knowledge. This comes, 
in large part, from researchers extending beyond their “specialty.” In multi-case studies, for 
example, the researcher certainly is more familiar with some cases than others, just as the 
researcher studying one case across time is likely more familiar with some periods than 
others. This risk is inherent to comparative analysis precisely because deep and detailed 
contextual knowledge requires substantial investment from the researcher; gaining this sort 
of familiarity for several cases would require a lifetime of research. However, this limitation 
is present for any methodology concerned with multiple variables or units of analysis. As 
with concerns about bias stemming from case selection, the solution here is reflexivity. John 
Foran’s admission in Taking Power that he has a “best case” in Iran and relied on country 
and area specialists to bolster his knowledge of other cases is precisely how researchers 
should handle this.31 
  Finally, comparative historical analysis assumes that cases (units) are independent, 
despite this very rarely being strictly true. As Skocpol stated in her study of revolutions: 
“these phenomena occur in unique world-historical contexts that change over time, and they 
                                                     
30 Arend Lijphart cited this as one of the means through which to strengthen comparative historical research 
more generally. Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method.”  
31 Foran, Taking Power, 27-8. 
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happen within international structures that tie societies to one another.”32 Some researchers 
attempt to address this concern directly by limiting the cases available for analysis. Moore, 
for example, consciously barred smaller European and Asian states because “the decisive 
causes of their politics lie outside of their own boundaries… [and] their political problems 
are not really comparable to those of larger countries.”33 Skocpol and Foran shared this 
concern in their respective studies of revolution. Both scholars recognized that revolutionary 
movements happen in a world that sees the results and may learn from or be inspired by 
them. Studies of contemporary phenomena have even greater difficulty with this as 
information is even more available and sources of news and information are more deeply 
penetrating than previously. 
 As with the previous limitations, a solution to this concern is to be conscious of the 
ways in which selected cases are interdependent and influenced by one another. Skocpol, for 
instance, paid particular attention to the fact that Russian revolutionaries played a direct role 
in the Chinese revolution. Sensitizing oneself to the connections between selected cases 
encourages the researcher to identify whether the connections and interdependencies are 
relevant to the analysis at hand. It is also worth noting that a lack of independence does not 
signal that nothing can be gained from comparison: only perfectly dependent cases produce 
no new information.  
 
Research Design 
This study takes a diachronic single-case approach to examining the intersections of nation, 
                                                     
32 Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions¸39. 
33 Moore, Social Origins, X. 
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nationalism, and citizenship. Because of the hegemonic nature of “the national,” the only 
method of observing changes in national identity, character, symbols, traditions, etc., is to 
observe them over relatively long periods. 34  That is, changes in “the national” are the result 
of what Paul Pierson called “cumulative causes,” which itself constitutes a “cumulative 
outcome.”35 For example, demographic change, geopolitical shifts, institutional development, 
and cultural production all contribute to the production of “the national” and are all 
cumulative processes. Furthermore, one of the benefits of a diachronic study is that a “long 
sequence of historical development offers … a large number of theoretically relevant 
observations that may rule out or suggest the revision of a whole series of propositions.”36 
 My research questions are not concerned with generalizations or the development of 
grand theory; rather, they are concerned with evaluating existing theory by applying it to a 
single case. Specifically, I am seeking to understand transformations in the criteria that 
determine who can be a German national and what it means to be one. Rather than taking a 
deductive approach oriented towards hypothesis testing, I am approaching my questions 
inductively. I am guided by past theories on the concepts of nation, nationalism, and the 
national, as well as theories of citizenship and Orientalism. My goal, however, is not to fit the 
data to these theories, but rather, to use these theories as sensitizing concepts that guide my 
analysis. 
 In order to facilitate the use of the comparative historical method, my unit of analysis 
will be the nation-state at various historical moments. In a manner similar to Moore, Skocpol, 
                                                     
34 For more on “the national” as hegemonic ideology, see Chapter 2 above. 
35 Paul Pierson, “Big, Slow-Moving… and Invisible: Macro-social Processes in the Study of Comparative 
Politics,” in Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences, ed. James Mahoney and Dietrich 
Rueschmeyer (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).  
36 Dietrich Rueschmeyer, “Can One or Few Cases Yield Theoretical Gains?” Comparative Historical Analysis 
in the Social Sciences, ed. James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschmeyer (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), 311. 
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Foran, and others, I separate the German case into historical periods in order to highlight the 
similarities that exist despite substantial structural, systemic, and contextual differences. 
Indeed, by dividing the German case into three distinct periods, I can control for the effects 
of changes in (or the emergence of) the international system, changes in political system, 
industrialization, and other major macro-level changes. This decision does limit the scope of 
the conclusions that can be drawn from the data. However, by sacrificing generalizability I 
reduce variation in case knowledge, which makes it easier to establish validity.  
 
Data Collection 
Engaging in comparative historical research, especially the comparative history of 
institutions and the artifacts they produce, necessitates an archival approach. As a result, this 
study draws on both primary and secondary texts as data. Specifically, I examine citizenship 
law, constitutional amendments, parliamentary debates, the German citizenship test, public 
speeches, newspaper articles and editorials, educational materials, and secondary histories. 
Focusing on these sources of data allows me to examine contestations over the content of the 
German national not only through analysis of the content that becomes hegemonic, but also 
through analysis of the contests over hegemony. Much of these data are available either 
through the German government or the newspapers themselves.  
 My analysis in this study relies heavily on the online archives of the Reichsgesetzblatt 
and Bundesgesetzblatt, hosted by Universität Regensburg and Bundesanzeiger Verlag 
respectively. The Reichsgesetzblatt (RGBl) was a public gazette published between 1868 and 
1944 that published full-length copies of German laws as produced by the Reichstag. From 
1868 to 1871, the RGBl was published by the North German Confederation (Norddeutsche 
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Bund). Publication of the RGBl was picked up by the German Empire (Deutsches Reich and 
later Großdeutsches Reich) between 1871 and 1944. After the dissolution of the Deutsches 
Reich and the formation of the Federal Republic of German (Bundesrepublik Deustchland) in 
1945, the publication was renamed the Bundesgesetzblatt. These archives, combined with 
Kay Hailbronner, Günter Renner, and Hans-Georg Maaßen’s Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht – 
which collects laws pertaining to citizenship, naturalization, refugees, etc. and provides 
commentary and analysis of the changes – contain the full scope of laws, regulations, and 
guidelines relating to citizenship law.  
 Much of the data are available online, including many of the newspaper articles. 
However, I did need to find physical copies of some of the news articles, speeches, 
parliamentary debate records, and law. The educational materials consist of lists of approved 
workbooks published by the German government and the workbooks themselves. Each of the 
workbooks used as data in this study is on the list of books approved for use in integration 
courses that is published by the German Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge [Federal 
Ministry for Migration and Refugees]. The six approved workbooks are all written and 
published by different private publishing houses, and are available for purchase through 
online retailers. The Bundesamt also publishes a curriculum for the integration courses which 
is available for download on their website and is used as data. 
 All of my sources for this study are available either for free or at minimal cost and 
cited as descriptively as possible in the interest of replicability and, therefore, reliability. 
Many of the primary sources are available only in German, and I use the original German for 
almost all sources that are available in both English and German. Almost all of the 
translations in this study are my own, unless otherwise specified. For most translations, I 
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include the original German, either in the text or in an attached footnote.
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Chapter III 
Citizenship and the German Nation, 1870-2000 
 
Writing in the wake of German reunification, which was arguably the greatest triumph of jus 
sanguinis citizenship policy, Rogers Brubaker asserted that “there is no chance that the 
French system of jus soli will be adopted [in Germany]; the automatic transformation of 
immigrants into citizens remains unthinkable....”1 Brubaker’s argument could not foresee 
either Germany or France straying from their respective paths, which had been shaped by 
their own respective histories, precisely because he saw their histories as building inertia. 
However, in the twenty-two years following the publication of Citizenship and Nationhood 
in France and Germany, the Bundestag passed substantial reforms to the German Nationality 
Act. This law opened up pathways to naturalization and broadened the ascription of 
citizenship at birth to incorporate non-ethnic Germans. Brubaker’s prediction did not 
materialize, but why was he so far off the mark?  
 Christian Joppke, like many scholars, sees these German reforms as being a symptom 
of processes of globalization that are divorcing the nation and the state. If we believe that this 
divorce is underway, then, according to Joppke, “Brubaker’s well-known argument that 
citizenship is determined by long-standing traditions of nationhood has to be rejected. 
Following this line of reasoning, Germany could never have had its citizenship reform of 
1999, and this proverbial ethnic nation could not, as it does now, grant condition jus soli 
                                                     
1 Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1992), 185. 
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citizenship to second-generation immigrants.”2 In fact, Joppke rejects Brubaker’s theoretical 
argument altogether. He understands citizenship law as having been developed and refined 
over time by bureaucrats and legal specialists from different governments observing one 
another. From this perspective, he suggests that it is unlikely that in a functionally 
differentiated society citizenship law could be “driven by the profanations of nationalist 
intellectuals, be they statesmen, composers, or fairy-tale collectors.”3 Instead, innovations in 
citizenship policy made in one state are either imposed abroad or imitated by other states. 
This trend towards liberalizing citizenship in Germany is not an unforeseeable historical 
anomaly, but rather, the result of a transformation in Europe post-World War II towards 
cosmopolitan or post-national citizenship.4 
 Another explanation is that Brubaker’s prediction failed because it is predicated on a 
particular reading of German nationhood in the second half of the 20th century. In Citizenship 
and Nationhood, Brubaker reads nationhood from citizenship law, although he suggests that 
nationhood is a hegemonic ideology that limits the range of possible expressions of state 
interests.5 Because citizenship law is but one in a range of possible expressions, reading 
nationhood back from citizenship produces an incomplete view of the realm of myths, 
histories, traditions, and symbols that constitute the national imaginary. Brubaker’s 
                                                     
2 Christian Joppke, “Transformations of Citizenship: States, Rights, Identity,” Citizenship Studies, 11 (February 
2007), 40. 
3 Joppke, 40. 
4 Joppke is not alone in this interpretation. For more on arguments about the movement towards post-national or 
cosmopolitan citizenship, see: Rainer Bauböck, “Models of Citizenship and Rules of Naturalisation,” in 
Challenging Racism in Britain and Germany, ed. Zig Layton-Henry and Czarina Wilpert (New York: Palgrave-
McMillan, 2003); Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Love: On the Frailty of Human Bonds (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2003); Ulrich Beck, “The Cosmopolitan Society and Its Enemies,” Theory, Culture, and Society, 19 (April 
2002); Jürgen Habermas, The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001); 
Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Yasmin 
Nuhoğlu Soysal, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1994); Bronislaw Szerszynski and John Urry, “Cultures of Cosmopolitanism,” The 
Sociological Review, 50 (November 2002). 
5 For more on how hegemonic ideologies limit the interpretation and expression of interests, see Antonio 
Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (New York: International Publishers, 2014). 
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understanding of German national idioms from 1945 to 1990 fails to include the public 
discussions and debates about the national character, national history, symbols (and their use 
or disuse), and traditions. It is no wonder, therefore, that the introduction of jus soli into 
German citizenship law was so unimaginable to him. His account for German nationhood in 
the post-War period relies heavily on pre-War citizenship law, rather than post-War 
institutions and debates, because he posits the national imaginary as rigid and unchanging.6  
 I hold the second position and, in doing so, maintain Brubaker’s theoretical position 
that citizenship law exists at the intersection of myths of nationhood and various state 
interests. This intersection is imperfect, and may favor state interests over nationhood, or vice 
versa. Furthermore, I understand citizenship as a particular relationship between an 
individual and the state through which the state imposes responsibilities on individuals. At 
the same time, this relationship also marks those individuals known as citizens as being 
guaranteed protection and other services by the state. As a result, citizenship often, but not 
always, maintains the boundaries of the national community.  
 The goal of this chapter is to recontextualize the development of citizenship law in 
Germany within the broader public debates about German nationhood. In doing so, my 
objective is to construct an understanding of the symbols, meanings, and traditions around 
which the German nation has been organized in the post-War period. Specifically, I will 
emphasize German debates around the construction of national history, the role of and need 
for immigrants, and German culture. Beginning with a discussion of the German Empire and 
the Third Reich, I will trace the establishment of the ethnic characterization of German 
                                                     
6 Many scholars have written about national history, symbols, or traditions as being contested and frequently 
rewritten and reimagined. For examples of this, see: Christopher Hill, National History and the World of 
Nations: Capital, state, and the rhetoric of history in Japan, France, and the United States (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2008); Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism; Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, The 
Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). Anthony D. Smith, National Identity 
(London: Penguin, 1991). 
  
 62   
 
citizenship and identity. From there, I will sketch an outline of the German “national,” 
focusing on three major influences on post-War German society and identity: the legacy of 
history, foreign pressures, and labor migration. However, this is not intended to replace the 
understanding of Germanness as couched in race and ethnicity, but rather to augment it by 
contributing an understanding of how it operates below the surface. Discussion of race and 
ethnicity is taboo in post-War Germany, so exclusion cannot operate as directly as under the 
Third Reich. As a result, I argue that German exclusion operates through a discourse of 
culture-as-race.  
 
Ethno-cultural and ethno-racial nations 
Until the reforms of the past sixteen years, German citizenship law had faithfully reflected 
Helmut Kohl’s famous proclamation that Germany was not a land of immigration. 
Germany’s first centralized citizenship law, the 1913 Reich- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz 
[Nationality Law of the German Empire], emerged, in part, out of two complementary 
demographic concerns. Prior to 1913, citizenship in the Reich was achieved by having and 
maintaining citizenship in the member states. This system, inherited from Prussia, attributed 
citizenship on the basis of descent, marriage, and naturalization, but tied the retention of 
citizenship to the territory. That is, although living in the territory was insufficient for gaining 
citizenship, leaving the territory for a substantial period was sufficient grounds for losing it. 
This is, in part, because Germanness was primarily cultural and linguistic. Echoing Johann 
Gottfried Herder and Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s calls for a strong and vibrant German-
speaking community, Bismarck’s primary approach to Polish laborers and immigrants in the 
east of Prussia was one of assimilation. Bismarck’s politics in the east of Prussia were 
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initially aimed at Germanizing the Catholic Poles who lived there. His Polenpolitik [policies 
towards Poles] and Kulturkampf [cultural struggle] included removing Polish religious 
leaders and teachers, limiting the language spoken in compulsory primary education to 
German, and banning and later limiting of Polish immigration into eastern Prussia. 
Eventually, Bismarck shifted from attempting to Germanize the Poles to attempting to 
Germanize the land by expelling the Polish people living there and relocating ethnic 
Germans.7 
 Aversion to Polish immigrants and citizens was typically framed around the 
perceived inferiority of Slavic peoples, and, although Bismarck was motivated by these same 
understandings of Eastern Europeans as inferior, he articulated his objection to Polish 
immigration and identity primarily as fear of the strength of Polish nationalism.8 Bismarck 
was concerned that Poles were not adapting to German as the language of public life and the 
intelligentsia; they were ensconcing themselves in Polish communities led by Polish clergy 
and nobility who promoted Polish in schools, Catholicism at home and in public, and the 
rejection of German culture in favor of Polish norms. Politicians feared a wave of 
Polonization, which would sweep over the eastern provinces and make them unrecognizable 
to their German citizens. This led to tighter naturalization restrictions, especially against 
Poles and Jews, with later restrictions imposed on Danes and Czechs.9 Naturalization 
restrictions were not codified in law, but neither were they secret in any sense of the word. 
Indeed, Jewish organizations and the Polish Party were aware of the restrictions because of 
the substantially lower naturalization rates for Jews and Poles. In spite of this, Prussian 
                                                     
7 Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood, 131. See also: Eli Nathans, The Politics of Citizenship in Germany: 
Ethnicity, Utility, and Nationalism (New York: Berg Publishers, 2004), 126. 
8 Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood, 131. This is not to say that Bismarck’s objections were not rooted in 
anti-Slavic sentiments, which were dominant in the Reich at the time. Instead, this is to say that, perhaps in spite 
of his anti-Slavic attitudes, Bismarck formulated the logic for Polish exclusion around competing nationalisms. 
9 Nathans, Politics of Citizenship. 
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officials were able to deny that applicants were being rejected based on their ethnicity and 
maintain their unofficial restrictions. These restrictions did not disappear with the 
introduction of the 1913 Nationality Act.  
 In the late 19th century, several nationalist groups began petitioning the Reich for a 
new citizenship policy that would simultaneously be more relaxed for Germans abroad and 
more exclusive for foreigners. The Pan-German League and the Colonial Society were 
especially vocal about wanting to ensure that Germans abroad were able to retain their 
citizenship in the Reich. Because of this expectation that German nationals and citizens 
living abroad would remain German at heart, these nationalist groups believed that Reich 
citizenship should only be lost for those who applied for citizenship in their receiving nation-
state without a pressing economic reason.10 Preserving German citizenship for German 
emigrants, as well as for their children and grandchildren, was meant to encourage their 
return and, as an indirect result, help to create a homogeneous German nation-state. German 
emigrants, they argued, could be reasonably expected to remain German in their hearts, 
which was sufficient. Making the naturalization process more accessible for returning ethnic 
Germans and maintaining citizenship for emigrants was to be accompanied by a tightening of 
the process for Volksfremde [foreigners, non-nationals]. According to the Pan-German 
League, those foreign to the ethnic and cultural German community had no place there 
because they could not and, possibly more importantly, would not Germanize. Nationalist 
groups did not see acceptance of language and culture as sufficient evidence that immigrants 
were truly German.11 
 Most major parties were sympathetic, at the very least, to the Pan-German League’s 
                                                     
10 Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood, 116; Nathans, Politics of Citizenship, 175. 
11 Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood, 116; see also, Nathans, Politics of Citizenship, 172-181. 
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and Colonial Society’s appeals for protecting the citizenship of Auslandsdeutsche [Germans 
living abroad], and the 1913 Nationality Act reflects this. Article 17 outlines the conditions 
for the loss of citizenship, which includes loss by dismissal, acquisition of citizenship in a 
foreign nation, non-performance of compulsory military duty, official mandate, evidence of 
being born to a non-German, and a woman’s marriage to a foreigner.12 Notably absent from 
the law is loss of citizenship through emigration. Ethnic Germans abroad would retain their 
citizenship, and, even more importantly, were granted automatic routes to naturalization. 
Provisions in Articles 30, 31, and 32 granted automatic naturalization to ethnic Germans who 
lost their citizenship through expatriation but still lived in Germany at the end of the first 
year after their expatriation. Further, emigration was no longer grounds for the loss of 
citizenship, so long as they had not acquired foreign citizenship. Germans who lived abroad 
for ten years or more were now granted the full protection of and membership in the German 
state.13 Indeed, the 1913 Nationality Act directly addressed the major concern of nationalist 
groups in the Reich by regarding as German those of German heritage.14  
 Despite the Pan-German League’s best efforts, nothing in the law, however, tightened 
restrictions on naturalization for foreigners. Access to naturalization was still contingent 
                                                     
12 “Die Staatsangehörigkeit geht verloren: durch Entlassung, durch den Erwerb einer ausländischen 
Staatsangehörigkeit, durch Nichterfüllung der Wehrpflicht, durch Ausspruch der Behörde, für ein uneheliches 
Kind durch eine Angehörigen eines anderen Bundesstaats oder von einem Ausländer bewirkte und nach den 
deutschen Gesetzen wirksame Legitimation, für eine Deutsche durch Eheschließung mit dem Angehörigen 
eines anderen Bundesstaats oder mit einem Ausländer.” “Reichs- und Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz,” 
Reichsgesetzblatt I (1913), 587.  
13 It is important to note that much of this was dependent on fulfilling the compulsory military service. One of 
the few ways for a German man to lose his citizenship, besides applying for expatriation or gaining citizenship 
in a foreign state, was to live abroad and fail to complete his compulsory military service by age 31. However, 
this liability could be absolved or postponed. As Nathans notes, the guidelines issued by the Foreign Office to 
consular bureaucrats contained notable class bias. Applicants whose property or employment would be 
threatened by completing their military obligation were to be exempted. For more on this, see Nathans, Politics 
of Citizenship, 174-179. 
14 I differentiate here between heritage, which can be considered those things transmitted through socialization, 
such as values, traditions, identity, etc., and heredity, which should be understood as ancestry. Having German 
heritage, then, is possessing the proper cultural markers of Germanness, where German heredity refers to being 
“of German stock” or to possessing those biological characteristics which are part and parcel of the myth of 
German ethno-racial homogeneity. 
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upon being able to support oneself, having one’s own residence, not having been convicted 
of a crime, and being deemed legally competent. Restrictions against “undesirable” 
foreigners, including Jews, Poles, and Czechs, were not codified, but did remain informally 
during and after World War I. Citizenship was still transmitted through parentage. Any child 
whose father possessed German citizenship at the time of birth would be ascribed German 
citizenship as well. In conjunction with the maintenance of German citizenship abroad, this 
would result in a German community abroad that, it was hoped, would support German 
interests abroad. Citizenship was transmitted through heritage for families that were already 
citizens, but ethnic Germans, those with German blood, who never possessed Reich 
citizenship were given no special consideration. Even children and grandchildren of former 
citizens were granted special access to naturalization as long as they did not possess foreign 
citizenship. Seemingly, Germanness was not transmitted through blood or genetics, alone. 
Instead, Germanness came from receiving Germanness through heritage; as far as the state 
was concerned, it was expected that German parents would transmit German values and 
allegiance to the Reich to their children, rather than that there was something inherently 
valuable in German blood. 
 Citizenship in the Reich, and later the Weimar Republic, were not as purely ethno-
racial as some suggest. Certainly, citizenship was tied to the concept of Germans as a 
community of descent, but absent from the text of the law is the idea of Germans as an ethnic 
community transcending the boundaries of the state. Being of German stock was not 
sufficient for gaining Reich citizenship, otherwise many more Austrian Germans would have 
been Reichsangehörige [citizens of the Empire]. In addition, anti-Semitic and anti-Slavic 
attitudes were not absent from naturalization processes. Individual states were able to raise 
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barriers to the naturalization of foreigners, and by 1920, all states in the Republic had 
instituted a minimum residency requirement for non-ethnic German applicants of ten years, 
with some states going as high as twenty years. On top of this, application fees were 
imposed, which were higher for non-ethnic German applicants than for ethnic Germans. 
Humiliation from the terms of surrender and economic collapse created ideal conditions for 
the rejection of foreigners, who could bring in foreign capital and buy German property and 
land for next to nothing as a result of high inflation. Germans had been lost to the territorial 
concessions required in the Treaty of Versailles, and the only way to ensure that they would 
return was to maintain a healthy and vibrant German culture at home. Indeed, guidelines put 
forward by the Interior Ministry promoted the naturalization of ethnic Germans who had 
never been citizens, so long as “they preserved the German outlook [deutsche Gesinnung] 
and German special nature [Eigenart] while abroad.”15 That is, so long as they possessed the 
values and culture of the German nation. 
  Although attitudes towards naturalizing Jews largely stabilized with the economy in 
much of the Reich, anti-foreigner sentiment, and especially anti-Semitic sentiment, re-
emerged during the Great Depression. There was, however, a solidification of the expectation 
that many non-Germans, especially bourgeois Eastern European Jews, who spoke German or 
received a German education would be Germans in practice.16 By 1935, the Nazi state 
codified unofficial prejudice in the 1935 Nuremberg Laws, which also began the transition 
from an ethno-cultural understanding of citizenship to an ethno-racial one. The Reich 
Citizenship Law created a new form of citizen status [Reichsbürger] that existed in addition 
to and above the status of the traditional German citizen [Staatsangehörige(r)]. Only those of 
                                                     
15 Memorandum from the Reich Minister of the Interior to the different Länder of 1 June 1921 quoted in 
Nathans, Politics of Citizenship in Germany, 202. 
16 Nathans, Politics of Citizenship, 207. 
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German or kindred blood [deutschen oder artverwandten Blutes]17 whose conduct displayed 
that they were willing and able to loyally serve the German people and state [daß er gewillt 
und geeignet ist, in Treue dem deutschen Volk und Reich zu dienen] were to be Reichsbürger. 
Moreover only Reichsbürger were to be afforded full political rights and protection.18 
Beneath the Reichsbürger were the Staatsangehörige who gained and retained citizenship 
based on the Nationality Act of 1913. Along with the Reich Citizenship Law, the Nuremburg 
Laws contained the Law for the Protection of German Blood and Honor. Asserting the 
necessity of pure German blood for the preservation of the German nation, the Law for the 
Protection of German Blood and Honor prohibited Jews from marrying or having relations 
with citizens of German blood, as well as from displaying the Reich flag, the national flag, 
and the national colors.19 Two months later, the Reichstag passed the first amendment to the 
Reich Citizenship Law; in it, Jews were prohibited from becoming Reichsbürger and, as a 
result, were unable to vote or hold office.20 
 The Reich Citizenship Law and its first amendment codified the notion of a German 
nation tied not to culture or language, but to heredity. Germanness was not transmitted from 
father to child through a “German outlook” or “special nature,” but through genetics and 
blood. Reichsbürger could only ever be those who were German by genetic descent. In 1933 
the Reichstag passed a law that allowed the nullification of naturalizations granted between 
1918 and 1933, as well as the removal of citizenship from those ethnic Germans who had 
fled Germany during the same period. In the first case, the Reich was able to nullify any 
                                                     
17 “Artverwandten Blut” refers specifically to those of the same genus. The use of biological language here is in 
accordance with Hitler’s belief that Germans belonged to a distinct race of humanity that enjoyed genetic and, 
therefore, hereditary superiority.  
18 “Reichsbürgergesetz,” Reichsgesetzblatt I (1935), 1146. 
19 “Gesetz zum Schutze des deutschen Blutes und der deutschen Ehre,” Reichsgesetzblatt I (1935), 1146-1147. 
20 “Verordnung zum Reichsbürgergesetz,” Reichsgesetzblatt I (1935), 1333-1334. 
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naturalizations it deemed “undesirable.”21 In the second instance, the citizenship of any 
emigrant whose actions “violate the duty of loyalty to the Reich and the Volk…” could be 
revoked. 22 Both of these laws were instrumental in the removal of citizenship and seizure of 
property from German Jews within the Reich and abroad. Although the article regarding the 
removal of citizenship from emigrants did not specify a racial component, it was applied with 
a “völkisch-national” criteria in mind, and more than 7,000 Jews lost their citizenship in the 
wake of this law.23 
 As Germany expanded eastward, Hitler was concerned with the weakening of 
Germandom in the Reich. His desire to maintain German racial purity, and therefore German 
national purity, resulted in the creation of the Volksliste, a state administered registry of all 
ethnic Germans in the Reich and Eastern Territories. The Volksliste was an effort to create an 
objective and scientific categorization of Germans in order to prevent Poles, Czechs, and 
Slavs from gaining the rights and privileges accorded to ethnic Germans, as well as to protect 
ethnic Germans from contamination. Four categories of German were created: (1) those who 
had German blood and had been actively engaged in the nationalist cause; (2) those with 
German blood who had been passive to “the cause;” (3) those with German blood who had 
been “Polonized,” and, as a result, would need to be re-educated and Germanized; and (4) 
those with German blood who were deemed of value and were actively engaged in the Polish 
nation.24 Access to full protection and full political participation (Reichsbürger status) was 
initially reserved for only the first two categories, although it was eventually restricted to 
                                                     
21 “Gesetz über den Widerruf von Einbürgerungen und die Aberkennung der deutschen Staatsangehörigkeit,” 
Reichsgesetzblatt I (1933), 480. 
22 Quoted in Nathans, Politics of Citizenship, 219. 
23 Nathans, Politics of Citizenship, 219 
24 “Erlass für den Überprüfung und Aussonderung der Bevölkerung in den eingegliederten Ostgebieten,” Herder 
Institut, (2012, [1940]); “Verordnung über die Deutsche Volksliste und die deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit in den 
eingegliederten Ostgebieten,” Reichsgesetzblatt I (1941), 118-120. 
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those individuals in the first list. The latter two categories were for ethnic Germans who 
needed to be re-educated. By 1942, both the third and fourth categories were subject to the 
revocation of their citizenship [Staatsangehörige auf Widerruf].25  
 Despite the Reich’s claim to represent all people of German descent 
[Deutschstämmige], German blood without the appropriate attitudes, culture, and language 
was not enough to ensure belonging to the Volk. That said, there was no amount of culture or 
devotion that could compensate for the providence of birth. Absent German descent, no 
combination of speaking German, being culturally German, and devoting oneself to the 
Reich and Volk could ever be sufficient criteria for citizenship. The Reich actively pursued 
Hitler’s vision of a racially homogenous Germany. Although racial purity as they conceived 
of it was a complete fiction, as are all myths of homogeneity, the effects of the regime’s 
eradication-oriented policies were very real. Descent was central to the Nazi conception of 
Germanness; it was the privileged category that united a people scattered across Europe in 
spite of different cultural or linguistic backgrounds, although their culture and language 
would need to be Germanized. Moreover, it was a privileged category under the Kaiserreich 
and the Weimar Republic. However, during these periods, culture was valued much more 
highly. Ethnic Germans who had never been citizens were expected to naturalize through the 
same process as Poles, Jews, Czechs, and Danes under the 1870 and 1913 laws. Although 
ethnic Germans typically had an easier time navigating the bureaucracy and getting their 
applications approved, they were nonetheless rejected by locals on the basis of culture.  
 
Citizenship and Nationhood: 1945-2000 
                                                     
25 “Verordnung über die Deutsche Volksliste.” 
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Creating a new German state under Allied occupation was as much an ideological 
undertaking as a practical one. Purging Nazis from the realm of public life (education, civil 
service, etc.) required a complicated understanding of guilt and a method for assessing and 
attributing it.26 Reconstructing bureaucratic and administrative structures and writing a new 
constitution required agreements on both methods of governance and which structures would 
be best insulated from the same perversion that infiltrated Weimar institutions. Of course, 
each of these was complicated by ideological conflict both between the Western Allies and 
the Soviet Union, as well as among the Western Allies. Allied efforts at reconstructing the 
German state needed to address the following questions: Were all Germans equally guilty of 
the atrocities of the Nazi regime? Was the Nazi problem a problem of individuals or of 
structures? Were Nazis, and Germans more generally, to be punished or rehabilitated? Could 
there be room for a unified German people and German identity in Europe? 
 The Western Allies emphasized that occupation was a process of recovery. It was not 
enough to cleanse German public life of Nazis, but rather the German people also needed to 
be reeducated. Ensuring that Nazism did not resurge and that Germans were both open to and 
capable of democratic rule required ideological conditioning. Democratization was as 
important as and a part of denazification, although the process was rocky at best.27 However, 
by 1949, representatives of the Länder [states] occupied by the Western Allies had written 
and ratified a new constitution for the Federal Republic of Germany. The Basic Law 
[Grundgesetz], which codified democratic institutions and structures, was, in many ways, an 
abnegation of the policies and atrocities of the Nazi regime. It included strong support for 
                                                     
26 Karl Jaspers, The Question of German Guilt, trans. E.B. Ashton (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2000). 
27 For an example of this, see Mary Fulbrook’s discussion of the problems of democratic elections that elect 
non-democratic candidates and German opinions of democratic institutions. Mary Fulbrook, A History of 
Germany 1918-2014: The Divided Nation, 4th Edition (West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 2015).  
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basic human rights and their enforcement, equality before the law, and a constitutional 
prohibition against denaturalization. These articles were direct responses to Nazi policies, 
including the 1933 Law on the Revocation of Citizenship and the 1935 Nuremburg 
Citizenship Law.  
 In addition to establishing democratic rule, the Basic Law established West Germany 
as the rightful representative of all Germans, including those in the Soviet zone and Soviet 
Eastern Europe. The Basic Law was meant to be an interim constitution that would be in 
effect until all Germans could participate in the creation of a new one, including those “to 
whom participation was denied” [denen mitzuwirken versagt war].28 Reunification was 
incorporated into the constitution as an important goal for the German people, for whom it 
was a duty to achieve “the unity and freedom of Germany through free self-determination” 
[in freier Selbstbestimmung die Einheit und Freiheit Deutschlands zu vollenden].29 In order 
for reunification to be politically viable, the West German state asserted itself as the rightful 
representative of Germans everywhere based on the principle of self-determination. Germans 
were defined ethnically, in the Basic Law and in the Nationality Act of 1913, which became 
the citizenship law of the Federal Republic. Anyone who held German citizenship in 1937 or 
was an expellee or refugee who had been accepted into the pre-1938 German territory was to 
be considered German. Furthermore, those whose citizenship had been revoked between 
1933 and 1945 were to be considered as never having lost their citizenship.30 
 Citizenship law in the Federal Republic was the same as under the 1913 law. One of 
the first Allied actions was to revoke the 1935 amendments that established a hierarchy of 
                                                     
28 Grundgesetz der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, (May 23, 1949), https://www.bundestag.de/grundgesetz, 1. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Article 116, Grundgesetz. This was further codified in the 1955 Act on the Regulation of Questions of 
Nationality. “Gesetz für Regelung von Fragen der Staatsangehörigkeit,” Bundesgesetzblatt 1955, 65. 
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citizenships and excluded Jews from access. Although with some changes, the 1913 
Nationality Act remained the basis for the attribution of citizenship until the 1999 reforms. 
However, this meant that the attribution of German citizenship was still based on descent, 
even if that descent was premised on the transmission of culture through socialization. 
Continuing to conceptualize Germanness as tied to descent served as an important legal basis 
for reunification and the integration of East German and Eastern European Aussiedler 
[resettlers]. Reforms to citizenship law, naturalization law, and foreigner law over the period 
between the establishment of the Basic Law and the 1999 reforms that introduced jus soli to 
Germany reflect the primary political objective of the Federal Republic: reunification.  
 What the laws do not reflect to any substantial degree, however, are the important 
public debates during the same period that addressed important dimensions of German 
identity, namely: who can be German and what is Germany’s role in Europe? Both of these 
questions were further complicated by the Holocaust and the Nazi regime, which further 
cemented Germany as a dangerous and unstable state in the center of Europe. It also 
forcefully asserted that Germans were only those with German blood in their veins and 
Germany in their hearts. Attempts to redefine what it means to be German, then, had to 
account for and overcome the legacy of the Holocaust. Germans were faced with the 
following questions, among others: What is it to be German in the wake of the Holocaust? 
Can there be German nationalism free from the stain of National Socialism? If not, what is 
there for Germans to identify with and be proud of? Where does Germany fit within Europe? 
Can Germany grow economically and politically without threatening its neighbors? Each of 
these questions was involved in the larger identity-building process that took place in 
Germany during the second half of the 20th century. Answers to these questions were 
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influenced by external and internal forces, including public spectacle, foreign relations within 
Europe, and labor migration. Specifically, public debates over the role of the Holocaust in 
German national history, European integration, and the naturalization of a sizeable guest 
worker population helped shape the answers to questions of German nationality. Together, 
these debates indicate that the nation that was being conceptualized across the second half of 
the 20th century differed from the nation described in citizenship law in important ways and 
laid the groundwork for the 1999 reforms.31 
 
Collective guilt, national memory, and national symbols 
 In a series of lectures given shortly after German surrender and Allied occupation, Karl 
Jaspers addressed the questions that became central to German post-War identity. Were the 
German people guilty of the atrocities of the Third Reich? How and in what ways can 
Germans address and deal with their guilt? Were all Germans equally guilty? During the 
early months of Allied occupation, the answer seemed to be that all Germans were equally 
guilty. Placards and posters were distributed and posted throughout German cities and 
villages which read “You are guilty” [Du bist schuldig] and “These Atrocities: Your Fault” 
[Diese Schandtaten: Eure Schuld].32 Part of the process of denazification, of purging Nazis 
from German public life, was the attribution of guilt. To the Allies, and many Germans, 
every single German was, in one way or another, responsible for the horrors perpetrated by 
the National Socialist regime. Karl Jaspers’ lectures, while differentiating between four types 
                                                     
31 I am focusing here on the Federal Republic of Germany primarily because reunification may be most 
accurately described as the accession of the east to the west. As a result, Germany post-reunification is a 
continuation of the policies, myths, and history of the Federal Republic, the institutions of which became the 
institutions of unified Germany.  
32 Aleida Assmann and Ute Frevert, Geschichtsvergessenheit-Geschichtsversessenheit: Vom Umgang mit 
deutschen Vergangenheiten nach 1945 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt GmbH, 1999), 126-127. 
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of guilt that vary by severity and type, came to the conclusion that “no one is guiltless.”33 
However, for Jaspers it was through direct confrontation with their guilt that Germans can 
reconcile with their past; specifically, he says “today we must examine ourselves more 
severely than ever… this is the only way to save our souls from a pariah existence.”34 
 Coming to terms with guilt and memory became an ongoing process for the German 
people. Denazification’s ideological dimension forced Germans to confront their 
involvement in the Holocaust and its development from German nationalist ideology. 
However, direct confrontation with responsibility and guilt did not take hold. On the one 
hand, Germans engaged in practices of self-victimization. Germans were just another entry 
on the list of victims of National Socialism and the war. Soviet persecution of German 
expellees became a meaningful way both to critique the Western Allies for not defending or 
acting in the interests of ethnic Germans in Soviet territory and emphasize German 
victimhood through comparisons to victims of National Socialism.35 Similarly, many 
Germans emphasized a distinction between the Nazi regime and the German people; it was 
the regime that committed the atrocities, the people were also victims of the regime’s 
oppression. On the other, Germans engaged in repression and silence. Remnants of the Nazi 
regime were destroyed on the basis of purging the last vestiges of National Socialism or of 
preventing the virulent ideology from taking hold again; this included the attempted 
destruction of Dachau’s crematoriums in 1953 and 1955 and the Gestapo headquarters in 
Prinz-Albrechtstrasse. Accompanying this was an unease and discomfort around German 
                                                     
33 Karl Jaspers, German Guilt, 15-16 
34 Karl Jaspers, German Guilt, 8, 10. 
35 Robert G. Moeller, “War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany,” The 
American Historical Review, 101 (October 1996). 
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national symbols, especially those tied to the Nazi regime.36 
 During the 1960s and early-1970s, German national history was reconsidered and 
revised to place the emphasis on the victims of National Socialism, as well as on Germany as 
perpetrator rather than as a victim. Fear of reverting to fascism and chauvinistic nationalism 
had made celebration of German identity and German successes uncommon. Historians from 
the Bielefeld School wrote analyses emphasizing the notion of a German Sonderweg [special 
path]. The Sonderweg thesis claimed that Germany’s development from feudalism to 
democracy was not only unique within the context of Europe, but also all but guaranteed the 
development of fascist ideology along the lines of National Socialism. German history was, 
thus, the history of the development of Nazi ideology, which was always destined to come 
from Germany’s incomplete democratization in the 19th century.  
 Within the realm of politics, a similar transformation was occurring. Willy Brandt’s 
rise to chancellor marked a shift in tone for discussing the past in politics. During his 
chancellorship, Konrad Adenauer supported reparations [Wiedergutmachung] for Jewish 
survivors, a domestically unpopular policy, although he rarely spoke of German 
perpetrators.37 Brandt was much more willing to acknowledge and center German 
responsibility for the Holocaust. His policy of coming to terms with the past 
[Vergangenheitsbewältigung], rather than continuing to avoid it, became embodied in his 
symbolic gesture at a former ghetto in Warsaw [Warchauer Kniefall]. This act became both 
national apology and national symbol. While on a diplomatic trip to Poland in order to ease 
relations with the Soviets, Brandt visited the monument commemorating the Warsaw Ghetto 
uprising of 1943. Spontaneously, he fell to his knees in an act of apology on behalf of the 
                                                     
36 Aleida Assmann and Ute Frevert, Geschichtsvergessenheit-Geschichtsversessenheit, 191-198. 
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German people, who had, to that point, offered nothing of the sort. Explaining it after the 
fact, Brandt noted that “an unusual burden accompanied me on my way to Warsaw. Nowhere 
else had people suffered as much as in Poland… On the abyss of German history and 
carrying the burden of the millions who were murdered, I did what people do when words 
fail them.”38 Although Brandt received some criticism at home, his apology was emblematic 
of the new approach to history that was supported by the youth who had been uninvolved in 
the war. 
 Vergangenheitsbewältigung became the dominant approach to thinking about 
Germany’s Nazi past. Since this transition, there have been two major public debates over 
whether or not this internalized guilt was appropriate: the Historikerstreit [historians’ 
dispute] of the late-1980s and the Walser-Bubis-Debatte [Walser-Bubis Debate] of the late-
1990s. Each of these debates originated in specialized fields but took place primarily in the 
newspapers. During the early and mid-1980s, conservative historians began calling for a 
reevaluation of German historiography, supporting, instead, one that did not treat the 
Holocaust as a unique historical event, but rather placed it in the broader context of modern 
genocides. Ernst Nolte, one of the main contributors to the conservative side of the debate, 
argued that the continued ahistorical treatment of the Holocaust – that is, the treatment that 
refused to recognize that it was a reaction to and imitation of Bolshevist tactics and policies – 
was the result of being overly attached to a “past which does not want to go away” and that 
hung “over the present like a vision of horror and an executioner’s sword.”39 Nolte’s position 
found support not only publicly, but also from high ranking politicians. Christian Social 
                                                     
38 The original German quote can be found in: Willy Brandt, Erinnerungen: “Mit den Notizen zum Fall G” 
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Union chairman, Franz Strauß, proclaimed that “Germans must not be portrayed 
‘continuously as the villains of world politics.’”40  
 Critical response to the conservative position varied in its basis. First, Habermas 
argued that conservative attempts to “historicize” the Holocaust were part of a larger 
conservative effort to revive German nationalism in the face of the emerging post-national 
identity being fostered in the Federal Republic.41 Returning to liberal nationalism, Habermas 
argued, would threaten the democratic order and values that had been developed and 
strengthened in the post-War Federal Republic. It was precisely because individuals were 
consistently questioning their own history and were therefore disinterested in affirming their 
continuity as a people that a post-national identity could take hold. Habermas proposed 
constitutional patriotism [Verfassungspatriotismus] as a replacement for and transcendence 
of national identity; that is, identification with and allegiance to democratic institutions and 
the public sphere. Habermas’ support for a German identification with the public sphere 
echoed Jaspers’ assertion that open and honest discussion between equals was the only path 
forward for Germans in the wake of the Holocaust. However, in order for constitutional 
patriotism to develop and crystallize in Germany, Germans needed to maintain an approach 
to their own history that distanced them from it. Critical reflection on the Holocaust, which 
involves an acknowledgement of the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime, was, therefore, 
necessary for Germany to maintain its post-national identity. 
 Although Habermas conceived of constitutional patriotism as a more universalistic 
form of allegiance, democratic ideals became another form of particularistic identification 
with the national community. Elements of constitutional patriotism had already been 
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incorporated into the 1977 National Guidelines for Naturalization. In addition to requiring 
that applicants had lived in Germany for at least ten years and had spoken and written 
command of the German language, these guidelines also stated that “naturalization requires a 
free-willing and longstanding orientation towards Germany, a basic knowledge of our 
institutions, and an orientation towards our free and democratic constitution.”42 These 
guidelines were in no way systematic; local offices relied on interviewing neighbors, friends, 
and the applicant in order to establish that the applicant actually held these beliefs.43 The 
1977 guidelines remained in place until they were integrated into the 1999 reforms. Article 2 
of the 1999 reforms outlines that a foreigner who has lived in Germany for eight years 
(reduced from ten) may be naturalized if they are committed to the free and democratic basic 
order in the constitution and declare that they have no intention of damaging that free 
democratic order.44 By 2006 nearly 92 percent of Germans would identify professing 
allegiance to free and democratic principles as an important criterion for determining whether 
or not to grant citizenship to a naturalization applicant.45 
 Habermas’ second argument echoed many of the sentiments put forward by German 
President Richard von Weizsäcker in his 1985 speech before the Bundestag. The approach to 
the Holocaust that had been developed over the previous decade and a half had produced 
important moral results. For von Weizsäcker, Vergangenheitsbewältigung had created both a 
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cautionary tale and a “guideline for… future behavior.”46 Maintaining this historical 
perspective on the Holocaust was important not because contemporary Germans were 
responsible for the event, but for its historical consequences. The argument, then, was that 
Germany’s past exerts a moral force on the present, which helps guide future behaviors and 
prevents the resurgence of nationalism. Feelings of guilt helped maintain the rejection of 
national symbols and national pride. By this point, the rejection of national symbols to the 
point of discomfort at their display had become part of what it meant to be German.47 Both of 
Habermas’s arguments addressed what it meant to be German. Reviving old national 
symbols and rhetoric undermined the progress he claimed Germans had made towards 
developing a truly post-national state. 
 Although the conservative opinion had gained some traction, the public debate served 
to reassert the dominance of the Vergangenheitsbewältigung approach. Being German, 
therefore, involved feelings of guilt towards the Holocaust, a discomfort with and rejection of 
national symbols, and attachment to democratic institutions and ideals. However, famous 
West German author and former Nazi party member Martin Walser’s acceptance speech for 
the 1998 German Booksellers Association’s Peace Prize reopened the question.48 During his 
speech, Walser argued that the memory of the Holocaust had a stranglehold on Germany and 
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limited expression. Germans were being held captive by their guilt, but the guilt was not 
exercised in good faith. He referred to criticism he had received for failing to depict 
Auschwitz in one of his novels: 
 
I said that anyone who sees everything as a road that could only end in Auschwitz 
makes the German-Jewish relationship into a catastrophe that was predestined under 
any and all circumstances. The intellectual who felt called on to comment called this 
a trivialization of Auschwitz… A clever intellectual on TV assumes a serious 
expression that on his face looks like a foreign language, when he shares with the 
world the author’s serious failure, namely that Auschwitz does not appear in the 
book. Evidently he had never heard of the primal laws of narration, that of narrative 
perspective. But even if he had, Zeitgeist comes before aesthetics.49  
 
 
 Where Habermas saw the potential for producing a positive and universalistic identity 
based on democratic ideals, Walser saw only the constraining of speech and the promotion of 
a negative identity. This guilt was not productive; rather, those who continue to accuse the 
Germans and hold their “everlasting disgrace” up to them do so in order “to hurt us, because 
they think we deserve it” or to relieve their own guilt and move “even for a moment closer to 
the victims than the perpetrators?”50 He called for a reproach of those who continued to 
exploit the memory of the Holocaust and try to cast German guilt as the prevention of 
another genocide. 
  On the sixtieth anniversary of the Kristallnacht, Ignatz Bubis, the then chairman of 
the Central Council of Jews in Germany, issued a response, accusing Walser of committing 
“spiritual arson” and opening the door for right-wing extremism.51 Following his statement, 
Bubis received a great deal of criticism in more than a thousand newspaper articles from a 
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variety of public figures, including the German president, Roman Herzog, and a former 
mayor of Hamburg.52 Although the Historikerstreit had the additional questions about 
German historiography, both that debate and the Walser-Bubis debate centered on the effects 
of the Holocaust on German national identity. The conclusion to the Walser-Bubis debate 
was an agreement that Germany needed a new language for discussing this aspect of its 
history, but not that this aspect needed to be overcome altogether.  
 Rarely do debates about the construction and telling of national history happen in the 
public eye. Even rarer is it that participants are transparent in their intentions. In many ways, 
the Holocaust restarted German national history. It became the new starting point for the 
German story and the German people. German identity and its component parts were 
constructed with this memory in mind, rather than the mythic past of Karl the Great, 
Frederick the Great, Bismarck, and Weimar. Cultural figures such as Goethe, Schiller, 
Beethoven, and Mozart, were allowed to remain, but German history and the German nation 
were tainted. Consequently, the flag, the anthem, and other standard national symbols or 
traditions were abandoned and were used almost exclusively during official ceremonies. 
Western democratic values, the constitution, and the public sphere took their place as 
national symbols and values. Although immigrants and Germans were expected to hold these 
values in order to perform Germanness, the maintenance of guilt and responsibility for the 
Holocaust compose a part of the national imaginary.53 The Holocaust, therefore, shapes three 
aspects of Germanness: (1) a national history that begins in 1949; (2) identification with 
democratic symbols and values; and (3) taboos on and rejection of standard national symbols, 
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pride, and tradition.  
 
Germany, Europe, and the West 
Although much of the German national consciousness was focused on coping with a 
disgraceful past, developments in the Cold War combined with the effects of this disgraceful 
past on the present forced Germany to look towards the future. The Cold War marked the 
international arena’s transition from a multipolar to a bipolar arrangement, leaving much of 
Western Europe to renegotiate its position in international relations. For Germany, however, 
foreign affairs were uncertain due to both internal and external constraints exerted by the 
memories of German aggression. Western Europe, especially France, was apprehensive of 
German economic development and engagement in global affairs out of concern that 
Germany might return to its strong and aggressive behaviors. German politicians recognized 
these fears and were keenly aware of the ways in which Western fears of German strength 
limited the potential for a unified German state. These constraints combined with Cold War 
concerns to orient German continental policy towards integrating into Western Europe, a 
process that informed elements of German national identity. 
 European integration provided a check on German economic recovery and political 
development. Adenauer recognized that France had only supported the creation of a West 
German state as a result of pressures from the United States. In the early years of the post-
War period, a prosperous Germany was not a trustworthy Germany from the European 
perspective. Because political and economic integration into a European regional community 
required the ceding of sovereignty, Adenauer was hopeful that it would assuage continental 
fears generated by the potential of German economic development and, more fundamentally, 
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German unification.54 Policies that promoted European integration, especially at the cost of 
German sovereignty, can be understood, in Helmut Kohl’s words, as “decisive preconditions 
for reunification in peace and freedom.”55 During the early years of the Federal Republic, 
however, European integration was very unpopular domestically. In spite of this, Adenauer 
stressed the urgency of the European question and the need to work feverishly towards unity. 
Indeed, in a debate with Ernst Friedländer, Adenauer noted that since the end of National 
Socialism, there was only one great evil: German isolationism.56 Adenauer’s efforts helped 
result in the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, followed by 
West Germany joining NATO in 1955, and, finally, the passage of the Treaty of Rome 
establishing the European Economic Community in 1957.  
 Adenauer’s Western orientation was opposed by those who envisioned a neutral, 
demilitarized Germany that would be left to its own devices and allowed to determine its 
own fate. Kurt Schumacher, the opposition leader of the Social Democrats, openly supported 
this stance, believing that German neutrality in central Europe would lead to German 
unification, a position that held popular support.57 As a result, Adenauer needed to integrate 
his European ideal into the popular conceptions of Germanness. He frequently emphasized 
that European integration was more than an economy- or security-oriented project; his 
commitment to Europe and European ideals was motivated by the “conviction of a man who 
had learned over the course of a long life to be a European German” and who was convinced 
that the German people would come to agree with him.58 Identification with Europe was not 
an unreasonable expectation for Adenauer given that the two shared a commitment to 
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democratic ideals, peace, and a Christian heritage.59 
 The long project of European integration became almost unquestionable. Adenauer’s 
policy successes and Germany’s economic recovery shifted the discussion from whether or 
not to how much European integration was viable or desirable. By the 1970s, every major 
political party had a section on European policy in their platforms, and by the 1990s, every 
party was outlining positive policy for continuing the development of the European 
Community. Almost every chancellor since Adenauer had overseen a major expansion of the 
European project: Kurt Kiesenger (1966-9) oversaw the creation of the European Community 
with the Brussels Treaty, Helmut Schmidt (1974-1982) oversaw the creation of European 
Monetary System, Helmut Kohl (1982-1998) oversaw the Maastricht Treaty and the 
Schengen Agreement, and Gerhard Schröder (1998-2005) oversaw the consolidation of 
national security and immigration policies with the Amsterdam Treaty.  
 Approval for the European Community and European integration has traditionally 
been high in Germany, even in policy arenas that limit or cede sovereignty.60 Between 1952 
and 1985, the percentage of Germans in support of West European integration was never 
below 70 percent and actually averaged 75 percent. In the wake of the Maastricht Treaty, 
approximately 71 percent of Germans supported European integration, 60 percent saw 
European Community membership as “a good thing,” and 59 percent reported that they 
would vote in favor of the Maastricht Treaty were a national referendum held the next day.61 
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Support for the European project does not, however, seem to undermine identification with 
Germany. When asked if they saw European integration as protecting or ending national 
identity, 42 percent of Germans reported that they thought a European Union would protect 
their identity. Further, 58 percent reported simultaneously holding a German and European 
identity.  
 How has such strong support for European integration been possible in Germany, 
especially if the standard interpretation of Germany as ethnically bounded holds? If Germans 
are so resistant to allowing non-ethnic Germans a voice in domestic politics, why are they so 
supportive of ceding control over domestic policy to a supranational body? Germany’s 
approach to and understanding of its place in Europe changed after Allied occupation. The 
experience of occupation, combined with the legacy of German aggression in Europe during 
the 20th century, necessitated a new attitude towards foreign policy. Instead of conceiving of 
Germany as more in line with the East or as having a distinct and unique heritage, Germans 
now understood that their future lay with the West. German European policy was heavily 
influenced by the legacy of German aggression during the first half of the century. President 
von Weizsäcker acknowledged this in his 1985 speech honoring the forty-year anniversary of 
the end of the war: “We cannot commemorate the 8th of May without being conscious of the 
great effort required on the part of our former enemies to set out on the road of reconciliation 
with us.”62 The course of German integration into Europe was a matter of necessity for 
Germany, especially if unification remained the goal. Integration was so successful that 
Germans began to think of themselves as simultaneously Europeans and Germans, just as 
Adenauer had predicted they would.  
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 Despite firm opposition from the Christian Democrats and Free Democrats, whose 
coalition held control of the Bundestag from 1982 until 1998, the reforms passed in 1999 
included provisions for dual citizenship in the reforms to the Ausländergesetz [foreigners’ 
law]. These reforms allowed foreigners who were citizens of another European Union 
member state to retain their citizenship when naturalizing as long as their home state also 
offered dual citizenship.63 Dual citizenship had been regarded as a conflict of interest in 
German political discourse: how could an individual be expected to become German if they 
maintained allegiance to another state? Accepting dual citizenship as not generating a 
conflict of interest was possible because of the centrality of “Western democratic basic 
principles” to both German and European identity. In an address to the Bundestag on 
November 10, 1998, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder stated:  
 
Our national consciousness is not based on a Wilhelmine “law of descent,” but on our 
self-assured democracy…. What I am formulating here… is the self-awareness of a 
nation that knows that democracy is not achieved for eternity, but that freedom… 
must be achieved daily…. The Germans were able to accomplish unification in peace 
and self-determination with the help of their friends and allies. Today, we are 
democrats and Europeans – not because we must be, but because we truly want to 
be.64 
 
 
 As discussed above, democratic ideals and their attending symbols had come to 
replace standard national symbols, such as the flag and anthem. Germans were identified, in 
part, by their allegiance to the constitution and the principles it outlines, and foreigners 
seeking to naturalize were evaluated along these same criteria. Schröder’s assertion that 
German national consciousness was grounded in “self-assured democracy” had a basis in 
naturalization standards from 1977, and would be further substantiated by the reforms to the 
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Ausländergesetz found in the landmark reforms passed in 1999. Europe and democracy, 
therefore, are not parts of a post-national identity, but rather, parts of Germany’s post-War 
national history. German national history is the history of German integration into Europe 
and German national symbols and traditions are democratic symbols and traditions. Certainly 
this is a firm break from pre-War understandings of Germanness. However, the geo-political 
and domestic circumstances after World War II necessitated a new formulation of what it 
meant to be German. This new conception came out not just in speeches and party platforms, 
but in foreign policy, domestic policy, and public opinion as well. 
 
Immigration, naturalization, and Leitkultur 
Germany had never considered itself a country for immigrants; even when the labor market 
demanded cheap labor, the invitations had always been begrudging, conditional, and finite. 
Polish agricultural laborers were invited into Prussia during the 1890s on a seasonal basis 
only. Similarly, Germany’s Wirtschaftswunder [economic miracle] of the 1950s and –‘60s 
relied heavily on imported labor from southern and eastern Europe. Initially, the Federal 
Republic was able to fill gaps in the labor market with refugees from the German Democratic 
Republic, but the rapid acceleration of the Western economy followed by the erection of the 
Berlin Wall necessitated an influx of short-term labor. Beginning with Italy in 1955, the 
Federal Republic signed a series of agreements with other countries in Southern Europe and 
the Mediterranean until 1973 when the Bonn government issued an end to the recruitment of 
foreign labor. By 1964, agreements with Italy, Greece, Turkey, Spain, and Portugal had 
brought one million Gastarbeiter [guest workers] into Germany. By the end of the program 
in 1973, Gastarbeiter accounted for 10 percent of the German labor force. 
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 By the early 1960s, as the Federal Republic was looking to expand its labor 
agreements beyond the successful agreement with Italy, newspapers were already 
questioning the wisdom of extending the offers to countries outside of Western Europe. 
Some expressed concern about expanding this new labor mobility beyond the boundaries of 
the European Economic Community (EEC), while others voiced concern about taking labor 
from still-developing countries. A press release by the Confederation of German Employers’ 
Associations in 1961 noted that countries in the EEC ought to have priority and that there 
were ethical questions behind taking labor from a country in need of development aid.65 
Germans were more supportive of labor migration from within the EEC than from without;66 
identification with Western Europe, spurred on by Adenauer’s efforts to integrate the Federal 
Republic into the West, certainly helped when the agreement with Italy was signed. There 
was, however, no such support for the Turks and Greeks. 
 Implicit in much of the concern over Gastarbeiter from outside of the EEC was the 
fear of Germanness being diluted by the incorporation of new cultures. Immigrants were seen 
as being unwilling or unable to become truly German. An article published in the July 1973 
issue of Der Spiegel titled “The Turks are coming – save yourself if you can” warns of lost 
neighborhoods and segregated communities. The author contrasts traditional German 
neighborhoods with their new Turkish contexts: “At the entrance to 50 Lausitzer Street hang 
the mailboxes of 30 renters, all of whose names end with ‘-oglu,’ ‘-ek,’ or ‘-can.’ On Oranien 
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Street, where Paul Lincke once lived at 64 and where one can almost hear the melody from 
‘Berlin Air,’ men in pedal pants are strolling like flaneurs.”67 Famous streets that were once 
home to industrious German cultural icons are now Turkish neighborhoods filled with 
foreign sounds, foreign clothes, and foreign people; one would hardly believe they were still 
in Germany! 
 It is no surprise, then, that the National Guidelines for Naturalization issued in 1977 
emphasized integration as a pre-requisite for naturalization. Command of the German 
language, longstanding orientation toward Western democratic ideals, and an orientation 
towards Germany and its culture were all listed as criteria upon which applicants would be 
judged. Each of these criteria, however, was a point at which guest workers, especially 
Turkish guest workers, were expected to fail. Turkish guest workers were cast as not only 
unwilling to “Germanize,” but also unable to integrate because they did not share the 
Western, Christian cultural heritage from which the peoples of Western Europe had 
developed. In 1981, a group of professors from nine German universities issued the 
“Heidelberger Manifest,” which would later be printed in several popular newspapers, 
including Die Zeit and Frankfurter Rundschau. In it, they echoed fears of the loss of German 
culture and the German Volk: “Already, many Germans feel like foreigners in their 
neighborhoods, workplaces, and homeland…. The integration of large masses of non-
German foreigners is therefore impossible without threatening the preservation of our 
people….”68  
 The “Manifest,” which drew great criticism, emphasized that supporting guest 
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workers was dangerous to the preservation of the German people as well as to the goal of 
reunification, which was enshrined in the Basic Law. They asked: “How could reunification 
remain possible if the two parts are becoming ethnically foreign to one another?”69 Although 
they expressed concern over the “infiltration of our language, our culture, and our national 
character,”70 the primary concern they voiced was over the dilution of the Volk in favor of a 
multicultural society. Indeed, it was the Volk that, to them, was the true basis for the German 
nation, rather than the nation as the sum of the peoples living in a territory or with the same 
culture. Allowing more non-ethnic German foreigners into the Federal Republic was a threat 
to its völkisch character. However, the legacy of the Holocaust had placed a heavy taboo on 
discussing ethnicity and the use of völkisch language. Attempting to distance themselves 
from this legacy, they write: “Standing firmly on the ground of the Basic Law, we 
fundamentally stand against ideological nationalism, against racism, and against right-wing 
and left-wing radicalism.”71 
 Ultimately, their defense was unsuccessful. Where other authors had succeeded in 
criticizing the guest worker policies and the influx of migrants from the East, it was because 
they had refrained from using old völkisch arguments, which had by then become taboo.72 
Journalists quickly condemned the “Heidelberger Manifest” and its authors for promoting 
nationalism and racism, as well as for voicing the opinions of “old Nazis, the National 
Democratic Party, those who write ‘Turks Out,’ [and] German children who ignore their 
foreign classmates…”73 Another critic wrote that the document was full of “prejudices, 
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made in the “Heidelberger Manifest,” were not gone from Germany, but the arguments and the individuals who 
made them were publicly reproached for having done so. 
73 “Türken, paßt euch an!” Die Zeit (April 2, 1982). http://www.zeit.de/1982/14/tuerken-passt-euch-an 
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banalities, platitudes, and overblown definitions” mixed with few reasonable 
considerations.74 Although criticism was voiced against all aspects of the “Heidelberger 
Manifest,” the greatest criticism was directed at the parts emphasizing the biological and 
ethnic construction of the German nation drew the greatest criticism.  
 But the suggestions of focusing on development aid for Turkey rather than on 
bringing Turks into Germany and of returning foreigners to their homeland, went almost 
unnoticed, being overshadowed by the language reminiscent of National Socialism. 
Throughout their 1983 campaign, Helmut Kohl’s Christian Democratic Union firmly 
supported the goal of reducing the number of foreigners in Germany, and turned that support 
into a series of policies that offered lump-sum payments and low-interest loans to foreigners 
willing to repatriate. 75 Several Christian Democrat-led Länder offered their own payments 
and loans in order to bolster the federal attempt at reducing the number of “foreign fellow 
citizens” [ausländische Mitbürger] living in the Federal Republic. In addition to promoting 
repatriation, many Länder also imposed greater restrictions on permitting the families of 
Ausländer to immigrate into Germany. Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, for example, 
required that immigrants wait a minimum of three years after a marriage before having the 
chance to bring their family over.76 These, combined with the restrictive naturalization 
guidelines and fees, were intended to incentivize repatriation and disincentivize 
naturalization. 
 Attitudes towards foreigners in Germany did not stray too far from the notion that 
they were unwilling to adapt or assimilate. However, the reforms to the Ausländergesetz in 
                                                     
74 Hanno Kühnert, “Rassistische Klänge,” Die Zeit (February 5, 1982). http://www.zeit.de/1982/06/rassistische-
klaenge. 
75 Nathans, “Politics of Citizenship,” 244. 
76 Ibid, 244. 
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1990 and 1999 were motivated by a need to come to terms with the reality of the number of 
foreigners living in Germany.77 Each of these sets of reforms aimed at opening the path to 
naturalization for the foreign population. However, as with the guidelines from 1977, 
naturalization was still granted at the end of the integration process, rather than guiding it. 
Naturalization was treated as the reward for foreigners and immigrants who successfully took 
on German values and culture, as opposed to part of a process of bringing immigrants in 
German political and social life. The reforms passed in 1990 eased the process for youths 
applying for citizenship between the ages of sixteen and twenty-four, as well as for those 
who had lived in Germany for fifteen years or more. As a result of these reforms, the number 
of naturalizations in Germany jumped from an average of approximately 40,000 
naturalizations in the 1980s to an average of approximately 230,000 naturalizations in the 
decade of the reforms.78 The liberalization of naturalization standards and the permitting of 
dual citizenship, albeit largely under exceptional circumstances, had increased the 
opportunity for foreigners to acquire citizenship.  
 Under the reforms to the Ausländergesetz included in the landmark 1999 citizenship 
reforms, individuals born in Germany to at least one parent who had lived in Germany for at 
least eight years were granted citizenship at birth, although they would have to confirm that 
they wanted to maintain their German citizenship by age 24. In addition, the residency 
requirement for adults seeking to naturalize was reduced from fifteen to eight years, with 
similar requirements as under the 1977 guidelines. The criteria were almost identical: a 
                                                     
77 Schröder’s inaugural address in 1998 specifically mentions the importance of facing the reality of the 
situation in Germany. He states: “Reality teaches us, for example, that, in the past decades, an irreversible 
immigration has occurred in Germany. We invited the people who came here in the 1950s. Today, we say to our 
fellow citizens that they are not foreign.” Schröder, Verhandlung.  
78 Statisches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden, “Bevölkerung und Erwerbstätigkeit: Einbürgerungen,“ (June 2015). 
https://www.destatis.de/DE/Publikationen/Thematisch/Bevoelkerung/MigrationIntegration/Einbuergerungen201
0210147004.pdf?__blob=publicationFile 
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lasting orientation towards Germany, relinquishing foreign citizenship, a command of the 
German language, and loyalty to the free democratic principles in the Basic Law. Requiring 
applicants to relinquish foreign citizenships was effectively targeted at Turkish migrants or 
ausländische Mitburger, who were ineligible for dual citizenship under the reforms. Barriers 
to naturalization had been lowered twice during the 1990s in order to better address the 
reality that the guest worker agreements and blind hope of eventual repatriation had created. 
Certainly, the new reforms had opened up new access to citizenship, but they still required 
some degree of assimilation and a feeling of commitment to the nation.  
 Conservative response to the reforms echoed the concerns of the 1970s and ‘80s. In 
October of 2000, Friedrich Merz, a member of the Christian Democratic Union, proclaimed 
that the naturalization requirements were too relaxed and threatening to German cultural 
identity and emphasized the need for a deutsche Leitkultur [German guiding culture]. The 
concept of a Leitkultur had first been gained popularity in its use by Die Zeit editor Theo 
Sommer in 1998. He wrote: “integration inevitably means a good bit of assimilation into the 
German guiding culture and its core values.”79 What were these core values that made up the 
German Leitkultur? According to the Christian Democrats, the German Leitkultur was 
composed of Christian, Western European values developed from their shared history. Very 
quickly, moderate and left-leaning groups in the Federal Republic responded to the CDUs 
use of the term Leitkultur. Some recalled the CDUs earlier slogan, “Kinder statt Inder,”80 
others questioned what the German guiding culture could be apart from harassing and 
                                                     
79 “Der Kopf zählt, nicht das Tuch,” Die Zeit (July 16 1998). 
80 “Kinder statt Inder” translates to “Children instead of Indians,” and was a slogan used by the CDU to promote 
increasing the birth rate among ethnic Germans in Germany rather than bringing in foreign tech specialists 
through a Green Card system. 
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abusing foreigners.81 
 Although the Leitkultur debate faded quickly, it prompted many Germans to actively 
think about what being German meant, and what becoming German required. To many, the 
new national history of Germany as a part of Europe, and having always been a part of 
Europe, had taken hold. At no point were völkisch language or conceptions of German 
identity the center of the debate as they had been in the early-1980s. Certainly, the concept of 
a Leitkultur was particularistic and targeted those coming from countries and regions seen as 
being incompatible with the free and democratic “West.” It was an anti-immigrant discourse, 
but an anti-immigrant discourse that viewed the internal mobility of the European Union as 
acceptable because they shared a common cultural heritage. At the center of the debate was 
Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations thesis:82 namely, the notions that the loyalty of 
immigrants is always incomplete, that Germans ought to be suspicious of the authenticity of 
immigrant loyalty, and that immigration was threatening to German national culture. The 
debate was framed around a discourse of lack; immigrants were always going to be short of 
the mark for one reason or another and could never become fully German. This was because 
culture in Huntington’s argument and in the Leitkultur argument was racialized, and 
immigrants cannot change their race. 
 However, the term Leitkultur served to mask borderline völkisch concerns of cultural 
infiltration and dilution to circumvent the post-War taboos against rooting Germanness in 
ethno-racial characteristics. Contextualizing Germanness in the new national myths of 
Germany as sharing the heritage of the West allowed for a conversation about exclusion that 
                                                     
81 Stefan Manz, “Constructing a Normative National Identity: The Leitkultur Debate in Germany, 2000/2001,” 
Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development, 25 (2006), 486. 
82 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, 72 (1993). See also a similar argument 
in: Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We: The Challenges to America’s National Identity, (London: Simon and 
Shuster Ltd., 2004). 
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targeted “Eastern” peoples (Turks) without having to say as much. Ultimately, the CDU plan 
incorporating the Leitkultur concept strongly resembled the existing naturalization standards 
for foreigners in Germany: dedication to Western democratic values and command of the 
German language. However, the debate reignited the debate about the acceptability of 
national rhetoric in the Federal Republic. Then CDU party leader Angela Merkel commented 
that the parties opposing the notion of the Leitkultur had a “disturbed relationship with their 
fatherland.”83 Moreover, she questioned what was so wrong with someone being committed 
to their fatherland, when it has nothing to do with spiked hats.84 Because the conservative 
position in the Leitkultur debate was focused on defining what it meant to be German, it was 
also about reclaiming the right to national pride and national celebration. However, one of 
the new national traditions that had developed over the course of the post-War period was the 
rejection of national symbols and traditionally nationalist sentiments. The conservative 
appeal was largely unsuccessful despite mapping very closely onto accepted public and 
official conceptions of what it meant to be German. 
 
Ethnic Germans and Citizenship  
None of this is to say that the old paradigm is irrelevant or completely unfounded. Attribution 
of citizenship at birth was, until the reforms went into effect in 2000, a right exclusive to the 
children of German citizens. Because of the stringent restrictions on naturalization – namely 
the high fee, the need to renounce other citizenships, and the need to demonstrate cultural 
integration prior to naturalization – access to citizenship was very limited for foreigners. On 
                                                     
83 “Merkel: SPD hat gestörtes Verhältnis zum Vaterland,“ Die Welt (2 November, 2000). 
http://www.welt.de/print-welt/article541870/Merkel-SPD-hat-gestoertes-Verhaeltnis-zum-Vaterland.html 
84 Ibid. 
  
 97   
 
the other hand, naturalization for ethnic Germans living in Eastern Europe or the German 
Democratic Republic [Aussiedler] was simplified and almost automatic. 85 The Basic Law 
ascribed citizenship to anyone descended of German citizens from the pre-1938 borders. 
Regardless of cultural, political, or linguistic background, however, these individuals were 
considered genuinely German. In that same spirit, von Weizsäcker noted in 1985 that “We 
Germans are one people and one nation. We feel that we belong together because we have 
lived through the same past… We are confident that the 8th of May is not the last date in the 
common history of all Germans.”86  
 Under the 1953 Expellees and Refugees Law (BVFG), the attribution of Vertriebene 
status required confirmation that the person possesses “descent, language, upbringing, and 
culture.”87 Again, what matters is not simply blood or heritage, but acculturation and 
possession of some measure of Germanness. This requirement was maintained through until 
the first decade of the 21st century. Still, ethnic Germans were expected to demonstrate that 
they were German in some capacity other than blood. Exceptions were made for Aussiedler 
living in countries in which being recognized as German would have been dangerous.88 The 
1992 Kriegsfolgenbereinigungsgesetz set limits on the number of people who could gain 
citizenship as Aussiedler or Spätaussiedler [late resettlers] during a given year: within 10 
percent of those admitted in 1991 and 1992. These limits simultaneously addressed the 
logistics of admitting hundreds of thousands of new citizens on a yearly basis, and the 
identity problems that accompany admitting hundreds of thousands of new citizens who are 
                                                     
85 During the early years of the Federal Republic, these people were called Vertriebene (expellees). During the 
1960s, Vertriebene was abandoned for the term Aussiedler (resettler), and in the 1990s, a new category was 
added – Spätaussiedler (late resettler).  
86 Richard von Weizsäcker, “Speech.” 
87 “Gesetz über die Angelegenheiten der Vertriebenen und Flüchtlinge,” Bundesgesetzblatt Teil 1, 22 (May 
1953), 201-222. 
88 “Gesetz zur Bereinigung von Kriegsfolgengesetzen,” Bundesgesetzblatt Teil 1, 58 (December 1992), 2094-
2108 
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not recognizably German. Although Aussiedler were required to demonstrate that they had 
command of the language or the culture, clauses allowing exception from some loyalty 
requirements made the path to naturalization easier. 
 Just as under the 1913 Nationality Act, ethnicity was a privileged category, even if 
that shared ethnicity was understood ethno-culturally. As seen in the Leitkultur debate, 
discussion of Germanness as ethno-racial had become taboo over the course of the post-War 
period. From the perspective of the state, the German nation was, as Schröder put it in 1998, 
not based on descent as it had been during the Wilhemine and Weimar periods, but rather on 
shared democratic values and shared cultural heritage. Following reunification, both East and 
West Germans came to realize how much had changed during the post-War period. For 
example, when polled in 2009, approximately 67 percent of East Germans expressed the 
opinion that East Germany had been “overwhelmed and taken over by West Germany” 
during reunification. This was a very small change from the 71 percent who had said so in 
1991.89 Ethnicity-as-bloodline was not enough to undo forty-five years of separate political, 
cultural, and economic development; East and West Germans were effectively no longer the 
same people in anything but name. 
 German reunification allowed for the liberalization of immigration and naturalization 
law. Ethnicity-as-descent had long since ceased being the official, state-sanctioned basis for 
German identity. It remained in the Basic Law and citizenship law during the post-War 
period exclusively with the goal of reunification in mind. However, new values, traditions, 
history, and symbols had risen during that time and created a new conception of Germanness 
that was codified in the 1999 laws, although it had been in the public consciousness long 
                                                     
89 “End of Communism Cheered but Now with More Reservations: The Pulse of Europe 2009: 20 Years After 
the Fall of the Berlin Wall,” Pew Research Center, (November 2, 2009). 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2009/11/02/end-of-communism-cheered-but-now-with-more-reservations/ 
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before. Understandings of Germany as sharing in the Christian heritage of Western Europe 
had begun to emerge in the 1950s. These understandings started being used as the basis for 
naturalization in the late-1970s, and were widely considered the cornerstone of German 
identity during the 1990s. If citizenship law is indeed the intersection between nationhood 
and state interests, then state demographic interests, namely reunification, allowed for the 
maintenance of ethnicity as a privileged category in citizenship law. Consequently, 
reunification provided an opportunity for myths of nationhood to reassert their influence over 
citizenship law in a much more impactful way than they had in the past. The gradual reforms 
made throughout the second half of the 20th century, therefore, were a precursor to the large 
reforms that were made possible by the change in state interests. As a result, to say that the 
reforms of 1999, which allowed for the attribution of citizenship at birth and embodied the 
idea that Germanness was socialized and taught rather than inherited by blood, were 
previously inconceivable seems dubious at best.  
 Notions of Germanness as culture date back to the attribution of citizenship to the 
children of German citizens abroad. German citizenship was not granted on the basis of 
blood or genetics, but rather on the expectation that German parents would instill in their 
German children the love of the fatherland and of its culture that was expected of Germans. 
Opening up citizenship-at-birth to the children of Ausländer and lowering naturalization 
standards, thus, expresses the belief that national identity can be transmitted as meaningfully 
through social institutions (e.g. schools, media, etc.) as through the family. This belief was 
certainly facilitated by the national myths and national character that emerged from 
engagement with the legacy of the Holocaust and European integration, and it is from these 
national myths that the citizenship and naturalization reforms were born. 
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 During the period after the reforms, the balance between exclusion and inclusion was 
difficult to maintain. While the attribution of citizenship and access to naturalization had 
been substantially opened, ever increasing mobility on the continent, CDU dominance in the 
Bundestag, and fears of domestic terror attacks encouraged continued caution with regard to 
integration standards. In addition, continued immigration from Eastern Europe through the 
allowances for Aussiedler strained German social institutions and welfare. New policies for 
ensuring loyalty to Germany and its Western democratic ideals were put into place, including 
a mandatory citizenship test and integration courses for immigrants. German openness 
remained a conditional openness, and the conditions were developed from many of the 
concepts developed over the post-War period. 
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Chapter IV 
Citizenship and Nation-making: Integration Courses and Citizenship Tests, 1999 to 
Present 
 
On January 1, 2008, Germany’s citizenship test, which had been established in a 2007 law, 
went into effect. Previously, applicants had been evaluated primarily through interviews and 
living in Germany for an extended period. However, applicants were now to be evaluated on 
language proficiency and their ability to pass a thirty-three question test that would be 
standardized across all sixteen states. The new test focused on knowledge of state 
institutions, liberal democratic ideals, history, and cultural practices. Unsurprisingly, it 
sparked a great deal of debate. 
 On the one hand, citizenship tests were just another institutionalized barrier to 
naturalization for the longstanding foreigner populations in Europe. Furthermore, many 
argued that they privileged applicants from within Europe whose culture of origin more 
closely matched that of Germany. On the other hand, the pool of questions was made 
available online for free, integration courses had been offered in Germany for four years 
prior and were reorganized to teach to the test, and study materials were available at low cost. 
Regarding the content of the test, sociologist and legal scholar Christian Joppke wrote: 
 
With respect of the contents of the citizenship test, to ask for host-society language 
competence and knowledge of the principles and procedures of liberal democracies is 
an incontrovertibly legitimate core component of all citizenship tests in Europe and 
other Western states. And few would doubt that asking for knowledge of historical 
key events in a country’s road to becoming a liberal democracy, along with 
knowledge of liberal democracy’s peculiar institutional form in the respective 
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country, is equally legitimate.1 
 
 
The implementation of a citizenship test in Germany indicates the continuation of the 
established expectation that foreigners become German in order to gain the German passport. 
Naturalization standards had always been restrictive, but the introduction of the 1999 reforms 
to citizenship law [Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz] seemed to lower the barriers enough as to 
make citizenship accessible. From the perspective of those who support the German 
citizenship test, naturalization is still more accessible than it has ever been, and the 
citizenship test does not undermine that assertion. However, it is impossible to deny that its 
implementation is the continuation of policies that view integration (read: assimilation) as the 
primary concern of citizenship and naturalization policy in Germany. 
 In this chapter, I argue that the integration courses established in 2004 and the 
citizenship test that went into effect on January 1, 2008 are manifestations of a conservative 
approach to naturalization and citizenship law that prioritizes an integration model based on 
essentialized differentiations between the Occident and the Orient. That is, the citizenship 
test and integration courses reassert and maintain an orientalist divide between Germany as a 
foundational member of Western Europe and the foreigner population, the majority of which 
originates from Eastern Europe and the Middle East. To do so, I begin by establishing the 
momentum gained by conservatives during the 1998-9 debates over the major reforms to the 
Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz and other key laws. Following that, I outline how that momentum 
carried through the following decade and created opportunities for the passage of the laws 
that established and implemented integration courses and the citizenship test. Finally, I 
                                                     
1 Christian Joppke, “How liberal are citizenship tests,” (working paper, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced 
Studies, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, 2010). http://eudo-citizenship.eu/commentaries/citizenship-
forum/citizenship-forum-cat/255-how-liberal-are-citizenship-tests?showall=&limitstart=. 
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present what foreigners are expected to integrate to and how they are expected to integrate in 
order to support my argument that orientalist differentiation between Germany and its 
immigrants helps to maintain difference between citizens of the state and members of the 
nation.  
 
Re-centering Integration in 1998-9 Policy Debate  
Electoral gains during the 1998 Bundestag elections brought a Social Democrat-led coalition 
into power for the first time since Helmut Kohl first became chancellor in 1982. Chief among 
the new coalition’s priorities was a liberalization of citizenship law. Specifically, they wanted 
to: (1) make dual nationality more available to immigrants and the descendants of the guest 
workers brought to Germany in the 1960s; (2) liberalize the rules for the ascription of 
citizenship to include children born in Germany to non-German parents; and (3) make the 
naturalization process more accessible to the substantial Ausländer [foreigner] population 
living in Germany without citizenship. At the same time, however, prominent conservatives 
began to assert the need to protect a German Leitkultur [guiding culture], which embodied 
the essence of what it meant to be German. Furthermore, they argued that it was good that 
the existing nationality law required immigrants to demonstrate that they had integrated into 
German life and that such integration required at least some degree of assimilation into 
German culture and values. At bottom, the argument was that immigrants ought not be able 
to attain German citizenship unless they could prove that they had become German.2 
 Although the Leitkultur debate provides insight into the how both the Social 
Democrats and Christian Democrats conceived of the role of the citizenship and what it 
                                                     
2 For example, see Stefan Manz, “Constructing a Normative National Identity: The Leitkultur Debate in 
Germany, 2000/2001,” Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development, 25 (2006) 
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means to be German, I think both approaches can best be summarized in the debate over the 
proposed reforms to the Nationality Act in 1999. Arguing in favor of the reforms, Interior 
Minister Otto Schily drew on Ernest Renan’s famous speech given before the Sorbonne 
given in 1882. Schily cited Renan’s definition of a nation not as a community with shared 
religion, ethnicity, or language, but as a community “reiterated in the present by a tangible 
fact: an agreement, a clearly expressed desire to continue a common life.”3 In quoting 
Renan’s definition of the nation, Schily applied the French model of national definition to 
Germany. The German nation, according to Schily, ought to be a community of will rather 
than a community of descent as it had historically been, and he cited German historian Hagen 
Schulze to validate this assertion. Schily followed this by encouraging his colleagues to use 
the day’s debate as an opportunity to reflect on questions of how they wanted to shape 
Germany’s future, as well as what the relationship between German society and the German 
state should look like. To this end, he finishes his speech with a quote from Frederick the 
Great: 
 
Ladies and gentlemen, today is the hour of modern democracy. So perhaps it is not 
quite appropriate for me to dwell on aristocrats. However, in light of the fact that we 
are soon relocating to Berlin, it is perhaps understandable that I now stick to the 
advice of an enlightened monarch. When asked if Catholics ought to be allowed to 
acquire citizenship in then-Protestant Prussia, Frederick the Great answered: ‘All 
religions are equal and good, so long as those who believe in them are good people, 
and should Turks and heathens come and choose to settle here, then we will build 
mosques and churches for them.’ This makes a good motto for our Nationality Law, 
as well.4 
                                                     
3 “… aber trotzdem faßt sie sich in der Gegenwart in einem greifbaren Faktum zusammen: der Übereinkunft, 
dem deutlich ausgesprochenen Wunsch, das gemeinsame Leben fortzusetzen.” Otto Schily, Verhandlungen des 
Deutschen Bundestages, Stenographische Berichte, 40th Setzung, (May 7th, 1999), 3418. See also Ernest 
Renan, “What is a Nation.” 
4  “Meine Damen und Herren, heute ist die Stunde der modernen Demokratie. Deshalb ist es vielleicht nicht so 
ganz angebracht, daß ich mich dauernd mit Bezügen zum Adel aufhalte. Aber im Blick darauf, daß wir 
demnächst alle gemeinsam nach Berlin umziehen, ist es vielleicht verständlich, daß ich mich heute an den 
Ratschlag eines aufgeklärten Monarchen halte. Friedrich der Große hat, als er gefragt wurde, ob ein Katholik – 
im damals protestantischen Preußen – das Bürgerrecht erwerben dürfe, geantwortet: ‚Alle Religionen seindt 
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 In referencing Frederick the Great, and this quote in particular, Schily did three 
important things.  First, he connected support for multiculturalism, social heterogeneity, and 
immigration to a figure from Germany’s mythic past. In doing so, Schily extended 
multiculturalism and tolerance into the past and did so in a German context. Multiculturalism 
and support for immigration, then, were to be understood as deeply embedded in German 
history, despite the similarly long history of Germany as the völkisch [ethnic] nation. 
 Second, he connected this support to a figure whose reputation had been salvaged 
from the taint of the Nazi legacy. Frederick’s role in elevating Prussia to great-power status, 
increasing bureaucratic efficiency, and his unlikely military victories had made him an 
important figure in Nazi national history. Despite an unfavorable status during the post-War 
period, his legacy as “an enlightened monarch” recast Frederick the Great as a positive force 
in German national history, a status not available to many major political figures from before 
the Nazi period. Quoting Frederick, therefore, granted status to the ideas from which the 
reforms were developed. Not only were these ideas seated in the 18th Century, but they also 
originated with a German national hero.5 
 Third, in using this particular quote from Frederick the Great, Schily connected 
present concerns to historical ones. The largest non-German ethnic group living in Germany 
during the second half of the 20th Century was the Turkish population. Islam was and is the 
third largest religion in Germany. Questions about opening access to citizenship and 
naturalization in Germany were and are primarily questions about the belonging of Turks and 
                                                                                                                                                                    
gleich und guht, wann nur die Leute, so sie profesieren, erliegte Leute seindt, und wenn Türken und Heiden 
kämen und wollten das Land pöplieren, so wollten wir Mosqueen und Kirchen bauen.‘ Das ist eine gute Devise 
auch für unsere Staatsangehörigkeitsrecht.” Otto Schily, Verhandlungen, 3419. 
5 As discussed in the previous chapter and as will be discussed below, Germany’s relationship with national 
history has made it such that national heroes are uncommon and would almost never be referred to as such. 
Attitudes towards and the role of Frederick the Great in German national history, however, approximate the 
traditional national hero. 
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Muslims. Frederick’s answer to these questions was cut-and-dry, and in quoting him, Schily 
placed himself, the Red-Green coalition, and the proposed reforms in the same cut-and-dried 
box. Who belongs in Germany? Anyone, and they ought to be welcomed as they are. 
 Conservative responses to Schily’s statements, and to the law more generally, were 
unsurprisingly negative. Jürgen Rüttgers of the CDU/CSU accused Schily of putting forward 
an unconstitutional patchwork rather than a developed law. His most damning critique of the 
reforms and Schily was that they seek to change what people understand as being under the 
umbrella of the German nation.6 According to Rüttgers, the reforms were not concerned with 
integrating foreigners, but only with granting them dual citizenship. Rather than focusing on 
dual citizenship and broadening access to citizenship, the Christian Democrats asserted the 
need to emphasize three areas: citizenship rights, border security, and integration. Peter 
Altmaier, also of the CDU/CSU, echoed Rüttgers’ concerns, arguing that the Social 
Democrats and Greens were not motivated by the desire to improve the integration of 
ausländische Mitbürger [foreign fellow-citizens], but rather by party tactics and electoral 
gains in the next election. Ultimately, criticism levied by the Christian Democrats centered 
entirely on the issue of integration. According to the Christian Democrats, the Doppelpaß 
[dual passport] threatened the internal homogeneity of the German people. Foreigners, they 
claimed, would not be required to learn German culture and values proficiently enough to 
become a part of German society, which threatened the integrity of the German nation. Peter 
Altmaier summed this up clearly during his closing remarks, which received applause from 
his party, when he said:  
We will not reject your draft bill, but we also cannot approve of it, because at no 
point have you sought to find a consensus, because you have refused all offers 
                                                     
6 Jürgen Rüttgers, Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, Stenographische Berichte, (May 7th, 1999), 
3420. 
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Wolfgang Schäuble and the CDU/CSU has made in the recent weeks to discuss the 
bill, and because you have rejected every single requirement outlined in our 
integration brief. So maybe this is good enough as far as your party tactics are 
concerned, but you definitely do not do justice to the concern of integrating foreigners 
into our society.7 
 
 
 This message is consistent with the conservative perspective during the post-War 
period. Helmut Kohl’s CDU/CSU during the 1980s and 90s were unwavering in their 
assertion that “Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland” [The Federal 
Republic of Germany is not a country of immigration].8 Policy towards Ausländer during the 
1980s focused on trying to reduce the number of foreigners living in Germany rather than 
welcoming them and opening paths towards naturalization. Naturalization standards were 
decentralized, but official guidelines prioritized acquisition of culture and values towards the 
purpose of integration into German society. In the eyes of the CDU/CSU, foreigners were 
capable of becoming German, so long as they leave behind their culture and their previous 
citizenships. During the 1990s, the debate over dual nationality, which culminated in these 
parliamentary debates in 1999, centered on this issue. If citizenship is tied to identity – that 
is, if all citizens are nationals – then what is the purpose of dual citizenship? Is that not just 
extending legal and political rights, including the right to vote, to people whose primary 
allegiance is not Germany?   
 So, on the one hand, opposition to the proposed reforms was grounded in classical 
thought about the connections between nationality and citizenship. According to 
                                                     
7 “Wir werden Ihren Gesetzentwurf nicht ablehnen, können ihm aber auch nicht zustimmen, weil Sie zu keinem 
Zeitpunkt versucht haben, einen Konsens zu finden, weil Sie alle Gesprächsangebote abgelehnt haben, die von 
Wolfgang Schäuble und der CDU/CSU in den letzten Wochen gemacht worden sind, und weil Sie jede einzelne 
Forderung aus unserem Integrationspapier zurückgewiesen haben. Damit genügen Sie vielleicht Ihren 
parteitaktischen Anliegen. Aber dem Anliegen der Integration von Ausländern in unsere Gesellschaft werden 
Sie damit ganz sicher nicht gerecht.“ (Emphasis mine). Peter Altmaier, Verhandlungen des Deutschen 
Bundestages. Stenographische Berichte, (May 7th, 1999), 3423.  
8 Christian Democratic Union, “CDU-Extra 29,” 1. Oktober, 1982, 7. 
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conservatives, citizen was a status meant only for those whose allegiance was to the German 
state, which was representative of the German nation; therefore, citizen was a status meant 
only for nationals. The ascription of citizenship, therefore, was reserved only for those the 
state could believe would become Germans in culture and in values. Because of this, 
naturalization was established as the endpoint of the integration process. It was also from this 
position that Guido Westerwelle asserted that the dual citizenship reforms were developed 
with children in mind, because “the [foreign] children born here should learn German and 
experience German culture… but they should also receive these opportunities via the German 
passport.”9 
 On the other hand, support for the reforms was seemingly framed around the moral 
value of a more progressive citizenship law and policy on dual citizenship. A more 
multicultural policy was the inevitable result of strains of thought present in Germany since 
the 18th Century. More specifically, they were strains of thought that originated in the 
aristocracy of the previous era. How is it, Schily seems to imply, that aristocrats and 
monarchs – granted, enlightened ones – got this right but we have not? Therefore, the 
argument is not only that multiculturalism has a long tradition in Germany, but also that this 
was something that was understood and achieved under a less developed system. Schily’s 
speech offers a damning critique of conservative policy and ideology over the previous 
sixteen years. 
 However, there is another line of argument present in Schily’s speech. While arguing 
that modern nations are bound together by will rather than by shared ethnicity, religion, or 
language, Schily also presented the contention that “contrary to all common preconceptions, 
                                                     
9 Guido Westerwelle, Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, Stenographische Berichte, (May 7th, 1999), 
3433. 
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a homogenous society is not sound, because it is a construct that cannot be reconciled with 
reality.”10 These remarks echo then-Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s comments in his 
inaugural address given one year prior: “Reality teaches us, for example, that, in the past 
decade, an irreversible immigration has occurred in Germany. We invited the people who 
came here in the 1950s. Today, we say to our fellow citizens that they are not foreign.”11 The 
issue of “right” was present in both Schily’s speech and Schröder’s, but practicality was the 
bottom line. Certainly, both argued that there was a moral imperative to make paths to 
naturalization and citizenship more accessible using multiculturalism as the basis for this 
process. Indeed, quoting Hagen Schulze, Schily argued that “it is not the concept of ‘nation’ 
that must be overcome in Europe, but the fiction of the fateful, objective, and inescapable 
unity of people [Volk], nation, history, language, and state.”12 However, the argument of 
needing to face the reality of the population of ausländische Mitburger [foreign fellow-
citizens] drove the issue forward. The issue was so pressing because there was already a 
sizable population of people living in Germany without citizenship, many of whom had lived 
there for decades or who had been born there.  
 On May 21, 1999, the Act to Reform the Nationality Law passed through the 
Bundesrat to go into effect on January 1, 2000. Getting the bill through the Bundestag and 
Bundesrat required concessions from the Social Democrats. Chief among these concessions 
was the shift from the Doppelpaß [dual citizenship], a staple of the original draft bill, to the 
Optionsmodell [options model]. Following Westerwelle’s remark that children who would be 
socialized in Germany ought to have German citizenship, the Optionsmodell grants German 
                                                     
10 Otto Schily, Verhandlungen, 3418. 
11 Gerhard Schröder, Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, Stenografische Berichte, 3rd Setzung, 
(November 10, 1998), 61. 
12 Otto Schily, Verhandlungen,  3419. 
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citizenship to children born in Germany to foreign parents in addition to the citizenship of 
their parents, if applicable. At the age of 23, individuals with both German citizenship and 
the citizenship of their parents must choose between the two. Children raised in Germany, 
socialized by German media and schools, and who were raised as Germans can be made 
foreign again through this model if they do not affirm their commitment to Germany. 
Changes to the standards for naturalization included in the 1999 reforms also emphasized 
integration as a requirement for the acquisition of German citizenship. Applicants were 
expected to be proficient in the German language and demonstrate loyalty to the free and 
democratic principles of the Federal Republic, incorporating the guidelines set out in 1977 
into law. 
 The Act to Reform the Nationality Law set the tone for the first fifteen years of the 
21st century. What the Social Democrats initially saw as the potential for a great multicultural 
triumph was instead a compromise that prioritized practicality and coming to terms with 
“reality” rather than focusing on ideals. That is, it required integration – understood as 
Germanization – over multiculturalism as well as granted dual citizenship as only a 
temporary right. In 2005, a failed vote of confidence in Chancellor Gerhard Schröder resulted 
in the dissolution of the Bundestag and a new election. The federal election resulted in a 
grand coalition, shifting the chancellery to Angela Merkel and the CDU/CSU, with whom it 
would stay for the following decade. Conservative policies regained momentum, in part as a 
result of the concessions made in 1999. Official attitudes towards immigration returned the 
Kohl government’s “Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland,” echoed in Merkel’s 
statement that “the multicultural approach has... completely failed.”13  
                                                     
13 “Der Ansatz für Multikulti ist gescheitert, absolut gescheitert.” 
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/integration-merkel-erklaert-multikulti-fuer-gescheitert-a-723532.html 
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 It was from this perspective on immigration and naturalization that emerged the 2004 
Immigration Act [Zuwanderungsgesetz]14 and the 2007 Act to Reform the Immigration Act, 
both of which further entrenched integration as the prerequisite for naturalization.15 The 2004 
Immigration Act implemented official standards for language proficiency and established 
integration courses, which although optional, reduced the residency requirement and were 
viewed favorably when evaluating applications. Building on these provisions, the 2007 
reforms to the Immigration Act addressed the issue of state-based variation by: (1) 
centralizing standards of evaluating integration, (2) further adjusting and refining the 
expectations for language proficiency, (3) providing a reward for those who can demonstrate 
a “high level” of knowledge of the German language, and (4) introducing an integration test 
as a requirement for naturalization. 
 Orienting naturalization standards towards integration binds citizenship to nationality. 
Becoming a citizen, then, requires socialization into German culture, knowledge of the 
German language, acceptance of German values and attitudes, and engagement with German 
institutions. If the first step to acquiring German citizenship is to Germanize, then looking at 
the contents of the integration courses and integration test should provide insight into the 
values, attitudes, and knowledge the state regards as essential to being and becoming 
German. 
 
                                                     
14 The full name for the Zuwanderungsgesetz is: Gesetz zur Steuerung und Begrenzung der Zuwanderung und 
zur Regelung der Aufenthalts und der Integration von Unionsbürgern und Ausländern [Law Governing and 
Limiting Immigration and Regulating the Residence and Integration of EU Citizens and Foreigners]. 
15 In spite of Rita Süssmuth’s comments in a 2001 publication that “It is a fact that Germany has been a country 
of immigration for a long time… The assertion that ‘Germany is not a country of immigration’ used to be a 
defining political principle but has become untenable as the cornerstone of migration and integration policy.” 
Rita Süssmuth, Zuwanderung gestalten – Integration fördern, ‘Bericht der Unabhängigen Kommission 
Zuwanderung,‘ Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innern, 2001, 1. 
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Generating institutional requirements for assimilation: integration courses and 
citizenship tests 
Praise for the 2004 Immigration Law came from both sides of the aisle. Where Otto Schily 
saw “the most modern immigration law in Europe,”16 Peter Müller of the CDU/CSU praised 
the law as being “an immigration limitation act [Zuwanderungsbegrenzungsgesetz], which 
puts to rest the notion that Germany could be a multicultural country of immigration.”17 Both 
the center-left coalition and the center-right opposition understood the Zuwanderungsgesetz 
as a laudable success and as having met their respective goals. Where the Social Democrats 
and Greens celebrated having further opened access to dual nationality, the Christian and 
Free Democrats had succeeded in substantially increasing limits on immigration and 
bolstering barriers to naturalization. Certainly, the center-right coalition were the big winners 
here: the debate about citizenship ascription and access to naturalization had shifted in their 
favor in 1999, and they had been able to carry that momentum forward. 
 One of the key results of this momentum was an inclusion of four articles sketching 
the outline of the integration course program. Article 43 opens by declaring that “the 
integration of foreigners living legally and permanently in the Federal Republic into 
economic, cultural, and social life of the Federal Republic of Germany is to be promoted.”18 
In order to promote and achieve greater integration, the Federal Republic instituted an 
integration course that would consist of two language courses of equal length (basic and 
advanced) and an “orientation course,” the aim of which was for foreigners to “obtain a 
                                                     
16 Sigrid Averesch, “Zuwanderung – Das neue Gesetz kann nicht in Kraft treten. Die Opposition ist begeistert, 
die Regierung enttäuscht. Sie reagiert zurückhaltend auf Verhandlungsangebote der Union,” Berliner Zeitung, 
December 18, 2002. 
17 Peter Müller, Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages, Stenographische Berichte, 118th Setzung, (July 1st, 
2004), 10723. 
18 “Gesetz zur Steuerung und Begrenzung der Zuwanderung und zur Regelung des Aufenthalts und der 
Integration von Unionsbürgern und Ausländern,” Bundesgesetzblatt Teil 1, Nr. 41, (July 30th, 2004), 1964. 
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knowledge of the legal order, culture, and history of Germany.”19 Details in the Immigration 
Law were sparse, with the specification that gaps – including the implementation, structure, 
duration, and content – would be developed in the future with the involvement of local, state, 
and federal authorities.  
 On December 13, 2004, they did just that with the Act for the Implementation of 
Integration Courses for Foreigners and Late Re-settlers [Integrationskursverordnung]. The 
Integrationskursverordnung details who is expected to take integration courses, as well as 
courses’ cost, structure, and duration. Courses are expected to last for six hundred thirty 
class-hours. Six hundred of these are split evenly between basic and advanced language 
lessons, with the remaining thirty reserved for the “orientation course.” At the end of the 
integration course, students are expected to take a final test with two parts: a language 
component that tests for German proficiency at B1 level20 or greater and a test of the 
information included in the orientation course. Courses could be taught by private citizens, so 
long as they are “reliable, can carry out the courses properly, and can apply a method for 
quality assurance for the courses.”21 
 Curricula for the integration courses were largely decentralized until 2007, when 
amendments to the Nationality Act and the Immigration Act cemented the role of the 
integration course in naturalization and centralized the courses more.  The Bundesamt für 
Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF) was made responsible for ensuring that integration 
                                                     
19 Ibid. 
20 B1 refers to a level of language proficiency as measured by the Common European Framework of References 
for Languages. (CEFR) It breaks foreign language proficiency into six levels: A1, A2, B1, B2, C1, and C2. B1-
level proficiency would be low-intermediate understanding, and is described as being the level at which an 
individual can understand main points made by a speaker or a text and can express themselves in simple 
language. For more on this, see the Council of Europe’s CEFR: 
http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/linguistic/cadre1_en.asp. 
21 Verordnung über die Durchführung von Integrationskursen für Ausländer und Spätaussiedler 
(Integrationskursverordnung). 
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courses were relatively homogenous across communities and states.22 In 2015, BAMF 
published a curriculum for the integration courses that splits the course into three modules: 
“Politics in a Democracy,” “History and Responsibility,” and “Individual and Society.”23 
“Politics in a Democracy” is allocated the most time, accounting for roughly 46 percent of 
the time spent on teaching, where “History and Responsibility” receives only 23 percent and 
“Individual and Society” receives roughly 31 percent. Given German narratives of being a 
“post-national society” that practices “constitutional patriotism” rather than nationalism, it is 
no wonder that the most time is spent on the topic of state structures and institutions.  
 Although BAMF sets the outline of the curriculum, there is variety between 
classrooms with regard to how much time is actually spent on each topic.24 One of the 
primary sources of variation between classes is the difference between workbooks used 
during the course. In July 2010, BAMF published a list of books and materials approved for 
use in integration courses; for the orientation section of the integration course alone there are 
six approved books from five separate publishers.25 Naturally, each book is written and 
organized differently, utilizes different lesson plans and activities, and emphasizes different 
content within each section. That said, they are organized around the content outlined in the 
curriculum published by the federal government and verified by the government as being 
suitable for the courses. As a result, it is reasonable to expect that their content, albeit 
                                                     
22 Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. 
23 In 2014, the amount of time dedicated to the orientation course increased from the 30 teaching units allotted 
in 2004 to 60 teaching units. This is in addition to the 600 teaching units dedicated to the two language courses. 
Out of the sixty units dedicated to the orientation course, twelve are spent on introductions, class trips, and the 
final exam for the course, while the remaining forty-eight are split between the three modules of the course. 
24 Of the five classes Jessica Brown studied in 2005, each of them dedicated most of their time to discussing 
Nazism and the Holocaust during the time allotted for history. Jessica Brown, “Our National Feeling is a 
Broken One,” Qualitative Sociology, 37 (December 2014), 425-442. 
25 BAMF, “List of approved textbooks for the integration course,” July 2010, 
http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/EN/Downloads/Infothek/Integrationskurse/Lehrkraefte/liste-
zugelassener-lehrwerke-pdf-en_IP.html. 
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presented differently, overlaps enough to be considered equally capable of fostering 
integration and Germanization. 
 In addition to the integration courses, which were aimed at Germanizing foreigners, 
the 2007 Reform to the Immigration Law introduced a citizenship test that evaluates whether 
an applicant has sufficiently Germanized. The 2008 Ordinance for a Naturalization Test and 
Naturalization Class [Einbürgerungstestverordnung] codifies the requirements for applicants 
vis-à-vis the naturalization test.26 Individuals applying for naturalization must take a test 
consisting of thirty-three questions, three of which pertain to the state in which it is being 
taken, and answer seventeen questions correctly in under one hour.27 The thirty-three 
questions of which the test is composed were initially selected randomly from a pool of one-
hundred questions, which was later increased to a pool of three-hundred. Ostensibly, 
naturalization tests are ensuring that applicants have the institutional knowledge required to 
function in a new society. Liav Orgad distinguishes between two types of citizenship tests: 
those that test for “National Constitutionalism,” understood as respect for and familiarity 
with the liberal-democratic principles of a given state, and those that test for culture-based 
criteria.28 Although this may operate as an ideal-typical distinction, German national culture 
cannot be separated from liberal-democratic principles, as is argued below, because the post-
War German nation has been built around its identity as a Western, Christian democracy.29 
                                                     
26 Hessen had installed a citizenship test in 2006 consisting of one hundred questions on a range of topics 
including national symbols, culture, German history, Germany in Europe, and Germany and Germans. For more 
on this, see Liav Orgad, “Illiberal Liberalism: Cultural Restrictions on Migration and Access to Citizenship in 
Europe,” American Journal of Comparative Law, 58 (May 2010), 15. 
27 “Verordnung zu Einbürgerungstest und Einbürgerungskurs,” Bundesgesetzblatt I, 35 (August 2008), 1649. 
28 Liav Orgad, “Illiberal Liberalism,” 4. 
29 I point here to questions that seemingly target institutional or legal knowledge, yet also speak to German 
values or the status of Germany as a nation-state. For example, several questions (including 26, 50, 171, 196, 
and 203) ask the applicant to identify the economic system under which either the Federal Republic operates or 
the German Democratic Republic operated. Although these are technically evaluating institutional knowledge, 
they also assert particular values and a particular orientation for the individual, especially to Spätaussiedler 
coming from the former Soviet Bloc. This will be discussed in detail below. 
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As a result, the citizenship test and the integration courses serve the purpose of binding 
citizenship to nationality and ensuring that only nationals can become citizens.30 
 After the introduction of the citizenship test, integration courses were expected to be 
structured to prepare foreigners for the test, emphasizing the institutional, cultural, and social 
knowledge that the test was designed to evaluate as a result. However, although the courses 
and test were and are expected to overlap in content substantially, they are designed 
independently. Texts and materials used during integration courses are written and published 
by private publishing houses, rather than by the government, while the pool of questions 
from which the test is pulled was written by BAMF. That said, because BAMF writes the 
curricula for the courses and curates a list of approved books, there is little latitude for the 
publishers to stray from the expectations and intent laid out by the state. 
 The goal of the orientation course is to “[integrate] foreigners into the economic, 
cultural, and social life of the Federal Republic of Germany,”31 which can be understood as 
helping foreigners to Germanize. Because of this, studying the topics covered in the courses, 
the ways in which the topics are described, and the types of activities assigned to students 
will shed light on how both the state and private publishers understand “Germanness.” 
Although participant observation within classrooms would also be a valuable means for 
understanding how foreigners are taught to be German, understanding the texts around which 
the classes are organized is an important first step. Analysis of the texts deemed appropriate 
for the courses establishes a baseline against which variation between individual classes can 
be measured. Because of this, I will be utilizing three of the six approved texts for the 
                                                     
30 This differentiation is between legal members, citizens, and social members, nationals, which is ultimately a 
differentiation between legal and social statuses. It is important to note that although citizenship and nationality 
often overlap, gaining legal recognition and its attending rights does not necessarily correspond to being treated 
as a member in the nation during day-to-day interactions.  
31“Gesetz zur Steuerung,” 1964. 
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orientation course, each of which is published by a different company: 30 Stunden 
Deutschland, Orientierungskurs Deutschland: Geschichte, Kultur, Institutionen, and 
Orientierungskurs: Grundwissen Politik, Geschichte und Gesellschaft in Deutschland. In 
addition, I will be drawing from the pool of questions used to construct the 
Einbürgerungstest.32 Examining the two side-by-side will provide a fuller understanding of 
the process through which the German state actively binds nationality to citizenship, not only 
through assimilationist policies, but also through processes of active Germanization via 
orientation courses. In addition, the combination of orientation courses and citizenship test 
illustrates what immigrants are expected to learn during the integration process and how they 
are expected to integrate. 
 
Learning to integrate: privileged knowledge of the Occident 
Characterizing Germany as “Occidental” was an essential part of the post-War project of 
national history. In order to construct the European Union and its predecessor institutions, 
Germany needed to be presented as another member of the continental European community, 
united in shared ideals, values, and history. Germany could no longer be thought of as neither 
Oriental nor Occidental, but, instead, as the gateway between the East and the West, nor 
could it be thought of as having its own “special path” [Sonderweg]; instead, Germany was 
as much a part of “Europe” as an essentialized community as France, sharing in its 
development into a region and community characterized by secularism, liberalism, and 
rationalism. As a result, the orientation course and citizenship test emphasize aspects of 
Germanness that intersect with Europe, namely Germany’s Christian heritage, the national 
                                                     
32 The full pool of questions is available online through BAMF. See www.bamf.de 
  
 118  
 
historical narrative of Germany as fundamental to the development of Europe, and shared 
liberal democratic institutions and values. 
 
“Without Christian influence, modern German culture is inconceivable”33 
Officially, Germany is a secular state without an official religion. In spite of this, Germany’s 
Christian influence is overt and essential. Two of the three workbooks openly state that 
although there is freedom of religion in Germany and the state is not to impose a religion, 
Christianity has a “special role” or “special place” in German society.34 Nowhere is 
Christianity’s “special position” in German society and the German nation more visible than 
German holidays. Of the nine national holidays in Germany, six are distinctly Christian.35 Six 
more Christian holidays are public holidays in various states. In addition, shops have been 
closed on Sundays since the passage of the Ladenschlussgesetz [Shop Closing Law] in 1956. 
The Ladenschlussgesetz, which attends to Article 139 of the Basic Law, dictates that Sundays 
are to be protected by law as days of rest and spiritual improvement and observes the 
Christian “Sabbath” as a mandated day of rest.  
 Students of the orientation courses and those seeking to naturalize are expected to be 
familiar with Christian holidays and traditions. Activities in orientation course workbooks 
require that students discuss Christian traditions and holidays. Some such activities take the 
true-false format, which provides a statement and asks students to evaluate it, while others 
focus on asking students to first discuss in small groups and then again in a larger class 
                                                     
33 Susann Kaufmann, Lutz Rohrmann, Petra Szablewski-Çavuş. Orientierungskurs Deutschland: Geschichte, 
Kultur, Institutionen (München: Langenscheidt, 2007), 59. 
34 30 Stunden Deutschland, (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Sprachen, 2005), 57; Joachim Schote, Orientierungskurs: 
Grundwissen Politik, Geschichte und Gesellschaft in Deutschland, (Berlin: Cornelsen Verlag, 2011), 67.  
35 They are: Good Friday, Easter Monday, Ascension Day, Pentecost Monday, Christmas Day, and Boxing 
Day/St. Stephen’s Day. The three without an overt Christian basis are: New Year’s Day, Labor Day, and the 
Day of German Unity. 
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discussion.36 While each book includes prompts for discussing other religions – many 
requiring that students break into groups organized around their shared religion and discuss 
their religion – only one workbook explicitly discusses a non-Christian tradition. While some 
activities require students to match important religious figures from various religions to their 
description, only 30 Stunden Deutschland includes a detailed and explicit discussion of a 
Muslim religious holiday, albeit seemingly tokenized at the end of a section discussing 
Christmas and Easter. 
 Questions on the citizenship test emphasize Germany’s Christian heritage and the 
continued importance of Christianity in contemporary Germany. One question asks the 
applicant: “What is customary at Christmas?” Another asks “What is customary at Easter?” 
Yet another question asks the applicant: “In Germany, what do we call the last four weeks 
before Christmas?” For an actively practicing Christian, such a question should cause no 
trouble. On the other hand, those who do not celebrate Christmas or attend church services in 
the preceding weeks, have no reason to be familiar with Advent. Furthermore, Advent is not 
mentioned explicitly in any of the orientation course books, whether in the body of the text or 
listed in the answers section in discussion of Christian holidays. Orientierungskurs 
Deutschland has a rather lengthy paragraph in the answer segment at the back of the book 
listing Christian holidays, but Advent is nowhere to be found. However, at no point are 
applicants tested on knowledge of Muslim holidays or traditions, despite Islam being the 
fourth largest religious community in Germany, at roughly four percent of the population.37  
  All of this contributes to a portrayal of Germany as being intrinsically Christian. 
                                                     
36 30 Stunden Deutschland, 56-8; Orientierungskurs, 23-4; Orientierungskurs Deutschland, 66-7. 
37 Orientierungskurs, 66. According to Orientierungskurs, Catholicism is the largest, Protestantism is the second 
largest, Atheist is the third, and Islam the fourth. This, however, contradicts other instances in which politicians 
and orientation course books talk about a unified and singular “Christian” heritage.  
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Both the citizenship test and the orientation course workbooks depict European and German 
culture as impossible without Christian influence. For example, Question 295 on the 
citizenship test asks: “Which religion shaped European and German culture?” while all of the 
workbooks make explicit that Christianity is vital to German and European culture. Indeed, 
according to the authors of Orientierungskurs Deutschland, “without Christian influence, 
German and European society and culture would be unthinkable.”38 Something similar is 
stated explicitly in 30 Stunden Deutschland and Orientierungskurs. German culture, and 
European culture as an extension, is inextricable from Christianity. Becoming German, then, 
necessitates learning and memorizing detailed knowledge about Christianity, its traditions 
and symbols, and its tenets, not just to pass the test, but to integrate into German culture and 
function in German social life. 
 
National history: Europeanization and liberal democratic values 
German national history as the history of Germany’s “special path” towards National 
Socialist dictatorship could not be the dominant narrative if Germany was to be regarded as 
being bound together with the West. Instead, history needed to reflect the development of 
liberal democratic ideals and institutions, as well as of German contributions to European 
culture and politics.  To that end, 30 Stunden Deutschland dedicates three pages to exploring 
the “long history” of unity, justice, and liberty in Germany. Included in this is one full page 
dedicated to the “fight for national unity and democracy” that coalesced in the Revolution of 
1848, which is given as much attention as the German Empire, World War I, and German 
                                                     
38 Orientierungskurs Deutschland, 59. 
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reunification respectively.39 The Revolution of 1848 and the constitution proposed by the 
parliament at St. Paul’s Church constitute an important starting point for a narrative about 
German commitment to democracy and rights that continues through the Weimar Republic, 
which took several cues from the 1848 constitution, and is fully realized in the 1949 Basic 
Law.40 
 In addition to portraying Germany as having a long history with liberal democratic 
principles, national history emphasizes German participation in the development of Europe, 
both culturally and politically. Historical figures, including Martin Luther and Johannes 
Gutenberg, are specifically framed as having contributed to the development of Europe. 
Regarding Gutenberg:  “The Reformation, the Industrial Revolution, and Europe’s entire 
cultural development since the 15th Century would be unthinkable without his invention.”41 
Similarly, for Martin Luther: “He changed Europe and the world religiously, politically, and 
spiritually like no other.”42 In both cases, the authors emphasize two important details: (1) the 
magnitude of each of their respective impacts was incomparable and (2) Europe could not 
exist as it does now without each of them. Framed in this way, Germany is central to the 
Enlightenment (from which the liberal democratic ideals with which Western Europe is 
affiliated developed) as well as to all of European print culture, Europe’s Christian tradition, 
and Europe’s economic development during the Industrial Revolution and, therefore, the 
development of capitalism. 
 Beyond Germany’s contributions to Europe’s historical development, German 
                                                     
39 30 Stunden Deutschland, 31.  
40 There is a particular irony to the conceptualization of the 1848 Revolts as a key moment in the development 
of German democracy. The Sonderweg thesis, which certainly holds a special place in German national history 
and is discussed in more detail above, viewed the failure of the Revolution of 1848 and the abortive 
Paulskirchenverfassung [St. Paul’s Church Constitution] as a moment that helped secure the development of 
fascism in 20th Century Germany.  
41 Orientierungskurs Deutschland, 53. Emphasis mine. 
42 Ibid. 
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national history as presented in the orientation course workbooks also emphasizes the 
establishment and development of the European Union. Both Orientierungskurs and 
Orientierungskurs Deutschland dedicate one full page to discussing the development of the 
European Union, from a resolution that there ought to be no more war in Europe to the full 
supranational body that it currently is. 43 Both books and the citizenship test highlight the 
concept of European integration, which they define as the association of members in the 
European Union.44 However, Orientierungskurs Deutschland emphasizes the need for 
homogeneity within the European Union: “The future of the European Union depends on 
whether or not we succeed in advancing political and social integration. This cannot be 
achieved only through policy, but depends on the commitment of European citizens, as 
well.”45 Europe can only be a successful project if its members share the same ideals, values, 
and institutions. 
 National history is also used to reinforce Germany’s status as a Rechtsstaat 
[constitutional state, nation of laws]. The narrative of Germany’s acceptance of guilt for the 
atrocities of the Holocaust, which culminates in Willy Brandt kneeling before a memorial in 
Warsaw,46 is also the narrative of Germany’s devotion to democracy. Applicants are expected 
to be knowledgeable about the events of World War II, including the rise of Hitler and the 
Nazi party, the atrocities committed during National Socialist rule, and Germany’s fate after 
                                                     
43 “For several centuries, there were always large and small wars in Europe. The 30 Years War waged from 
1618 to 1648. From 1870 to 1945, France and Germany waged three wars against one another. After the Second 
World War it was clear: there cannot be any more wars. The countries of Europe must work together.” 
Orientierungskurs Deutschland, 8. Question 235 of the citizenship test also emphasizes this point. It shows an 
image of Francois Mitterand and Helmut Kohl together at a memorial for those who died in both World Wars. It 
asks the applicant to indicate which goals of the European Union are shown in this picture. The correct answer 
is “Peace and security in the countries of the European Union.” 
44 Orientierungskurs, 45; Orientierungskurs Deutschland, 8; and Question 231, Bundesamt für Migration und 
Flüchtlinge, “Gesamtfragenkatalog zum Test‚ Leben in Deutschland,‘” June 2013. 
45 Orientierungskurs Deutschland, 8. 
46 30 Stunden Deutschland, 39; Orientierungskurs, 41; Orientierungskurs Deutschland, 4, 5, 9; Question 181, 
“Gesamtfragenkatalog.” 
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the war. Roughly eight percent of the questions on the citizenship test address these events, 
and each book discusses it in detail.  
 Discussion of the post-war period emphasizes West German success and East 
German struggles against oppression. The only mentions of East Germany and its history are 
of the 1953 strikes for free elections, the construction of the Berlin Wall to prevent East 
German flight to the West, and the protests and desire to reunify in the 1980s. Indeed, as far 
as the orientation course workbooks are concerned, the history of East Germany is 
characterized by a longing to unify and be democratic. The German Democratic Republic is 
represented simply as an authoritarian and undemocratic state, the history of which can be 
reduced only to the secret police [Stasi]47 and the longing for Western institutions and ideals 
that culminated in protests and becoming democratic.48 
 Requiring knowledge of national history helps to reinforce the assertion of the 
centrality of liberal democratic ideals to German society. The German national anthem, 
which applicants are expected to be familiar with,49 begins with the lines: “Unity, justice, and 
liberty for the German fatherland. Let us all strive for this purpose.” Germany is presented as 
a Rechtsstaat, and is presented as such in contrast to the National Socialist regime and the 
German Democratic Republic. Applicants are expected to know the characteristics of a 
Rechtsstaat,50 the economic and political systems,51 and the fundamental rights afforded to 
the citizens.52 In addition, they are tested on knowledge of these same characteristics of the 
Nazi regime and the German Democratic Republic.53 As a result, contemporary German 
                                                     
47 Questions 199 and 208, “Gesamtfragenkatalog.” 
48 Questions 166, 186, 189, 196, 205, 206, 210. 
49 30 Stunden Deutschland, 6; Orientierungskurs, 44; Question 40, “Gesamtfragenkatalog.” 
50 Questions 3, 51, 53, “Gesamtfragenkatalog.” 
51 Questions 22, 26, 27, 34, 38, 50, 120, “Gesamtfragenkatalog.” 
52 Questions 1, 4, 7, 9, 12, 18, 281, “Gesamtfragenkatalog.” 
53 Questions 157, 159, 170, 196, 203, 204, “Gesamtfragenkatalog.” 
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institutions are contrasted with non-democratic and illiberal institutions and states and, in 
doing so, filled with normative value. To oppose or reject these systems is to be on the wrong 
side of history, or to find oneself in the company of Nazis, socialist dictators, leftist 
“terrorists” such as the Rote-Armee-Fraktion, or Islamists. 
 “Politics in a Democracy” is allotted roughly forty-six percent of the course time in 
the curriculum published by BAMF, and is given the most attention in the workbooks and the 
largest number of questions on the citizenship test. However, more than just knowledge is 
expected. Respect for laws is listed in Orientierungskurs as one of the responsibilities of 
German citizens and the following example is given: “Danail Akuzov was born in Bulgaria. 
He has lived in Germany for eight years and has applied for German citizenship. He must 
embrace the constitution and accept Germany’s democratic principles.”54 This is nothing 
new. Since 1977, confessing allegiance to Germany and acceptance of the democratic 
principles on which Germany is based has been a requirement for naturalization. However, 
requiring knowledge of these systems, values, and traditions, which are laden with normative 
meaning, is treated as objective and non-normative through its inclusion in a multiple-choice 
citizenship test. 
 The framing of Germany as sharing European institutions, culture, heritage, and 
values is built on a tradition of Orientalism that casts the “Occident” as “rational, peaceful, 
liberal, logical, capable of holding real values, [and] without natural suspicion.”55 Orientation 
course workbooks and the citizenship test position Germany within the European Union and 
Europe, more generally, as a region of culturally similar and politically homogenous member 
states. “Europe,” understood as “the West," the European Union, and a monolithic region, 
                                                     
54 Orientierungskurs, 19. 
55 Edward Said, Orientalism, (New York: Vintage, 1978), 49. 
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does not include Russia, many of the post-Soviet republics, and Turkey, which has repeatedly 
been denied entry into the EU. The success of the European idea, embodied in the European 
Union as a region of peace, security, and Enlightenment values (democracy, individualism, 
tolerance, rationality, secularism, constitutionalism, etc.) depends on “advancing political and 
cultural integration” through “the commitment of citizens.”56 There is, then, seemingly a 
built-in impediment to integration based on the below-the-surface valuation of knowledge 
that is treated as “objective” and non-normative. However, if the information is made 
available, as it is, how are immigrants and foreigners expected to integrate? That is, what is 
involved in the process of integration, who is responsible for the success or failure of the 
process, and what does integration look like? 
 
Expectations for immigrant integration: who is responsible? 
Certainly, the creation of integration courses and a citizenship test indicates that the German 
state and German politicians understand Germany as needing to remain internally 
homogeneous, rather than multicultural. Indeed, it is no surprise that these policies are 
championed and lauded by the same party that generated the notion of a German Leitkultur, 
to which, they argued, immigrants and foreigners needed to assimilate in order to protect 
Germany’s soul.57 However, it is more than institutional structures and political discourse 
that promotes citizenship as a reward for assimilation. Activities and lessons included in the 
                                                     
56 Orientierungskurs Deutschland, 8. 
57 I am using Robert Park and E.W. Burgess’ definition of assimilation as “a process of interpenetration and 
fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons and groups 
and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life.” 
Understanding assimilation in this way relates the concept directly to the idea of becoming “national,” which 
requires sharing in the shared culture, values, attitudes, and knowledge (of national history, symbols, and 
myths) of the nation. For more on this, see Robert Park and E.W. Burgess, Introduction to the Science of 
Sociology, (Reprint, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1921 [1969]), 735. 
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orientation course workbooks address the desirability of assimilation and the expectation that 
foreigners will pursue the process on their own. 
 Support for multiculturalism is generally absent from the workbooks. Although each 
book has a section on the multiplicity of perspectives and worldviews present in Germany, 
such discussions are either dealing directly with freedom of speech and opinion as a basic 
right, or are presented absent any reference to national differences or foreigners. 
Orientierungskurs Deutschland, for example, offers a six-page section titled “Diversity of 
Life – Diversity of Opinions,” which discusses preconceptions and biases, different family 
compositions, the variety of media available in Germany, and the “culture shock model.” 
Discussing preconceptions and biases is the closest that this workbook comes to discussing 
multiculturalism: the proposed activity asks that students examine a series of photographs 
depicting individuals of a range of ethnic and racial backgrounds and “write down what 
comes to mind for each person: nationality, how long they have been in Germany, 
occupation, hobbies…. Then let the other students guess which person you have described.”58 
Certainly, the purpose of the exercise is to teach students that preconceptions are not 
necessarily accurate and that they can be harmful, but there is no accompanying negation of 
the preconception that only the phenotypically white individuals were German, or that the 
individuals who are expected to be read as Black or Middle Eastern would not have lived in 
Germany for a long time. 
 Another example of weak representation of multiculturalism in the workbooks is the 
testimonials listed under the headline “Between Cultures?” in Orientirungskurs. The section 
contains five testimonials, each of which describes a different immigrant (one who was born 
in Germany to immigrant parents, one labor-migrant, one whose family fled persecution, one 
                                                     
58 Orientierungskurs Deutschland, 35. 
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Spätaussiedler,59 and one who immigrated for school) who maintains a connection to their 
respective homelands. Each testimonial has a narrative in three parts: why and how the 
individual immigrated to Germany; what they like about Germany, which typically explains 
why they see Germany as their homeland; and what they miss about their former home. 
Although each of them maintains a connection to home, whether that is visiting their 
homeland for four months out of the year or having dual-citizenship, each of them regards 
German as their primary language and each of them is happy to call Germany home. In spite 
of the fact that the testimonials included in Orientierungskurs present foreigners with deep 
connections to their country and culture of origin, their status as Germans is verified by and 
rooted in their acceptance of German culture and language, as well as of Germany as their 
new home. Of the five foreigners who gave testimonials, two specifically mention meeting 
and marrying a German national and two note having children whom they have taught only 
German. 
 The narrative of the committed and assimilated immigrant is presented more overtly 
in three testimonials from 30 Stunden Deutschland. Where the testimonials in 
Orientierungskurs include statements about how the immigrants maintain connections to their 
homeland, the testimonials in 30 Stunden Deutschland only discuss how they have 
“integrated.” For each of them, “integration” is a process that begins with the individual 
deciding that they want to be German and pursuing integration on their own, but with help 
from the community. One woman explains: 
 
My husband and I have been living in Germany for 23 years. We fled the war in 
Afghanistan. At the beginning, everything was hard. I was homesick for three years. 
But then I said to myself: ‘I want to stay here, so I have to do something. I started 
                                                     
59 Spätaussiedler is a term translating to “late resettler,” and refers to ethnic Germans who lived in the former 
Soviet republics and are allowed to “return” to Germany with an easier path to naturalization. 
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talking to my neighbors much more. As a result, I learned better German and, above 
all, got to know my neighbors and they got to know me. That helped. Now I don’t 
feel foreign any longer…. Now, Germany is my home.60 
 
 
Another immigrant describes his experience coming to Germany for work and integrating: 
“At first I worked in catering, and then in a factory. But I kept saying to myself: I can do 
more. And I want more…. One must ask: What is going on here? How does this work? What 
can I do? I started at the office for foreigners.”61 Common to these testimonials is the idea of 
the hardworking immigrant who, feeling foreign initially, integrates through hard work and a 
determined orientation towards becoming German. Both involved themselves in their local 
community, which is valued and presented in each of the three workbooks, and in doing so, 
by incorporating themselves into their neighborhood as Germans, were able to feel at home 
and become German. 
 Valuing individual efforts to integrate is unsurprising in a Western capitalist nation-
state with strong connections to the Enlightenment. Indeed, the larger German narrative that 
the immigrant needs to integrate and become German places the burden on the immigrant. 
Seemingly, in coming to Germany and seeking German political and civil rights, an 
immigrant has committed herself to becoming national. There is no bilateral coming together 
here. Orientierungskurs Deutschland makes this clear in a section titled “In a New Country.” 
Here, the authors present the five-stage “Culture Shock Model” as a description of the 
process of integration and the mentality of foreigners during the process. Particularly 
interesting are stages three and five. Stage three, titled “Crisis,” reads: “One feels very 
foreign in the new country. The individual blames the foreign culture….” Stage five, titled 
“Understanding,” states: “The misunderstandings are fewer. The individual understands, 
                                                     
60 30 Stunden Deutschland, 41. 
61 Ibid. 41. 
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accepts, and appreciates the cultural rules of the game.” When introducing the model, the 
authors write that because of all of the new things that the foreigner encounters, they must 
muster all of their energy and apply it to integrating. The model and its introduction are 
oriented towards blaming the foreigner for any misunderstandings and the desire to maintain 
a connection with their own culture. There is no discussion of the hostility of the host society 
or the willingness of host society members to accommodate new cultures or values. Again, 
the unstated expectation is that foreigners in Germany ought to become German, and this 
value is not presented for discussion. 
  However, there is one segment in one book that makes this expectation very explicit. 
30 Stunden Deutschland presents an interesting activity in which students are asked to 
answer four yes-or-no questions as they think Germans answered them. These questions 
include: “Should foreigners who live in Germany be politically active?” and “Should 
foreigners who live in Germany better adapt their lifestyle to the German lifestyle?”62 
Another exercise under the same page asks students to discuss what it means for foreigners to 
better adapt their lifestyle to the German one, and what foreigners and Germans should each 
do in order to achieve this. Immediately, these questions imply that foreigners have a 
responsibility to become more German and encourage foreigners to think about how they can 
solve the problem of learning to live together. However, this is compounded by the answers 
given in the book’s “Solutions” section. To the question of whether or not foreigners living in 
Germany should be politically active, most Germans responded no (63 percent of West 
Germans and 55 percent of East Germans). An even greater percentage (72 percent of West 
Germans and 71 percent East Germans) agreed that foreigners needed to adjust their lifestyle 
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to better match that of Germans.63 Foreigners taking the orientation course are told in no 
uncertain terms that they are expected to change themselves to be regarded as German. 
Politicians talking about multiculturalism in Germany are offering only lip service. 
 It is clear, therefore, that part of the goal of the orientation course is to teach 
foreigners that integration is their responsibility. The state offers the courses and makes 
resources available, but it is the individual’s responsibility to attend the courses and take 
advantage of the community-based resources. Course workbooks make this abundantly clear. 
Nominal Germanness comes at the end of this integration process pursued by the individual; 
that is, once an individual has demonstrated their commitment to and a successful attempt at 
assimilation, the state can choose to recognize them as a citizen. Important, here, is that the 
process demands more of the individual than language competency and the ability to operate 
in German social life. Integration is unidirectional, requiring that immigrants give up their 
culture and traditions in order to adopt German ones. They are expected to change their daily 
life, perspectives on the world, and understandings of manners and acceptable social 
behavior, and replace them with German ones. According to this standard for integration, if 
an individual continues to be regarded as foreign, it is their fault rather than a structural 
failure or a problem with German society. There are no structural factors preventing 
integration or success in social life; failure to integrate is attributed exclusively to the 
immigrant’s lack of acceptance of German social rules, culture, and value. 
 
Conclusion 
Are citizenship tests inherently illiberal? Liav Orgad and Christian Joppke argue that they are 
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not. For Orgad, citizenship tests that include only history and institutions are liberal, and it is 
only when they evaluate cultural knowledge that they become problematic.64 Joppke, 
however, finds no issue with evaluating cultural knowledge, so long as the test is only 
evaluating knowledge, and not belief. He argues: 
 
The mainstream variants that ask for factual knowledge about a country’s history, 
culture and institutions are unproblematic in this respect, because such a matter is 
merely cognitive: it can be learned and mechanically reproduced. Moving from 
knowledge to values, even a signed loyalty declaration or an oath to the Constitution 
does not raise eyebrows, because it consists of external behavior that, moreover, only 
actualizes the contractual underpinnings of liberal citizenship. However, a citizenship 
test that scrutinizes a candidate’s “inner disposition” does raise eyebrows, precisely 
for transgressing the thin line that separates the regulation of behavior from the 
control of beliefs.65 
 
 
Where Orgad took issue with iterations of the German citizenship test that question an 
applicant’s knowledge of Easter traditions and famous composers, Joppke saw nothing 
wrong with this practice because the applicant need only memorize information made 
available online for free or in print at minimal cost. Because the tests are not asking 
applicants to prove that they have internalized particular attitudes, feel an attachment to 
German culture, practice Christian traditions, or feel genuine pangs of guilt when discussing 
the Holocaust, they constitute a perfectly legitimate means of maintaining the liberal and 
democratic quality of the state. In his words:  
 
you cannot run a liberal state that is filled to the ceiling with illiberal people… 
liberalism is all we have: it is the political theory, the ideology… of differentiated 
societies. We should trust in its powers, but it would be naïve to assume that it never 
needs protection – through citizenship tests, for instance, perhaps including their 
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American Journal of Comparative Law, 58 (May 2010 
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more intrusive variants.66  
 
 What both fail to recognize is that distinctions between liberal and illiberal are 
steeped in centuries-old Orientalist discourses. Joppke’s comments that there are “illiberal 
people” from whom liberal societies need “protection” are particularly troubling, and seem to 
be ripped straight from Edward Said’s Orientalism. Indeed, to label a people as illiberal is to 
continue to draw and redraw the map, distinguishing between the Occident’s liberal 
democracies and the Orient’s illiberal regimes. Framing Germany as a country that is deeply 
embedded in and contributed to the development of Western Europe, which is only ever 
referred to as “Europe,” is to place Germany discretely in the Occident. The European Union, 
which evaluates membership applications based on having liberal democratic state 
institutions, a market economy, and the willingness to accept all EU policy, maintains this 
Orientalist approach as well. Studying European Union enlargement into Eastern Europe, 
Merje Kuus argues that Eastern Europe states are objects of orientalist discourses that assert 
essential difference between Eastern Europe and Europe.67 Similarly, Yusuf Devran’s study 
of European framing of Turkish applications to the EU shows that politicians and media use 
references to Turkey as a “Muslim Democracy” and as needing a “cultural revolution” to 
establish irreconcilable differences between Turkey and Europe.68 For countries without the 
shared “Christian Occidental” tradition, gaining membership in the European Union requires 
a process of integration-as-assimilation, because Turkey is seen as unable to be integrated. 
                                                     
66 Chistian Joppke,”How liberal are citizenship tests? A rejoinder” (working paper, Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, 2010). http://eudo-citizenship.eu/commentaries/citizenship-
forum/citizenship-forum-cat/255-how-liberal-are-citizenship-tests?showall=&start=10. 
67 Merje Kuus, “Europe’s eastern expansion and the re-inscription of otherness in East-Central Europe,” 
Progress in Human Geography, 28 (August 2004), 473. 
68 Yusuf Devran, “The Portrayal of Turkey in the British Media: Orientalism Resurfaced,” Insight Turkey, 9 
(October 2007). 
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 In spite of the claim made in 30 Stunden Deutschland that most of the foreigners 
presently living in Germany are from the European Union,69 the largest single-country 
foreign populations are primarily from Turkey and from Eastern Europe.70 Of the ten largest 
populations, four are from non-EU member states – Turkey, Syria, Serbia, and Russia – and 
of the remaining six, three are former Soviet Republics – Poland, Romania, and Croatia. 
Each of these countries is cast as outside of Europe as a result of its lack of shared Western, 
Enlightenment heritage. For those with majority Muslim populations – Turkey, Syria, and 
Serbia – that difference is compounded and deepened by religious differences. Because of 
this, integration and Germanization are impossible projects, especially for those from the 
“Middle East.” Foreigners who do not share in Germany’s “Christian Occidental tradition” 
are expected to learn that tradition in order to naturalize as well as take part in social life. 
Those whose phenotype betrays their country or region of origin, however, are likely to be 
regarded as “Other” on sight.71 No amount of cultural and political integration can prevent 
them from being treated as fundamentally and essentially different, although that difference 
will always be vocalized through assumptions about cultural difference rather than skin 
color. That is, although immigrants can become proficient enough in German and know 
enough about German history, culture, and institutions in order to gain citizenship in the 
state, that citizenship does not necessarily translate into national membership for those who 
                                                     
69 30 Stunden Deutschland, 50.  
70 “Anzahl der Ausländer in Deutschland nach Herkunftsland in den Jahren 2014 und 2015,” Statista, 
de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/1221/umfrage/anzahl-der-auslaender-in-deutschland-nach-herkunftsland/ 
71 There is an unfortunate dearth of literature discussing the racialization of contemporary German Orientalism.  
For broader discussions of the intersection between Orientalism and race, see: Akihiko Hirose and Kay Kei-Ho 
Pih, “’No Asians Working Here’: racialized otherness and authenticity in gastronomical Orientalism,” Ethnic 
and Racial Studies, 34 (2011); Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East 
Since 1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008); Zaki Nahaboo, “Multicultural Society Must 
Be Defended?” in Citizenship After Orientalism: Transforming Political Theory, ed. Engin Isin (New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2015); Meghana Nayak, “Orientalism and ‘saving’ US state identity after 9/11,” 
International Feminist Journal of Politics, 8 (2006); Edward Said, Orientalism. 
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are labeled phenotypically Other. 
 The system of privileged knowledge institutionalized in the orientation courses and 
citizenship tests reifies essentialized differences between Occident and Orient by treating 
Occidental tradition and heritage as objective knowledge or as the most developed. Certainly, 
Orgad was correct that there can be nothing “liberal” about a citizenship test that tests 
cultural knowledge. However, even without questions about cultural traditions and lessons 
about manners or Christianity’s “special role,” the reification of Enlightenment thought and 
Occidental tradition present in Germany’s citizenship test, as well as in citizenship tests more 
generally, makes the institution inherently exclusionary. To wit, Joppke’s suggestion that 
there need be protective measures against “illiberal people” to protect Western European 
societies drew directly from Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations,72 but instead of 
masking race with culture as Huntington did, Joppke masked race with liberalism. 
                                                     
72 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, 72 (1993). See also a similar argument 
in: Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We: The Challenges to America’s National Identity, (London: Simon and 
Shuster Ltd., 2004).  
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Discussion and Conclusion 
Producing German Nationals  
 
What does it mean to be German in contemporary Germany? Can someone become a 
German citizen without becoming a German national? What does continued integration into 
and participation in the European Union mean for the German national? How can immigrants 
become national, if at all, in Germany? In order to tackle these questions, this study took a 
diachronic, comparative historical approach, and was thereby able to examine changes in the 
German national over time, which included changes made during and after the processes of 
Allied occupation, European integration, and German reunification.  
 Chapter One outlined the theoretical basis for this study. I argued that nations are not 
naturally existing communities, but are instead communities of people who share a belief in 
particular fictions – internal homogeneity, historically shared ethnicity or language, etc. – 
that makes them internally and externally recognizable. This understanding of nation as a 
social relationship emphasizes the creation, negotiation, and institutionalization of the 
narratives around which the nation is organized. Such a perspective encourages examination 
of struggles over the establishment of hegemonic national narratives, understood as both 
continuous processes and as discrete events, and of institutionalized forms of exclusion 
derived from and legitimated by the national. 
 Chapter Two began from this perspective and outlined a methodology for studying 
changes in the national and national exclusion. I argued that the comparative historical 
approach was well suited to analyzing the national precisely because it is capable of 
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longitudinal and cross-sectional comparative analysis. Furthermore, its unique relationship to 
theory – more specifically, its capacity for both deductive grand theorization and hypothesis 
testing, as well as inductively building middle range theory – allowed for multiple possible 
research designs, each of which addresses the same macro-social phenomenon. 
 Chapter Three focused on the process through which the hegemonic German national 
were negotiated and established. Taking the establishment of a unified “German” state in 
1870 as its starting point and ending with the substantial reforms enacted at the end of the 
20th century, the chapter explored changes in German citizenship and naturalization law, as 
well as trends in public contestations over what it meant to be a German national. Treating 
citizenship law as coming out of the intersection between state interests and the national, the 
analysis combines understandings of the national derived from citizenship law with 
expressions of what it means to be national as expressed by historians, politicians, and public 
figures to get a fuller understanding of German nationhood. In taking such an approach, the 
chapter highlights the importance of cultural boundaries to becoming national in Germany, 
especially as they became used more broadly in the second half of the 20th century. 
 Picking up where Chapter Three left off, Chapter Four begins with the reforms to the 
citizenship and naturalization law passed in 1999 and examines the establishment and 
implementation of integration courses and the citizenship test in the following decade. Rather 
than taking a longitudinal approach to observe changes in the fifteen years following the 
reforms, this chapter took a cross-sectional approach, first contextualizing and then focusing 
on the content of the integration courses and citizenship test. The data for this analysis was 
drawn from the text of the citizenship test, the curricula for the integration courses published 
by the Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge [Federal Office for Migration and 
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Refugees], and three of the six workbooks approved for use in integration courses by the 
Bundesamt. Analysis of these documents revealed narratives of justifiable exclusion for those 
who do not fit in with the narratives of Germany as Western, European, cosmopolitan, and 
liberal.   
 The goal of this chapter is to summarize and contextualize the findings of the 
previous chapters. Although there is likely more to be found in the data, I will discuss three 
key findings that bridge Chapters Four and Five in the space below: the role of culture in 
bounding the German national community, the presence of Orientalist discourses in the 
German national, and the role of social institutions in producing nationals out of immigrants. 
I conclude this chapter with a discussion of avenues for further research, including further 
questions inspired by the findings of this study, research approaches that might shed more 
light on the questions asked in this study, and questions that would help expand the 
generalizability of the conclusions from this study. 
 
German Cultural Nationalism 
The conventional wisdom is that Germany is the model for the ethnocultural nation. 
“Ethnocultural,” however, has been used in the German context almost exclusively to 
describe an ethnoracial understanding of national membership. Rogers Brubaker’s analysis of 
the continuities of German citizenship, for example, asserted “ethnocultural nationalism” as 
the underpinning for the German system of citizenship jus sanguinis.1 The ascription of 
citizenship by blood that was at the core of 19th and 20th Century German citizenship law as 
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described by Brubaker, however, focused almost exclusively on the racial dimension of 
ethnicity. As a result, it was inconceivable to him that German citizenship law could be 
substantially “liberalized” at the turn of the century or that culture could become the primary 
institutionalized condition for the ascription of citizenship.2 
 Culture, however, had long been an important marker of difference within the 
hegemonic German national as expressed through German citizenship law. Opposition to 
Polish immigration and naturalization in the late 19th Century was articulated as a fear that 
Poles, and later Danes and Czechs, did not and would not assimilate. Indeed, Bismarck’s 
early approach to Polish immigrants and laborers in eastern Prussia was assimilationist. Even 
before Bismarck’s German Empire, German Romantic philosophers, including Johann 
Gottfried Herder in the late 18th Century and Johann Gottlieb Fichte in the early 19th, called 
for a revitalization of German culture and language through the production of both folk 
literature and an educational regime by which Germans would be raised and produced.3 For 
both Herder and Fichte, descent was the means through which German culture and language 
were transmitted and preserved. 
 Descent as Fichte conceived of it, however, did not depend on racial purity. Instead, it 
                                                     
2 This is, in part, because his argument for citizenship as a state institution is one of inertia. Citizenship models 
survive as institutions in their respective contexts because (1) they are underpinned by congruous conceptions 
of nationhood and (2) they “have taken on the inertial weight and normative dignity of [legal] tradition.” 
Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood, 186. 
3 Herder’s call for a revival of folk literature divorced from the French tradition of the Enlightenment inspired 
both the Sturm and Drang movement in German literature and the works of the Brothers Grimm. Much early 
German nationalism was motivated by fear of losing the “German essence” to the encroaching cultural, 
intellectual, and military power of the French. For more on German philosophical nationalism during the late 
18th and early 19th Centuries, see: Arash Abizideh, “Was Fichte an Ethnic Nationalist? On Cultural Nationalism 
and Its Double,” History of Political Thought, 26 (Summer 2005); Robert R. Ergang, Herder and the 
Foundations of German Nationalism (New York: Octagon Books, 1976; orig. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1931); Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Addresses to the German Nation, trans. R.F. Jones and G.H. Turnbull 
(Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1922); Royal J. Schmidt, “Cultural Nationalism in Herder,” 
Journal of the History of Ideas, 17 (June 1956); Richard White, “Herder: On the Ethics of Nationalism,” 
Humanitas, 18 (2005); William A. Wilson, “Herder, Folklore, and Romantic Nationalism,” Journal of Popular 
Culture, 6 (Spring 1973). 
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was the culture and, more importantly, the language that needed to remain pure and 
determined membership in the national community. This notion of heritage as the primary, 
and perhaps only legitimate, means of transmitting membership in the German nation relied 
on the transmission of German values, language, traditions, etc. Indeed, the Nationality Act 
of 1913, upon which most subsequent citizenship law was based, emphasized the notion of 
inheriting Germanness through provisions for Germans born abroad. Under this new law, 
children born abroad to parents with citizenship in the Reich (and later the Republic) were 
granted citizenship at birth. Volksdeutsche [individuals of German descent] abroad who had 
never possessed Reich citizenship, however, were given no special consideration. Indeed, 
further provisions in 1920 confirmed the importance of culture to differentiating between 
members and outsiders, especially within the category of Volksdeutsch: ethnic Germans were 
given special naturalization considerations so long as “they preserved the German outlook 
and German special nature while abroad.”4 During the German Empire and Weimar 
Republic, German citizenship, and the membership in the national community to which 
citizenship was tied, certainly privileged ethnic Germans, but used culture as the final criteria 
for evaluating naturalization.  
 The racial component of Germanness, in both national conception and citizenship 
policy, emerged under Hitler’s regime. Under Hitler, the Reichstag passed a new citizenship 
law that, for the first time, used biological terminology to delimit the boundaries of who 
could be German. These boundaries began with “German or kindred blood,” and were later 
extended to include “objective” and “scientific” categorizations to prevent people with 
                                                     
4 Memorandum from the Reich Minister of the Interior to the different Länder of 1 June 1921 quoted in 
Nathans, Politics of Citizenship in Germany, 202. 
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Jewish, Polish, Czech, Romani, or other Slavic heredity from being considered German.5 
Although there were different categories of racial Germans afforded different sets of rights 
based on how closely they reflected the Nazi regime’s conception of German national 
culture, the Reich’s conception of citizenship and nation was, without a doubt, ethno-racial. 
 Ethnic Germans remained a privileged category after the war. Border changes within 
Europe after the war resulted in thousands of ethnic Germans no longer living in or having 
access to Germany. The new West German government enshrined the right of return for 
these Volksdeutsche in 1945 in the constitution and again in 1955 in the Act on the 
Regulation of Questions of Nationality. Furthermore, the attribution of citizenship at birth 
remained a right exclusive to the children of German citizens until 2000, when the 1999 
reforms went into effect. Explicit references to race had been removed and become taboo in 
public discourse, but more stringent cultural boundaries were erected and reinforced through 
discussion in public forums.6 Naturalization standards required that applicants demonstrate 
command of the German language, a “free-willing and longstanding orientation towards 
Germany,” and an orientation towards Western Democratic ideals, which were understood as 
the basis for German society.7 Acquiring citizenship as a non-ethnic German required taking 
on German values and culture – assimilating, in other words. 
 The implementation of the citizenship test in 2008, which followed the creation of 
“integration courses” four years prior, signaled continued commitment to a naturalization and 
citizenship regime predicated on assimilation. Germany’s current national narrative draws 
                                                     
5 In keeping with the distinction drawn in Chapter 4, I am using heredity to refer to ancestry, where heritage is 
values, traditions, identity, etc. 
6 For more on this, see the discussions of Gastarbeiter, the Heidelberger Manifest, and the Leitkultur Debatte in 
Chapter Four, above.  
7 “Einbürgerungsrichtlinien,” Gemeinsames Ministerialblatt, (January 30, 1978), 27. 
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heavily on what they call the “Western Christian tradition” and participation in Europe, 
which draws on knowledge of Christianity, Enlightenment thought, German culture, and 
European history and treats them all as ubiquitous. Each of these strains is present in the 
German Einbürgerungstest: in questions about how to properly celebrate Easter, in questions 
about famous German composers, and in questions about value-laden symbolic gestures from 
history, all of which are dressed up as non-normative and objective.  
 The citizenship test, which applicants are required to take and pass in order to 
naturalize, evaluates an applicant’s knowledge of German history, traditions, and civic 
values. Implicit in arguments that favor citizenship tests that emphasize “liberal values” is an 
inherent divide between nationals, who are assumed to have knowledge of the civic 
institutions, history, and liberal principles on which nationhood is based, and non-nationals, 
who are regarded as lacking this knowledge. Indeed, such tests require applicants “to show 
allegiance to a constructed national identity understood as a set of principles, historical 
events and values wrapped into a liberal democratic package.”8  
 More clearly than ever before, culture is the pivotal point of difference between 
members of the German national community and nonmembers. The ideal immigrant, as 
presented in the workbooks used in the integration courses, is the one who pursues 
integration (read: assimilation) as an individual project and becomes German. However, 
culture has always been an important aspect of the German national. Naturalization had 
previously been a possibility for non-ethnic Germans during the German Empire, but relied 
on proving almost complete assimilation. Bismarck’s explicit attempts at forcibly 
                                                     
8 Sergio Carrera and Elspeth Guild, “Are Integration Tests Liberal? The ‘Universalistic Liberal Democratic 
Principles’ as Illiberal Exceptionalism,” (working paper, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EUDO 
Citizenship Observatory, 2010). http://eudo-citizenship.eu/commentaries/citizenship-forum/citizenship-forum-
cat/255-how-liberal-are-citizenship-tests?showall=&start=7. 
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assimilating migrant worker populations in eastern Prussia in the late 19th Century and the 
special provisions for those who possessed the deutsche Gesinnung [German outlook] and 
Eigenart [special nature] support this. However, this is not to say that culture is the only 
metric by which applicants are evaluated. Culture can be –and often is – raced and operates 
as a proxy for race, especially when “race” is a taboo subject.9  
 Expanding the use of culture as a means of bounding the national community places 
Germany firmly in the company of other Western European nation-states that use political, 
cultural, and linguistic knowledge measures for assessing if someone is national. In some 
ways, the German naturalization model resembles the French model Brubaker used as the 
ideal-type for the political nation and has been characterized as such. It is perhaps more 
useful, however, to understand this as an expansion of a model that already existed in the 
German legal and national tradition. Germany had used this as a method for bounding the 
community of ethnic Germans – that is, as a means of differentiating between the broader 
category of Volksdeutsche and the subset of that category that qualified as Staatsangehörige 
[nationals]. But only recently has this become its primary means of legal differentiation.10 
That said, the cultural and political content that immigrants and naturalization candidates are 
expected to know and internalize now differs from what it was during the Weimar Period.  
 
                                                     
9 For examples of this in the German context, see my discussion of the Leitkultur debate in Chapter 4 above. 
See also: David Beriss, “Culture-as-Race or Culture-as-Culture: Caribbean Ethnicity and the Ambiguity of 
Cultural Identity in French Society,” French Politics, Culture and Society, 18 (2000); Carolyn McKinney, 
“Caught between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’? Talking about ‘race’ in a post-apartheid university classroom,” Race, 
Ethnicity, and Education, 10 (May 2007). 
10 This internal boundary can be seen as early as the period before the establishment of the German Empire in 
1871. More specifically, it is present in the struggle between the Großdeutsch and Kleindeutsch approaches. 
Bismarck’s approach to the formation of a single German state (the Kleindeutsch solution) did not include 
Austria. Although the Austrians were considered ethnic Germans, Bismarck and other proponents of the 
approach considered Austrians to have their own culture that was distinct from the German culture. As a result, 
they could not be German nationals and, therefore, could not be part of the unified German state.  
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Orientalism and Naturalization 
One of the most significant national projects after the Second World War was the 
reformulation of German national history, narratives, and symbols. What was originally an 
argument for German exceptionalism, the Sonderweg [special path] thesis, which argued that 
German economic and political development were unique within the broader European 
context, was reformulated in the 1960s and 1970s to be a deterministic argument for the 
inevitability of German fascism.11 Germany’s surrender on May 8, 1945 became Stunde Null 
[zero hour] and marked the start of a new period in German national history.12 During the 
second half of the 20th Century, German participation in the European Coal and Steel 
Community – and later the European Union – as well as broader German integration into 
“Western” supra-national organizations carried with it an Europeanization of German 
national memory. Over this period, two major discourses were integrated into the hegemonic 
German national: (1) narratives of national guilt and anti-nationalism and (2) Germany’s 
position within Europe. 
 The primary narrative propagated by proponents of denazification was that every 
German was guilty of the atrocities of the war. It was not sufficient to remove high-ranking 
Nazis from positions of power – whether in academia, state apparatuses, or public media – 
and public authority. Rather, each individual German also needed to be denazified. Under 
Allied occupation, placards declaring the guilt of every individual German were posted 
throughout occupied territories. During the following decades, attempts to address and move 
                                                     
11 Jürgen Kocka, “Asymmetrical Historical Comparison: The Case of the German Sonderweg,” History and 
Theory, 38 (February 1999), 40-50.  
12 In 1985, German president Richard von Weizsäcker famously stated that “there was no ‘zero hour’, but we 
had the opportunity to make a fresh start,” essentially critiquing the notion that German history had reset at the 
end of the war.  Richard von Weizsäcker, “Speech during the Ceremony Commemorating the 40 th Anniversary 
of the End of War in Europe and of National-Socialist Tyranny,” (Bonn, 8 May 1985). 
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past the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime all came to the same conclusions: Germans 
were guilty and the only path forward was to reject nationalism. The German flag, the 
national anthem, German political heroes, and other standard national symbols were tainted; 
they were replaced by Western democratic values, the constitution, the public sphere, the 
memories of the Holocaust and the acts of contrition those memories had inspired, and those 
cultural figures deemed harmless or apolitical. Expressions of national pride and affiliation 
were taboo. 
 At the same time, German participation in the European project became an important 
facet of German national history and identity. Being German involved being committed to 
democracy, peace, the Christian heritage of the West, and identifying with the Western 
tradition. German history was now framed as being part of the history of Western Europe, 
where it had once been particularistic and on its own Sonderweg. These contemporary 
understandings of German national history and nationhood are reflected in citizenship law as 
well as the naturalization process. Beginning in 1977, federal naturalization guidelines 
required that applicants declare their commitment to the “free and democratic constitution.”13 
This requirement was codified in the 1990 reforms to the Nationality Act, and was reinforced 
in the curriculum for the integration courses and the questions of the 2008 citizenship test. 
Indeed, one text used in the integration courses used the following example: “Danail Akuzov 
was born in Bulgaria. He has lived in Germany for eight years and has applied for German 
citizenship. He must embrace the constitution and accept Germany’s democratic 
principles.”14 
 This shift in the content of the hegemonic German national to drawing external 
                                                     
13 “Einbürgerungsrichtlinien,” Gemeinsames Ministerialblatt, (January 30, 1978), 27. 
14 Joachim Schote, Orientierungskurs, (Berlin: Cornelsen Verlag), 19. 
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boundaries based on political and cultural content created a new privileged class of migrant. 
Where the pre-1999 laws privileged Volksdeutsche by virtue of their heritage but expected 
them to demonstrate cultural and linguistic knowledge, the post-1999 regime privileged those 
with the right kind of political and cultural knowledge – namely, Europeans. Germany’s role 
in the founding of the European Union created an understanding of German nationhood that 
emphasized nearness to Europe. This process occurred through both material and ideological 
integration. This included shared European policies, such as the opening of physical borders 
with policies supporting the freedom to travel and work within Europe, and shared narratives 
of mutual development within Western Europe, Christian heritage, and a post-national 
outlook. As a result, applicants are functionally divided into two categories: those who share 
these heritages and those who do not – or as legal scholar Christian Joppke put it, liberal 
people and illiberal people.15  
 Divisions between “liberal” and “illiberal” – those sharing and lacking the Occidental 
Christian tradition – rely heavily on longstanding Orientalist narratives. Germany, as a 
founding member of and central influence in perhaps one of the most successful and 
normalized Western institutions, represents and has integrated into its hegemonic conception 
of nationhood those qualities associated with the “Occident”: rationality, liberalism, logic, 
civilization, and peace; on the other hand, those associated with the Orient are understood as 
possessing none of these qualities. This essentialized difference can be seen in decisions for 
European enlargement as well as in the priorities and defenses of German – and other 
                                                     
15 Chistian Joppke,”How liberal are citizenship tests? A rejoinder” European Union Democracy Observatory on 
Citizenship (working paper, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, 
2010). http://eudo-citizenship.eu/commentaries/citizenship-forum/citizenship-forum-cat/255-how-liberal-are-
citizenship-tests?showall=&start=10 
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Western European – citizenship tests.16 Where Germans and those who can become German 
are Christian, democratic, liberal, rational, and anti-nationalistic, the foreign is 
conceptualized as Muslim, illiberal, emotional, and too attached to their nation of origin. 
Potential citizens are conceived of as inherently not knowing or understanding “a constructed 
set of national liberal democratic history, principles and values (‘rules of the game’)….”17 
   
Producing German Nationals 
Examining German citizenship law over time also sheds light on the importance of social 
institutions in producing German nationals. By understanding who can be a citizen and under 
what circumstances reveals which social institutions are expected to socialize and produce 
Germans. Implicit in the pre-1999 citizenship regime, for example, which ascribed 
citizenship at birth to children born to German citizens relies on the expectation that German 
parents will produce German children. Because the children of Volksdeutsche who were 
never German citizens were not ascribed citizenship in this manner, it is clear that the state 
expected the German family to be the institution that would be primarily responsible for 
socializing children into Germans. German citizenship was transmitted through descent 
                                                     
16 Yusuf Devran, “The Portrayal of Turkey in the British Media: Orientalism Resurfaced,” Insight Turkey, 9 
(October 2007); Christian Joppke, “How liberal are citizenship tests?” (working paper, Robert Schuman Centre 
for Advanced Studies, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, 2010). http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/commentaries/citizenship-forum/citizenship-forum-cat/255-how-liberal-are-citizenship-
tests?showall=&start=7; Christian Joppke, “How liberal are citizenship tests? A rejoinder”; Merje Kuus, 
“Europe’s eastern expansion and the re-inscription of otherness in East-Central Europe,” Progress in Human 
Geography, 28 (August 2004). 
17 Sergio Carrera and Elspeth Guild argue that citizenship tests represent a form of “illiberal exceptionalism” 
wrapped up in liberal values and history. While a strong and damning critique of the wave of support 
proclaimed by “liberal” people for this inherently “illiberal” institution, I would argue that their argument does 
not go far enough to examine how citizenship tests perpetuate an essentialized Occidental-Oriental divide by 
creating privileged categories. For more of their argument, see: Sergio Carrera and Elspeth Guilt, “Are 
Integration Tests Liberal?” See also: Elspeth Guild, Kees Groenendijk, and Sergio Carerra, Illiberal Liberal 
States: Immigration, Citizenship and Integration in the EU (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009); Ricky van Oers, Eva 
Erboll, and Dora Kostakopoulou, A Redefinition of Belonging? Language and Integration Tests in Europe (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010). 
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because the family was the primary socializing institution that would effectively produce a 
love of the fatherland and German culture. 
 This reliance on the family corresponds, in part, with the period characterized by the 
expansion of both compulsory primary school enrollment and the abortive process of 
nationalizing public education in Germany.18 Bismarck’s initial efforts at eradicating Polish 
nationalism and producing Germans in East Prussia, for example, targeted primary schools. 
In so doing, he aimed to utilize the burgeoning socializing institution to Germanize them at a 
young age and undermine the influence of Polish community leaders and family. 
 The first reforms to naturalization law that substantially expanded access to 
naturalization did so for the children of foreigners born in and socialized in Germany. More 
specifically, the reforms to the Ausländergesetz [foreigners’ law] in 1990 eased access for 
youths between the ages of 16 and 24, lived in Germany for at least eight years, and had 
attended a German school for at least six years.19 A German education now granted easier 
access to citizenship precisely because the German education system had become the primary 
producer of German nationals. 
 It is no surprise, then, that an integration course was introduced in 2004. Foreign 
adults would likely never attend a German school and receive the same socialization as 
German adults had received. Indeed, the integration courses, which were initially developed 
as an optional means by which to reduce the residency requirement for applicants, and 
citizenship test are both expected to function as a substitute for passage through the education 
                                                     
18 The process of nationalizing education policy continued through the late 1960s and early 1970s, for example. 
For more on the nationalization of German education, see: Susanne Wiborg, “Why is there no comprehensive 
education in Germany? A historical explanation,” History of Education, 39 (July 2010). For more on enrollment 
rates, see: Aaron Benavot and Phyllis Riddle, “The Expansion of Primary Education, 1870-1940: Trends and 
Issues,” Sociology of Education, 61 (July 1988).  
19 “Ausländergesetz,”Bundesgesetzblatt Teil I, 34 (July 1990), 1354-1387. 
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system. Defenders of the citizenship test cite this as one of the primary virtues of such a 
barrier to naturalization. Political scientist Randall Henson argued that:  
 
citizenship tests are in a fundamental sense a substitute for education: those born in 
the country or those who arrived very young can generally be expected to have 
acquired a basic knowledge of the country’s history, institutions, and cultural 
practices through school… Since immigrants have generally not been schooled in the 
country, they lack this education…. And making the test a requirement rather than an 
expectation is no different than making education a requirement rather than an 
expectation.20 
 
Making a similar argument in the same working paper series, Christian Joppke wrote:  
 
Only citizens vote (at least nationally), and this requires civic knowledge, for the sake 
of all who have to suffer the consequence of the vote. Citizens acquire civic 
knowledge in school (which incidentally is mandatory), immigrants don’t. So it is 
apposite that immigrants, who have not been schooled in their country of residence, 
are required to undergo a civics course and test as condition for citizenship.21 
 
 It is clear that the school is the primary institution through which nationals are 
expected to be produced in Germany. Certainly, public media and the family still play 
important roles in socializing youths into nationals and citizens, but the homogenizing power 
of the school as a social institution is much more vital to nation-making. For adults, who 
cannot be expected or required to pass through the German educational system, there are 
integration courses. These courses are not, however, mandatory. Yet looking to the materials 
used in the courses, though, indicates that the transformation of adults from foreigner to 
national is expected to be an individual-led process. Testimonials present in the course 
                                                     
20 Randall Henson, “Citizenship Tests: An Unapologetic Defense,” (working paper, Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies, EUDO Citizenship Observatory, 2010). http://eudo-citizenship.eu/commentaries/citizenship-
forum/citizenship-forum-cat/255-how-liberal-are-citizenship-tests?showall=&start=10 
21 Christian Joppke, “How Liberal Are Citizenship Tests?” 
  149  
 
workbooks that are intended to depict “successfully integrated” immigrants all focus on one 
central message: integration can only be achieved through individual efforts to become 
German. Further exercises tell immigrants that, on average, over 70 percent of Germans want 
“foreigners who live in Germany [to] better adapt their lifestyle to the German lifestyle.”22 
 German citizenship law reflects a reliance on schools as homogenizing institutions for 
the production of nationals and messages about “integration” as an individually-pursued 
process of becoming more German. These indicate that the expectation is not integration 
understood as a transcultural process of mutual coming-together, but assimilation, in which 
the immigrant “acquire[s] the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons and 
groups and… are incorporated with them in a common cultural life.”23 This is only possible 
because of the greater emphasis on cultural markers of Germanness; there could be no 
assimilation if the German national community was bounded solely by ethnicity-as-race. 
That said, the conferral of citizenship is not necessarily the conferral of nationality. Just 
because individuals become German citizens and are recognized as being culturally national, 
does not guarantee that they will be regarded as a member in the nation by other nationals. 
That is, there are still barriers to membership that extend beyond socialization, including, for 
example, hegemonic understandings of what a “German” looks like.  
 
Avenues for Future Research 
As with almost any study, the findings for this study raise a host of new questions that can be 
                                                     
22 30 Stunden Deutschland, (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Sprachen, 2005), 51, 64. 
23 Robert Park and E.W. Burgess, Introduction to the Science of Sociology, (Reprint, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1921 [1969]), 735. See also: G. Reginald Daniel, “Assimilation or transculturation? The 
diversity of ethnic relations reconsidered,” Unity and Difference, 1 (1999), 43-48. 
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pursued in the future. These range from further questions about the state of the German 
national to expanding the questions and findings of this study beyond the German context. 
There are, of course, several directions that can be taken, and I will discuss a few of them 
here. 
 One of the most significant limitations of this study is that it takes a purely top-down 
approach. Understanding how state institutions, state actors, elites, etc. conceive of and 
bound the national through policy, education, writing national history, and other means is an 
important first step to thinking about nation, nationalism, and the national. However, reading 
policy, speeches, and textbooks can only roughly approximate the attitudes and 
understandings of individuals or what sorts of behaviors and interactions those attitudes 
produce. Indeed, any study of nation and nationalism is incomplete if it only attends to elite 
conceptions of the national. As a result, a key path forward is to study how individuals within 
Germany – specifically Germans, European non-nationals, and non-European non-nationals 
– understand what it means to be German, as well as if and how an individual can become 
German. Doing so could open the analysis to include interviews, observation, or surveys.  
Taking a micro-level approach such as this could also allow for study of the role that race 
plays in contemporary popular understandings of the German national. Do German nationals 
associate race with citizenship and status as a national? Does race structure who German 
nationals perceive as being national, whether consciously or subconsciously? Because state 
and hegemonic narratives around what it means to be German and the German national have 
moved away from heredity and völkisch [ethnic] language, these questions are better suited to 
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an approach focused on individuals and patterns of behavior.24  
 Another set of questions raised by this study attend to the issue of Orientalism in 
contemporary Germany, as well as in contemporary Europe more broadly. Is there a tradition 
of Orientalist narratives in the German national? Are the contemporary iterations of these 
narratives, which draw heavily on narratives surrounding the European Union, unique to 
Germany, or can they be found in other Western European nation-states as well? Do policies 
and statements made by the European Union reflect these Orientalist discourses as well? In 
what ways do national and supra-national iterations of Orientalist discourses structure and 
influence one another? Because Orientalist discourses construct essentialized differences 
between regions, rather than simply differences between nations, questions about the role of 
Orientalism in structuring national and supra-national identities in contemporary Europe can 
be posed at multiple levels of organization. 
 If academics and state officials justify citizenships by arguing that they act as a 
replacement for passage through the national school system another set of avenues for future 
research could address these claims. For example, one might evaluate the degree to which 
youth who go through compulsory education in Germany are held responsible for the same 
material as those who take the citizenship test, as well as if the material is presented in the 
same way. More specifically, it would be useful to examine if the national is taught in the 
same way, if discourses present in the integration courses and citizenship test are also present 
in German schoolrooms, and if Orientalist narratives are also present there. Another potential 
direction would be to examine changes in the material taught in schools that helps to produce 
                                                     
24 Although this study finds that Orientalist narratives are important aspects of the contemporary German 
national, and Orientalism is raced and often results in racial divisions, it  cannot definitively establish that race 
structures divisions between “nationals” and “foreigners.” 
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nationals. Studying the messages and content used to socialize nationals in German schools 
lends itself to several approaches: archival analysis of textbooks, curricula, worksheets, and 
other artifacts produced for schooling;25 observation of classrooms for both integration 
courses and compulsory education; interviews with teachers for both types of education; etc. 
 Further research on the topics of nation, nationalism, and citizenship are by no means 
limited to these areas of inquiry. Indeed, future studies may, for example, continue with the 
comparative historical approach and extend to multiple cases, use process-tracing or 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis, or take another approach altogether. Regardless, 
continuing to understand how Orientalist narratives are constantly modernized and integrated 
into conceptions of nationhood, especially for those nation-states that are party to the 
European Union, is a vital path forward, especially as regional and global crises push 
refugees and migrants to seek access to “Fortress Europe.”
                                                     
25 This could be a particularly interesting avenue for study, especially because school textbooks are written and 
produced by private publishing houses, rather than by the state. As a result, publishing companies must ensure 
that the content of their textbooks coincides with the hegemonic national in order to remain competitive in the 
market. In this way, they resemble the texts used in the integration classes. 
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